{"id":183374,"date":"2014-12-13T20:49:00","date_gmt":"2014-12-14T01:49:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2014\/12\/13\/not-enough-bullets-44\/"},"modified":"2014-12-13T20:49:00","modified_gmt":"2014-12-14T01:49:00","slug":"not-enough-bullets-44","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2014\/12\/13\/not-enough-bullets-44\/","title":{"rendered":"Not Enough Bullets"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>As former federal regulator Bill Black notes, <a href=\"http:\/\/neweconomicperspectives.org\/2014\/12\/second-circuit-makes-sophisticated-insider-trading-perfect-crime.html\">the second circuit court decision effectively legalizes insider trading<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color: blue;\">We know that insider trading is an activity in which cheaters  prosper. We know that Wall Street and the City of London are dominated  by a fraudulent culture and we know that firm culture is set by the  officers that control the firm. We know that the Department of Justice  (DOJ) has allowed that to occur by refusing to prosecute any of the  thousands of senior bank officers who became wealthy by leading the  three most destructive financial fraud epidemics (appraisals, \u201cliar\u2019s\u201d  loans, and fraudulent sales of these fraudulently originated mortgages  to the secondary market) in history. No one is surprised that Wall  Street\u2019s elites have also engaged in widespread efforts to rig the stock  markets so that they can shoot fish in the barrel through insider  trading. Unlike the three fraud epidemics, one DOJ office, the Southern  District of New York, has brought a series of criminal prosecutions  against these officers.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"color: blue;\"><br \/><\/span> <span style=\"color: blue;\">Wall Street\u2019s court of appeals (the Second Circuit) has just issued  an opinion not simply overturning guilty verdicts but making it  impossible to retry the elite Wall Street defendants that grew wealthy  through trading on insider information. Indeed, the opinion reads like a  roadmap (or a script) that every corrupt Wall Street elite can follow  to create a cynical system of cutouts (ala SAC) that will allow the most  senior elites to profit by trading on insider information as a matter  of routine with total impunity. The Second Circuit decision makes any  moderately sophisticated insider trading scheme that uses cutouts to  protect the elite traders a perfect crime. It is a perfect crime because  (1) it is guaranteed to make the elite traders who trades on the basis  of what he knows is secret, insider information wealthy absent  successful prosecutions and (2) using the Second Circuit\u2019s decision as a  fraud roadmap, an elite trader can arrange the scheme with total  impunity from the criminal laws. The Second Circuit ruling appears to  make the financial version of \u201cdon\u2019t ask; don\u2019t tell\u201d a complete defense  to insider trading prosecutions. The Second Circuit does not simply  make it harder to prosecute \u2013 they make it impossible to prosecute  sophisticated insider fraud schemes in which the elites use junior  cutouts to create (totally implausible) deniability.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The <i>New York Times <\/i><a href=\"http:\/\/dealbook.nytimes.com\/2014\/12\/10\/appeals-court-overturns-2-insider-trading-convictions\/?hp&amp;action=click&amp;pgtype=Homepage&amp;module=first-column-region&amp;region=top-news&amp;WT.nav=top-news\">article<\/a>  on the decision was entitled \u201cTwo Insider Trading Convictions Are  Overturned in Blow to Prosecutors.\u201d The title is partially correct. The  real blows, however, were to investors, the already crippled integrity  of Wall Street, and every honest trader on Wall Street who cannot  possibly compete with his rivals who cheat through the \u201csure thing\u201d of  insider trading now that the Second Circuit has written an opinion  explaining how to corrupt the entire system with impunity from the  criminal laws.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The Second Circuit decision admits that the prosecutors presented  evidence established a massive conspiracy designed to allow Wall Street  elites to profit by engaging in insider trading, a conspiracy that  greatly enriched the defendants that were convicted in the case under  appeal.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><span style=\"color: blue;\">\u201cAt trial, the Government presented evidence that a group  of financial analysts exchanged information they obtained from company  insiders, both directly and more often indirectly. Specifically, the  Government alleged that these analysts received information from  insiders at Dell and NVIDIA disclosing those companies\u2019 earnings numbers  before they were publicly released in Dell\u2019s May 2008 and August 2008  earnings announcements and NVIDIA\u2019s May 2008 earnings announcement.  These analysts then passed the inside information to their portfolio  managers, including Newman and Chiasson, who, in turn, executed trades  in Dell and NVIDIA stock, earning approximately $4 million and $68  million, respectively, in profits for their respective funds.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The Second Circuit was not distressed that senior Wall Street  officials received information that was clearly insider information that  they knew they should not have access to. The insider information they  were provided was the crown jewels \u2013 two major corporations\u2019 soon to be  announced \u201cnumbers\u201d \u2013 at least one of which was sure to be a major  surprise to the markets. A senior trader that knows \u201cthe number\u201d in  advance, particularly when he knows that the number will be a surprise,  can shoot fish in a small barrel with a large shotgun. The insider  information allows the senior trader to reduce the risk of loss to  trivial levels while increasing the probability of gain to near  certainty. The trader makes a fortune by cheating, not through any  unusual skill. The senior trader knows that no employee of any publicly  traded corporation is permitted to release such secret and proprietary  insider information to investors.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The Second Circuit was not distressed that the senior Wall Street  officials did not react to being provided what was clearly insider  information by demanding to know how their analysts got the information  and instructing them that their actions violated the firms\u2019 ethical  standards and would lead to their termination if it were ever repeated.  The firm\u2019s ethics manuals banned the senior traders from trading on the  basis of insider information. Instead, of serving as ethical leaders in  training the analysts not to engage in such behavior and instead of  following their firm\u2019s ban on trading on the basis of insider  information, the senior officers engaged in a cynical financial version  of \u201cdon\u2019t ask; don\u2019t tell.\u201d The analysts and the senior officials that  traded on the inside information understood the wisdom of the old line  \u201cask me no questions and I\u2019ll tell you know lies.\u201d The senior officers  proceeded to profit by exploiting this advantage over honest investors  while minimizing the risk of a successful prosecution not by being  ethical, but by consciously maintaining (not remotely) \u201cplausible  deniability.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">But worse will soon come. The Second Circuit\u2019s decision is a \u201chow to\u201d  manual on how elites Wall Streeters can become wealthy through insider  trading with impunity from the criminal laws. The Second Circuit opinion  shows that using a \u201ccutout\u201d is the key to achieve the \u201csure thing\u201d of  enormous wealth through insider trading without financial or legal risk.  The Second Circuit lays out the game plan. The little folks in the  organization develop the contacts with insiders in publicly traded  firms. The analysts function initially like any good intelligence agent  recruiting an asset. These assets have insider information of their  employers, the publicly traded corporations. The analyst develops a  rapport with the employee or exploits an existing tie. The analyst shows  the employee a very good time \u2013 a taste of how good his life can be if  he plays ball. But the analyst doesn\u2019t make any explicit promises or  deals. (In the case decided by the Second Circuit others cutouts earlier  in the insider trading chain made the corrupt payments to the  employees.) The Wall Street senior officers who grow wealthy by trading  the insider information will make sure that the analysts are well cared  for \u2013 discretely and at a later date.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The analyst then has to do one thing and avoid doing a second. Both  are simple. The analyst needs to signal to his superior that the  information is reliable. The government complaint against SAC show one  the innumerable means of sending that signal. The government\u2019s appellate  brief contains the text of an email in which an analyst explicitly  conveyed the reliable track record of the leakers of the inside  information to the senior traders so that they could be sure they had a  \u201csure thing\u201d by investing on the basis of the inside information.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The analyst needs not to <i>explicitly <\/i>tell the senior officer  conducting the trade that the insider information was the product of a  deal in which the employee who leaks the insider information was <i>explicitly <\/i>promised a <i>quid pro quo <\/i>to  the leaker. Again, the government complaint against SAC and the  government appellate brief in the case reversed by the Second Circuit  show in detail how simple it is to design systems of not making these  matters explicit. That is why the Second Circuit ruling imperils  prosecutions in every case in which the insider trading scheme was done  with even modest cleverness.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">\u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The Second Circuit\u2019s reasoning has the perverse effect that the more  corrupt individuals engaged in the insider trading scheme the more  likely the scheme is to be declared lawful as long as the traders use  their corrupt colleagues as cutouts. Note that the Second Circuit  reasoning does not simply make it harder to prosecute sophisticated  insider trading schemes \u2013 it holds that the actions of the elite traders  who know that they are achieving the \u201csure thing\u201d of immense insider  trading profits on the basis of deliberate leaks of that information are  not unlawful and cannot be prosecuted. The Second Circuit has created  the perfect crime and publicized how to shape the scheme to insure  wealth and impunity through creating widespread chains designed to  corrupt the markets, employees of the publicly traded corporations, and  the Wall Street firms.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"color: blue;\">The tone of the opinion is particularly galling. The Second Circuit  is not even mildly distressed by the result. It expresses disdain for  the idea that Wall Street elites should not be able to enrich themselves  with complete impunity from the laws through corrupt arrangements such  as those proven at the trial. The opinion consciously deliberately  creates a straw man argument designed to hide the fact that insider  trading schemes of this make it impossible for honest competitors to  prevail through skill and hard work.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I&#8217;m hoping that someone manages to take them down before the banksters destroy us all.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>As former federal regulator Bill Black notes, the second circuit court decision effectively legalizes insider trading: We know that insider trading is an activity in which cheaters prosper. We know that Wall Street and the City of London are dominated by a fraudulent culture and we know that firm culture is set by the officers &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[970,1052,1004,972],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-183374","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-corruption","category-crimes","category-finance","category-justice"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183374"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=183374"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183374\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=183374"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=183374"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=183374"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}