HISTORY OF BROOKLYN. 397

Aug. 5th, 1812. “On Thursday last, the Artillery of Brooklyn, under the command of Captain Barbarin, took an excursion to the Narrows for the purpose of firing at a target. The guns were 3-pounders; the target was ten feet square; and placed at the distance of four hundred and fifty yards. Forty shots were fired, twenty of which pierced the target. The medal was awarded to Mr. John S. King.”

Although her citizen soldiery were thus prompt in preparing for the war, it was not until the year 1814 that Brooklyn became the theatre of warlike operations. In the summer of that year, it became evident that the large British fleet, which for months past had been quietly concentrating upon the Bermuda Station, was intended to make a formidable descent upon some point upon our coast. Whether the blow was about to fall on New Orleans, Norfolk, Washington, Baltimore, New York, or Newport—all of which places were much exposed—was a matter of conjecture, and in consequence much alarm was felt at all those points. The commercial value of New York, and the importance of its position with reference to ulterior measures of offence, gave to its citizens considerable ground for anxious fears, which were in no degree lessened by the remembrance of a similar attack and occupation by the British during the Revolutionary War. That these fears were not altogether groundless, was sufficiently proved by the secret report of the Committee of Defence, appointed by the Common Council of the City of New York, made and approved July 17th, 1814.

From this document it appeared that the city was open to an enemy’s approach, in two ways by water, and in two ways by land. He might come up by Sandy Hook, which route was protected, although not completely, by several strong and important works; or, approaching through the Sound, he might pass the unprotected Hell Gate with safety. He might land at Gravesend, as in the Revolutionary War, and arrive at Brooklyn in the rear of the fortifications; or landing on the main-land above Hell Gate, he might at once command the city, and cut off all communication with the upper counties. These two latter approaches—which in themselves presented the most feasible route of aitack—were quite unprotected, and therefore called for the prompt attention and most energetic