2.1 The theological model for natural rights, held by
Thomas Aquinas and others, was that such rights were given by God, the
divine lawgiver. Unfortunately, this fails to hold outside of a particular
set of theological beliefs. It may be for this reason that it is not generally
invoked.
2.2 There is also a moral model, viz. the view that all
human beings ought to have certain rights recognized and protected
by positive law. This is a view held by numerous philosophers.
2.2.1 But this is not what natural rights theorists generally appeal
to, i.e. they don't claim that the right follows from the moral
imperative, but rather that the moral imperative is justified
by the
existence of the natural rights of human beings. It is because the
natural rights exist that the moral imperative
ought to be recognized.
2.3 So, given the failure of the above attempts, on what basis can natural
rights be defended?
2.4 In addition to the theological and moral models, there is a contractual
model which says that if you claim something from me that is
not protected by positive law (e.g. in a totalitarian dictatorship such
things as freedom of speech, assembly, self-determination, etc.), I can
ask what it is that justifies your claim to these things.
2.4.1 So, for example, if I entered explicitly or implicitly into a
contract or promise with you and you have fulfilled your part of
the agreement, then in such a case your claim is justified.
2.4.2 But how does this address the issue of a natural right,
i.e. one that holds just in virtue of my existence? How is there a contract
in this case, and with whom would I have such an agreement?
2.5 Here the argument moves to the notion of a natural contract
with a claim to natural rights justified roughly in the following way.
2.5.1 No one has a right against me unless there is a contract;
unless there is consent on my part and full performance of the claimant's
obligation under the contract.
2.5.2 No one can legitimately interfere with me unless the above conditions
are met, and that includes the State.
2.6 This notion of natural rights, which emerges in the seventeenth
century, helps explain why the social contract is necessary for
a proper defense or justification of state power.
2.7 It is against this backdrop that we should look at Hobbes' argument
for the State, a mechanistic argument designed to avoid any appeal to divine
right or to moral value, but rather to ground morality and virtue on "enlightened
self-interest".
© T. R. Quigley, 1999