Suppose we imagine someone growing up who, because of various social prejudices overwhelmingly in his favor, is constantly epistemically puffed up by those around him. Let’s say that he is a member of a ruling elite, and that his education and entire upbringing are subtly geared to installing this message in his psychology. […] No doubt the credibility excesses he tends to receive from most interlocutors in his class-ridden society will be advantageous […]. But what if all this also causes him to develop such an epistemic arrogance that a range of epistemic virtues are put out of his reach, rendering him close-minded, dogmatic, blithely impervious to criticism, and so on? Is it not the case that such a person has in some degree quite literally been made a fool of?

Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing