{"id":183986,"date":"2012-09-16T19:01:00","date_gmt":"2012-09-17T00:01:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2012\/09\/16\/least-surprising-data-point-of-the-day\/"},"modified":"2012-09-16T19:01:00","modified_gmt":"2012-09-17T00:01:00","slug":"least-surprising-data-point-of-the-day","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2012\/09\/16\/least-surprising-data-point-of-the-day\/","title":{"rendered":"Least Surprising Data Point: Of The Day"},"content":{"rendered":"

Using OCC data, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Columbia Business School, Ohio State University, and the University of Chicago crunched the numbers to find the number of unnecessary foreclosures, and 800,000 homes were foreclosed on that should not have been<\/a>:<\/p>\n

But while evidence of these problems was pervasive, it was always hard to quantify the damage. Just how many more people could have qualified under the administration’s mortgage modification program if the banks had done a better job? In other words, how many people have been pushed toward foreclosure unnecessarily? <\/span>

<\/span> A thorough study released last week provides one number, and it’s a big one: about 800,000 homeowners.<\/span>

<\/span> The study’s authors \u2014 from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the government’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Ohio State University, Columbia Business School, and the University of Chicago \u2014 arrived at this conclusion by analyzing a vast data set available to the OCC. They wanted to measure the impact of HAMP, the government’s main foreclosure prevention program. <\/span>

<\/span> What they found was that certain banks were far better at modifying loans than others. The reasons for the difference, they established, were pretty predictable: The banks that were better at helping homeowners avoid foreclosure had staff who were both more numerous and better trained.<\/span>

<\/span> Unfortunately for homeowners, most mortgages are handled by banks that haven’t been properly staffed and thus have modified far fewer loans. If these worse-performing banks had simply modified loans at the same pace as their better performing peers, then HAMP would have produced about 800,000 more modifications. Instead of about 1.2 million modifications by the end of this year, HAMP would have resulted in about 2 million.<\/span>

<\/span> That’s still well short of the 3-4 million modifications President Obama promised when he announced the program back in early 2009. But it’s a big difference, and a reasonable, basic benchmark against which to compare the program’s failings. <\/span>

<\/span> \u2026\u2026\u2026<\/span>

<\/span> The report does not identify these poor performing banks, but it’s not hard to ID them. A \u201cfew large servicers [have offered] modifications at half the rate of others,\u201d the authors say. The largest mortgage servicers are Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Citi.<\/span>

<\/span> Bank of America in particular (the largest of all the servicers when HAMP launched) has been far slower to modify loans than even the other large servicers, as other analyses we’ve cited have shown. <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

These are the banks that we bailed out, either directly, or by bailing out their counter parties, and they responded by f%$#ing home owners, and by extension, the the real estate market and the entire country.<\/p>\n

This is why not prosecuting the banksters was such a bad thing.  People who know that they have impunity, and know it, it does not produce ethical, or competent, behavior.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Using OCC data, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Columbia Business School, Ohio State University, and the University of Chicago crunched the numbers to find the number of unnecessary foreclosures, and 800,000 homes were foreclosed on that should not have been: But while evidence of these …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[970,1004,1088],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-183986","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-corruption","category-finance","category-real-estate"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183986"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=183986"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/183986\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=183986"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=183986"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=183986"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}