{"id":183317,"date":"2014-12-27T20:31:00","date_gmt":"2014-12-28T01:31:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2014\/12\/27\/so-not-surprised-4\/"},"modified":"2014-12-27T20:31:00","modified_gmt":"2014-12-28T01:31:00","slug":"so-not-surprised-4","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2014\/12\/27\/so-not-surprised-4\/","title":{"rendered":"So Not Surprised"},"content":{"rendered":"

It appears that the USAF is cooking the books on A-10 use in Afghanistan to justify retiring the Warthog<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Over the past five months, Air Force leaders have pointed to one key fact while advocating for their controversial decision to retire the A-10 Warthog, an aircraft specifically designed to provide support to ground troops. The service\u2019s top leaders say the vast majority of so-called \u201cclose air support\u201d missions conducted in Afghanistan since 2006 have been flown by a variety of aircraft that are not A-10s. Specifically, the leaders say that the 80 percent of these missions conducted by aircraft other than the Warthog shows that a variety of aircraft can do the critical mission of reinforcing ground forces with firepower from the air.<\/span>

<\/span>However, a number of observers challenge the Air Force\u2019s claim that 80 percent of close air support missions are really conducted by non-A-10 planes. These observers assert that the service has deliberately manipulated the data to support its case.<\/span>

<\/span>The plan to retire the A-10 has sparked a firestorm of criticism from members of Congress, A-10 pilots and airmen whose job is to embed with ground forces and call in air strikes.<\/span>

<\/span>In fact, Congress is well on the way to rejecting the Air Force\u2019s plans. The House of Representatives passed legislation Thursday, rejecting sending the A-10s to the boneyard<\/a>. The Senate is expected to do the same.<\/span>

<\/span>The Air Force says it can save $4.2 billion over the next five years by retiring the fleet of 350 A-10s. The savings would be plowed into other aircraft that can perform a variety of missions, including close air support.<\/span>

<\/span>And, in making the case to retire the A-10, the one number that comes up time and again at congressional hearings is this: 80 percent.<\/span>

<\/span>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span>

<\/span>The PBS NewsHour asked the Air Force about the basis for the 80 percent figure. The NewsHour shared the Air Force answers with A-10 supporters and those who advocate retiring the aircraft. The complete exchange can be viewed in the document linked here<\/a>.<\/span>

<\/span>\u201cThis is a classic case of using numbers as propaganda for some bureaucratic position.\u201d\u201cThis 80 percent number is a total fabrication,\u201d said Pierre Sprey, one of the key designers of the A-10 in the 1960s and 1970s. Sprey has recently been lobbying Congress to save the aircraft. \u201cThis is a classic case of using numbers as propaganda for some bureaucratic position.\u201d<\/span>

<\/span>Among the data the Air Force provided was a breakdown of the number close air support sorties flown between 2010 to 1014: 121,653. Also included was the number of sorties with at least one weapon released: 8,691.<\/span>

<\/span>Sprey notes that of the 121,653 close air support missions conducted, \u201c93 percent of them never drop a weapon.\u201d Sprey says the Air Force is \u201ccounting a whole lot of fluff.\u201d<\/span>

<\/span>\u201cThe Air Force is counting these missions or these activities in a way that biases strongly against the A-10,\u201d said Winslow Wheeler, a former congressional staffer with more than three decades of experience working for both Democrats and Republicans. Wheeler is now with the Project On Government Oversight, a non-profit watchdog organization.<\/span>

<\/span>The Air Force is \u201cnot counting sorties where actual munitions delivery actually occurs,\u201d he said. And they are \u201cnot distinguishing\u201d between bombing fixed points on the ground from 20,000 feet and supporting troops that are moving while under fire from an enemy in close proximity. Wheeler said it is in situations like this \u201cthat really count\u201d and where the A-10 outperforms all other aircraft.<\/span>

<\/span>\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span>

<\/span>\u201cMeasures of kinetic activity alone don\u2019t capture events where aircraft presence was sufficient to deter attackers \u2014 which can be the better outcome in COIN [counterinsurgency] operations,\u201d Sholtis explained in an email. \u201cActions like shows of force or armed overwatch of ground forces are legitimate and effective forms of CAS.\u201d Shows of force are when aircraft fly overhead, making their presence known and signaling to the enemy \u2014 sometimes by dropping flares \u2014 that they might get bombed.<\/span>

<\/span>But counting shows of force is stretching the definition of close air support, according to retired Chief Master Sergeant Russell Carpenter, a 30-year veteran and specialist in leading troops who call in air strikes. When you \u201clook up the definition of close air support, shows of force doesn\u2019t fit in there.\u201d Carpenter said what the Air Force has \u201cdone is said there are a variety of ways we achieve air-to-ground effects. But guess what, call that something else. But it is not close air support.\u201d<\/span>

<\/span>Another controversial aspect in the way the 80 percent number was generated is the time frame of when close air support missions are counted. According to Air Force data released to the NewsHour, the service counted missions flown between 2006 and October 2013.<\/span>

<\/span>The Air Force told the NewsHour \u201cunfortunately we do not have information prior to 2006 available in our AFCENT Combined Air Operations Center database.\u201d Other Air Force officers who asked that their names not be used in this article, because they were not authorized to speak publicly, also told the NewsHour that the Air Force has not maintained records from before 2006.<\/span>

<\/span>But critics are skeptical.<\/span>

<\/span>\u201cThe date 2006 was not picked by accident,\u201d said Sprey, the A-10 aircraft designer.<\/span>

<\/span>From March 2002 to December 2006, the only fixed-wing aircraft that could operate from the austere and dilapidated runways in Afghanistan were A-10s, according to the Air Force. Sprey believes counting close air support missions beginning in 2006 is suspect because that time period marks the point when different types of aircraft were beginning to operate out of the newly improved runways in Afghanistan.<\/span>

<\/span>\u201cBefore 2006, they couldn\u2019t even get fighters into Afghanistan, they couldn\u2019t land anywhere,\u201d Sprey said. \u201cThey were totally dependent on the A-10 before and they don\u2019t want to admit that, so they don\u2019t tell you about it before 2006.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The USAF has wanted to kill the A-10 and replace it with a “Wild Blue Yonder” alternative  since it began to enter service in the 1970s.<\/p>\n

Close air support has been a responsibility that the Air Force has consistently shirked since before its creation as an independent service.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

It appears that the USAF is cooking the books on A-10 use in Afghanistan to justify retiring the Warthog: Over the past five months, Air Force leaders have pointed to one key fact while advocating for their controversial decision to retire the A-10 Warthog, an aircraft specifically designed to provide support to ground troops. The …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1007,1038,970,1051,1006],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-183317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aviation","category-budget","category-corruption","category-hypocrisy","category-military"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183317"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=183317"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183317\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=183317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=183317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=183317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}