{"id":175790,"date":"2020-11-27T20:07:00","date_gmt":"2020-11-28T01:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2020\/11\/27\/privatizing-profits-and-socializing-losses\/"},"modified":"2020-11-27T20:07:00","modified_gmt":"2020-11-28T01:07:00","slug":"privatizing-profits-and-socializing-losses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2020\/11\/27\/privatizing-profits-and-socializing-losses\/","title":{"rendered":"Privatizing Profits and Socializing Losses"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>  The World Bank has now   <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ksjomo.org\/post\/world-bank-urges-governments-to-guarantee-private-profits\">come out in favor of a program that would make taxpayers responsible for     guaranteed profits of private business all around the world<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>This is an obscenity:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>  <span style=\"color: #2b00fe;\">The World Bank has been leading other multilateral development banks (MDBs)     and international financial institutions to press developing country     governments to \u2018de-risk\u2019 infrastructure and other private, especially     foreign investments. <\/p>\n<p>They promote public-private partnerships     (PPPs) supposedly to mobilize more private finance to achieve the     Sustainable Development Goals. PPP advocacy has been stepped up after     developing countries\u2019 pleas for better international tax cooperation were     blocked at the third United Nations\u2019 Financing for Development conference     (FfD3) in Addis Ababa in mid-2015. <\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p><b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">De-risking?<\/span><\/b>    <\/p>\n<p>The World Bank\u2019s latest Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions     measures progress in terms of \u201csuccessfully procured PPP transactions\u201d. The     Bank explicitly recommends \u2018de-risking\u2019 PPPs, effectively involving     \u2018socializing\u2019 risks and privatizing profits. <\/p>\n<p>But the term     \u2018de-risking\u2019 is misleading as some risk is inherent in all project     investments. After all, projects may encounter problems due to planning     mistakes, poor implementation or unexpected developments. Hence, Bank advice     does not really seek to reduce, let alone eliminate risk, but simply to make     governments bear and absorb it. <\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p><b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">Off the books, out of sight<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p>Both World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) research     has found many governments using PPPs and other similar arrangements to keep     such projects \u2018off the books\u2019 of official central government accounts,     effectively reducing transparency and accountability, while compromising     governance. <\/p>\n<p>Such project financing typically involves     government-guaranteed \u2013 rather than direct government \u2013 liabilities. Not     booked as government development or capital expenditure, it is also not     counted as part of sovereign or government debt, e.g., for parliamentary     reporting and accountability. <\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p><b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">Shifting     responsibility<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p>PPP financing is typically booked as     government-guaranteed liabilities, rather than as sovereign debt per se.     Being \u2018off the books\u2019, governments face fewer constraints to taking on ever     more debt and risk. With such commitments, they also become much more     vulnerable to \u2018unforeseen\u2019 costs. <\/p>\n<p>Such contractual arrangements,     typically set by private partners in most PPPs, do little to improve     governance and accountability. To be sure, normal government budgetary     accounting and audit procedures for PPPs may not meaningfully improve     transparency and accountability. <\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p>    <b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">Moral hazard<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p>World Bank guidance is clear that even a private partner<b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\"><\/span><\/b>    who fails to deliver as contracted must be compensated for work done before     a government can terminate a contract. Whether private partners actually     deliver as promised does not seem to matter to the Bank which provides no     guidance for addressing their failures to meet contractual obligations.     <\/p>\n<p>The Bank thus contributes to \u2018moral hazard\u2019 in PPPs: the less     likely the private partner stands to lose from poor performance, the less     incentive it has to meet contractual obligations. Guaranteeing cost     recovery, revenue and profit erodes the motive to deliver as promised and to     consider project risks. <\/p>\n<p>Enthusiastic PPP promotion \u2013 by the     Bank, other MDBs and donors urging developing country governments to bear     more risk \u2013 is not only encouraging \u2018moral hazard\u2019, but also creating more     opportunities for the corruption and abuse they profess to lament.     <\/p>\n<p>Instead, private partners have greater incentives to try gouging     rents from government partners, e.g., by renegotiating existing contracts to     their advantage. Conversely, governments have to choose between bearing the     costs of failed projects, and paying even more to save problematic ones in     the hope of cutting losses. <\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p><b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">Ignoring evidence <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p>Many governments can     undertake large infrastructure projects themselves, or alternatively, make     much better procurement arrangements. IMF research has also found, \u201cIn many     countries, PPPs have not always performed better than public procurement\u201d.     <\/p>\n<p>Ironically, Bank research has shown that \u201cwell-run public firms     tend to match the performance of private firms in regulated sectors\u201d,     concluding, \u201cThere is no \u2018killer\u2019 rationale for public-private     partnerships\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Even the Bank\u2019s Research Observer has published a     summary of \u201csome of the most compelling examples of this kind of emerging     critique\u201d of infrastructure PPPs in telecoms, transport, water and     sanitation, waste management and electricity. <\/p>\n<p>Yet, the Bank     continues to promote PPPs as the preferred mode of infrastructure financing,     trying to shift more risk to governments, ostensibly to attract more private     investment. Meanwhile, Bank guidance typically fails to warn governments of     the risks involved and their implications.     <\/p>\n<p><b><span style=\"font-size: 100%; font-variant: small-caps;\">Prejudiced guidance<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<p>Bank and other PPP     advocates dismiss criticisms as \u2018ideological\u2019 despite growing empirical     evidence. Such damning findings have had little impact on their PPP     advocacy. Instead, the new fad is for more \u2018blended finance\u2019 to PPPs, using     official concessional finance to subsidise and attract more private     investment.<\/p>\n<p>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/p>\n<p>Unsurprisingly, despite Bank, donor and other efforts, PPPs have     only generated 15~20% of developing countries\u2019 infrastructure investments,     according to the Bank\u2019s Independent Evaluation Group, while remaining     negligible in the poorest countries.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>PPPs, and related institutions are little more than looting by private actors.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The World Bank has now come out in favor of a program that would make taxpayers responsible for guaranteed profits of private business all around the world. This is an obscenity: The World Bank has been leading other multilateral development banks (MDBs) and international financial institutions to press developing country governments to \u2018de-risk\u2019 infrastructure and &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[365,368,575,417,632],"class_list":["post-175790","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","tag-business","tag-corruption","tag-fraud","tag-international-commerce","tag-public-finance"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175790"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=175790"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175790\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=175790"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=175790"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=175790"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}