One might object that subjectivists and internalists who are attracted to the Alignment View [of blameworthy norm-violation] have an easy response: namely, that subjectivist and internalist norms, because they feature triggering conditions that are usually (if not invariably) transparent, are better than objectivist and externalist norms at securing an alignment between the deontic facts and the hypological facts […]. That may well be. But such a view doesn’t uniquely recommend subjectivist and internalist norms, since the triggering conditions featured in some objectivist and externalist norms are also usually if not invariably transparent. (One usually is in a position to know, for example, whether one’s belief-forming mechanism is reliable.) Relevant here is also [Schwitzgebel’s] argument that we are often in a better position to know external world conditions than our own mental state conditions; if that’s so, it might very well turn out that ‘objectivist’ and ‘externalist’ norms better fit subjectivist and internalist aspirations. What we have lost, thus, is a principled argument for subjectivism and internalism.

Amia Srinivasan, “Normativity without Cartesian Privilege”