{"id":192720,"date":"2009-03-01T22:50:00","date_gmt":"2009-03-02T03:50:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2009\/03\/01\/not-just-aig-but-the-entire-financial-system\/"},"modified":"2009-03-01T22:50:00","modified_gmt":"2009-03-02T03:50:00","slug":"not-just-aig-but-the-entire-financial-system","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/2009\/03\/01\/not-just-aig-but-the-entire-financial-system\/","title":{"rendered":"Not Just AIG, But the Entire Financial System"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Seriously, this <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2009\/02\/28\/business\/28nocera.html?partner=rss&amp;emc=rss&amp;pagewanted=all\"><span style=\"font-style: italic;\">New York Times<\/span> article on AIG<\/a>, is a quick and layman accessible recounting of what went wrong there, and now that <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/reuters\/2009\/03\/01\/business\/business-us-aig.html?_r=1\">the Taxpayer is laying out another $30<\/a> to prop them up, with the <a href=\"http:\/\/online.wsj.com\/article\/SB123589399651003021.html\">approval of the ratings agencies who made this problem possible in the first place,<\/a> it bears reading.<\/p>\n<p>What we see is a metaphor for the entire rotten &#8220;Anglo-Saxon&#8221; system of unregulated hyper-capitalism.<\/p>\n<p>AIG does not exist any more, what&#8217;s there is a simulacrum of a going business, fueled by zombie juice amounting to over $150 billion of taxpayer dollars, with the promise of more federal support, but that&#8217;s not the important part.<\/p>\n<p>The important thing is are not just talking recklessness and incompetence here, we are talk real and deliberate crimes, and even now the authorities don&#8217;t have the slightest inclination to prosecute.<\/p>\n<p>What took AIG down was a division that wrote credit default swaps (CDS), <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">lots<\/span> of them, and then, when they came due, they were bankrupt.<\/p>\n<p>A CDS is a piece of paper that allowed them to insure all sorts of dodgy documents, but lacked the regulation, and the reserve capital requirements, of real insurance.<\/p>\n<p>They wrote them because people were willing to pay them to write them, and people were willing to pay them because it allowed them to &#8220;lease&#8221; AIG&#8217;s AAA rating (see the ratings agencies linked above) for their financial instruments.<\/p>\n<p>The result is that if AIG is allowed to die, instead of remaining in its undead state, <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">everything<\/span> blows up:<\/p>\n<blockquote style=\"color: rgb(0, 0, 153);\"><p>&#8230;. Yet the government feels it has no choice: because of A.I.G.\u2019s dubious business practices during the housing bubble it pretty much has the world\u2019s financial system by the throat.<\/p>\n<p>If we let A.I.G. fail, said Seamus P. McMahon, a banking expert at Booz &amp; Company, other institutions, including pension funds and American and European banks \u201cwill face their own capital and liquidity crisis, and we could have a domino effect.\u201d A bailout of A.I.G. is really a bailout of its trading partners \u2014 which essentially constitutes the entire Western banking system.<\/p>\n<p>I don\u2019t doubt this bit of conventional wisdom; after the calamity that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers, which was far less enmeshed in the global financial system than A.I.G., who would dare allow the world\u2019s biggest insurer to fail? Who would want to take that risk? But that doesn\u2019t mean we should feel resigned about what is happening at A.I.G. In fact, we should be furious. More than even Citi or Merrill, A.I.G. is ground zero for the practices that led the financial system to ruin.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThey were the worst of them all,\u201d said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and a derivatives expert. Mr. Vickrey of Gradient Analytics said, \u201cIt was extreme hubris, fueled by greed.\u201d Other firms used many of the same shady techniques as A.I.G., but none did them on such a broad scale and with such utter recklessness. And yet \u2014 and this is the part that should make your blood boil \u2014 the company is being kept alive precisely because it behaved so badly.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>They fail because if AIG fails, then their CDS contracts are worthless, and they have to account for their assets at <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">their actual value<\/span>, and overnight they become insolvent.<\/p>\n<p>So, AIG is Sheriff Bart from <span style=\"font-style: italic;\">Blazing Saddles<\/span>, holding the gun to his <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">own<\/span> head, saying, &#8220;Hold it! Next man makes a move, the n***** gets it!&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Of course, this isn&#8217;t criminality (though it should be), this is Republican economics, privatizing the profits while socializing the losses.<\/p>\n<p>The criminality is further down in the article:<\/p>\n<blockquote style=\"color: rgb(0, 0, 153);\"><p>&#8230;.A.I.G. didn\u2019t specialize in pooling subprime mortgages into securities. Instead, it sold credit-default swaps.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;.But it also saw the fees as risk-free money; <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">surely it would never have to actually pay up<\/span>. Like everyone else on Wall Street, A.I.G. operated on the belief that the underlying assets \u2014 housing \u2014 could only go up in price.<\/p>\n<p>That foolhardy belief, in turn, led A.I.G. to commit several other stupid mistakes. When a company insures against, say, floods or earthquakes, it has to<span style=\"font-weight: bold;\"> put money in reserve in case a flood happens<\/span>. That\u2019s why, as a rule, insurance companies are usually overcapitalized, with low debt ratios. But because credit-default swaps were not regulated, and were not even categorized as a traditional insurance product, A.I.G. didn\u2019t have to put anything aside for losses. <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">And it <\/span>didn<span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">\u2019t<\/span>. Its leverage was more akin to an investment bank than an insurance company. So when housing prices started falling, and losses started piling up, it had no way to pay them off. Not understanding the real risk, the company grievously mispriced it.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>(<span style=\"font-style: italic;\">emphasis mine<\/span>)<\/p>\n<p>So they sold insurance, and <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">never had any intention on paying off<\/span>, because if they had, and remember that AIG is (was) at its core an <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">insurance company<\/span>, even absent regulatory demands, they would have put aside <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">something<\/span> in the way of capital reserves.<\/p>\n<p>This is the same as selling phony stocks.  AIG, or more at least its everyone in a position of responsibility in its financial practices unit in London, where the swaps were written and sold, and everyone involved in supervising these activities, <span style=\"font-weight: bold;\">up to and including the CEO<\/span>, and probably the board of directors, knowingly sold a fraudulent product.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Seriously, this New York Times article on AIG, is a quick and layman accessible recounting of what went wrong there, and now that the Taxpayer is laying out another $30 to prop them up, with the approval of the ratings agencies who made this problem possible in the first place, it bears reading. What we &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[970,1004,1045,972],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-192720","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-corruption","category-finance","category-insurance","category-justice"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/192720"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=192720"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/192720\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=192720"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=192720"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.panix.com\/~msaroff\/40years\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=192720"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}