THREE MODELS OF GOVERNMENT
Notes for an article
by Frank Forman

Buchanan has been tirelessly propounding the
distinction between the "truth model" and the "exchange
model" of government. The first is held by someone who
believes that he is in possession of the truth about
what the government ought to do (government "for the
people"), while the second is held by those, like
Buchanan, who take the preferences and values of
citizens as the starting point and try to mold a
government as a result of a constitutional omni-lateral
exchange, corresponding to bilateral exchange in the
market (government "by the people"). I shall not try to
improve upon Buchanan's many elegant statements of this
dichotomy and, indeed, shall presume they are well-
known to the readers here.

However, Public Choice theory has produced two
different varieties of non-truth models to explain the
governments we see. The first is the constitutional
framework, ideally where there is unanimity at the
constitutional stage. The ideal constitution would then
provide legislative rules to balance the costs imposed
on those who object to a given piece of legislation and
the costs of reaching an agreement. Thus,
Thecalculusofconsent, a single word by now. The U.S.
Constitution of 1789 may very well have approximated
unanimity, and the Confederate Constitution of 1861
even more so, but by today the cost of forming rent-
seeking coalitions has so far fallen that the
constitution needs revision in the direction of
requiring substantial supra-majorities.

And this is familiar also. But there is another model
beloved of Public Choice scholars, and this is that the
government serves only to serve itself, usually to
maximize its revenues, and which cannot be construed to
be either government for the people or government by
the people. According to this model, public goods are
not the aim of government but rather its incidental
byproducts. The great John C. Calhoun beat the scholars
in saying that the basic division is between the
taxpayers and the taxeaters (not his term). Both models
indeed explain much of the world around us.

These two views have been termed those of consensus vs.
conflict by Joseph A. Tainter in his remarkable book,
The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge UP, 1988),
which all should read for its panoramic presentation of
theories of government alone. Buchanan takes a
consensus view, as in his Calculus of, while Marx takes
a conflict view. But where is the truth model, the one
pre-Public Choice political scientists believed in and
which is the most common view held generally and by
socialists and libertarians alike (Buchanan said they
were equally bankrupt in The Limits of Liberty)?

There is a trichotomy here, one that I finally found
elucidated in James Dale Davidson and Lord William
Rees-Mogg, The Sovereign Individual: How to Survive and
Thrive during the Collapse of the Welfare State (NY:
Simon & Schuster, 1997). It's an exciting and upbeat
book, until you realize that the authors conflate their
analysis of 500-year cycles of change driven by the
technology of governments with their prophecies of the
immediate future at most twenty years away. (Recall
that John Perry Barlow said that cybercash would doom
central governments within six months. We tend to
overestimate short-run change and underestimate long-
run change.) This conflation dampens the considerable
excitement generated by the book.

Davidson and Rees-Mogg speak of governments controlled
by a king, by its employees, or by its consumers.
Clearly, they say, government is nowadays controlled by
its employees. Under capitalism (that economic system
controlled by consumers, not as Marx would have it by
capitalists), a telephone call costs the same whether
done by a rich man or a poor man. But governments
operate to squeeze the maximum out of its so-called
customers and charge and get away with charging far
more for a stock market transaction by a rich man.

An excellent point, an exciting point, since the
information revolution is going to do away with the
capacity of governments run by their employees, though
500 years is a bit of a wait. But where is the
government by a proprietor? Only mentioned in passing,
I'm afraid, but it corresponds perfectly to Buchanan's
truth model, according to which the economist's job is
to find this truth and convey it to the king, a
hopefully benevolent despot.

The world we see is, as always, a mix of things, and
all three models describe political realities. Everyone
thinks that there is some truth about politics, for
everyone want to keep at least some things beyond the
reach of politics. Everyone thinks also that some
things are always within the reach of politics, surely
to provide domestic tranquillity. All governments, too,
serve their own bureaucrats, and all of them do manage
to rest on some modicum of consensus. It would be hard
to find an example of any government that perfectly
represents a single pure type.

If so, then a little caution is in order before we rush
in an proclaim a single model to be the way things
ought to be. Government by king, or the truth model, is
objectionable both ontologically (there is no truth out
there, or at least none that Buchanan can see) and
epistemologically (no committee of experts can find
it). Government ruled by its employees is
objectionable, not just to the exploited but to the
exploiters, who would ultimately gain more satisfaction
in life if they were to earn their incomes honestly.
Government ruled by its customers is objectionable, on
Mencken's famous characterization of democracy as "the
theory that the common people know what they wants, and
deserve to get it good and hard."

There are good things about governments under each
model also. A benevolent despot can do good, at least
if his activities are contained, and there are certain
truths about politics that stem from human nature.
Elites, to take up the conflict model, have been
beneficial, again within limits. And the public
provision of public goods, as seen by the public, is a
good thing to have.

Alas, while writing this, I am reminded of a much
earlier formulation, by Aristotle. He spoke of three
kinds of polities, control by the one, by the few, and
by the many. He spoke of good forms and degenerate
forms of each. I would say our current governments are
a mix of degenerate types. But consensus remains pretty
high.