The Mayor is the city's chief executive, thus is responsible for setting overall priorities. John Dyson, Deputy Mayor for Finance and Economic Development, is supposed to be Mayor Giuliani's liaison for budgetary matters. In reality, Peter Powers, who is both the First Deputy Mayor and the Mayor's lifelong friend, has far more influence. Dyson is an outspoken, insensitive and mean spirited to the point where many despise him. Powers, on the other hand, is a reserved and behind the scenes kind of person who has an extraordinary and conservative influence on the Mayor.
Mayor Giuliani is, deservedly, getting a bad rap for his deep and nasty budget cuts, though he is not completely to blame. Mayor Dinkins would have been required to make similarly drastic cuts in order to compensate for factors such as unfunded mandates, the economy and tax breaks though he may have made them in different policy areas. A major difficulty with Mayor Giuliani is his inability to reach agreements with the City Council. His October Plan for the budget was withdrawn a day prior to it going before the Council in order to avoid rejection. The Council wanted to devise another plan, but the Mayor was uncooperative. This led to a stalemate that even the courts could not resolve. As a result, the Mayor acted unilaterally, impounding funds, a rarely utilized tactic.
While the Mayor is in charge of the city, and thus responsible for budget creation and implementation, the Mayor ends up in the back seat as the Office of Management and Budget chauffeurs them through fiscal matters.
Office of Management and Budget
OMB is part of the Mayor's executive office and its director is appointed by the Mayor. The agency exists to survey each agency and determine their budgetary requirements. The Director can require departments and employees to produce needed documentation. While the Mayor sets the overall tenor of the administration, they generally have to defer to OMB's expert advice. OMB approval is needed for a project to progress once budgeted. Thus, OMB is the most significant player in budgeting, and hence, policy.
Department of Finance
The Department of Finance, who's Commissioner is appointed by the Mayor, has little influence on spending policy because they are responsible for the collection and administration of the City's cash. Their main influence on budgeting is determining how much revenue the City has, or will have, on hand to spend.
The Comptroller is responsible for overseeing the city's financial matters, with the goal of keeping things as honest and inexpensive as possible. To carry out this objective, they are given the power to compel testimony under oath and can obtain confidential information. The Comptroller has grounds to critique just about anything the city does because it will have an impact on the city's fiscal situation. Another means to ensure financial integrity and freedom from corruption is done using their power to approve all contracts, thus keeping the contracts both honest and ensuring the City doesn't take on too many liabilities at once. When the Comptroller gives final approval for a contract and the parties sign it, the contract is considered "registered."
Financial Information Services Agency
FISA manages the city's financial databases. The Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) database covers expense and capital budgeting. Capital planning is stored in the Capital Project Information System (CAPIS). FISA is run by three directors appointed by the Mayor. One of the appointees is selected by the Mayor, the second is recommended by the Comptroller and the third is recommended by the other two. These unpaid directors suggest to the Mayor who to appoint as the agency's Executive Director.
The Board of Estimate used to be in charge of approving the budget. The Borough Presidents, which sat on the Board, thereby had a hand in budget approval and thus a chance to include their pet projects. The board had to be abolished because the Supreme Court of the United States found it to be unconstitutional. The Charter Revision Commission included a concession in their proposal which they hoped would gain the Borough Presidents' support for the new charter. This compromise gave the Borough Presidents control over 5% of the budget by creating what are now known as Borough Allocations. These funds are often used to help community organizations.
Charter revisions that came into effect during 1990 gave the Council power of budget approval. The elected body is growing in strength and conviction since then, challenging the Mayor at times, but such altercations generally result in minor modifications to the Mayor's intent, not enacting the council's own vision. The weight of the Council's counterbalance is increasing with the advent of the Giuliani administration, but not enough.
In a stronger posture against then Mayor Elect Giuliani, the Council passed a privatization review law, giving it the power to examine city functions the Mayor proposes to privatize. Despite these moves, Giuliani's budget priorities are barely being challenged because Speaker Vallone generally thinks they're good ideas. Council Members, like the Borough Presidents, are presented an opportunity to include their own pet projects in the budget in order to keep the members from holding up the works.
The City's 49 Community Boards have an advisory role in budget making. Board members are appointed by the President of that borough, at least half recommended by local Council Members.
Each Borough Board is comprised of the Borough President, Chair of each Community Board and the Council Members serving districts in that borough. The Borough President is in charge of these entities. They have an advisory role similar to those of the Community Boards.
City Planning Commission
Part of the CPC's responsibilities include assisting OMB create the Ten-Year Capital Strategy. Their role in the process ends up being a minor one. This commission is comprised of thirteen members, seven of which are appointed by the Mayor, one by each Borough President and one by the Public Advocate.
Independent Budget Office
The Independent Budget Office was formed by the Charter revisions passed in 1989, but has yet to be established. The Mayor and the Council, who have their own budget offices, are reluctant to fund it because they are afraid to face a countervailing force. The IBO is to analyze proposed budgets and the fiscal implications of legislation as well as produce any reports on fiscal matters it deems important. Analyses can be requested by elected officials, beside the Mayor, and Community Boards. The office's Director is recommended by an Advisory Board and appointed by a special committee comprising the Comptroller, Public Advocate, a Borough President and a Council Member. The Advisory Board is a ten member panel appointed jointly by the Public Advocate and Comptroller containing representatives of unions, budget offices, community groups and the like.
Financial Control Board
The Financial Control Board examines city and city authority operations, seeking methods to increase efficiency. In difficult financial situations, they must approve the budgets. Members of the FCB are the Governor, the Mayor the city and state Comptrollers plus three citizens appointed by the Governor.
Municipal Assistance Corporation
The Municipal Assistance Corporation is a state entity designed to bring the city out of the 1970's fiscal crisis. MAC has the ability to issue bonds backed by a dedicated portion of the city's sales tax. The proceeds from such bonds are used by the city. MAC reduced their expenditures by refinancing its bonds when the interest rates dropped. In the meantime, tax revenues kept arriving, so a surplus was generated. MAC uses these funds as bait, getting the city to adopt various cost saving measures or invest in particular areas. Over the years, MAC has pushed for funding the Transit Authority's capital program. The board of this organization is comprised of nine members, appointed by Governor, four of which are upon the recommendation of the Mayor.
The entity in charge of most of the City's roads and bridges is the New York City Department of Transportation. They deal with the day to day planning, construction and operations of these facilities, including the Staten Island Ferry. NYC DOT also provides equipment and partial funding for some private bus operations.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority is responsible for mass transit planning and operations in this area of New York State. The Long Island Railroad also handles freight. MTA Bridges and Tunnels runs the toll bridges and tunnels in the City. The MTA is an independent authority, so can separate their bonding from the State and City. This separation allows the State, City and MTA to incur higher debt financing levels and/or obtain better bond ratings. The steady positive cash flow from their toll facilities provides them a high debt ceiling and a decent credit rating. Board members are appointed by the Governor and the Mayor.
The MTA's facilities are in the midst of a massive rebuilding program. Unfortunately, the State and City are withholding significant funds for this work. Cuts in operating assistance from the City and State present the need to lower service and maintenance costs. While the MTA's federal funding levels are determined in large part by the State, the US government pays the MTA directly, eliminating the ability of the State to play games by delaying payment.
NYS Department of Transportation has three regions in the New York City area: 8 contains the counties north of the City, 10 is Long Island and 11 is the City. NYS DOT is very highway centric, ignoring or hampering alternative options such as transit, bicycling and pricing. The State has considerable power because they serve as the conduit of federal funds to the City. These purse strings allow them to meddle in project design and ignore local objectives. They also apportion funds in a way that negates regional planning.
The New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) is New York's Metropolitan Planning Organization. MPO's are mandated by the federal government, but they are state level agencies run by a board composed of county, city and agency executives. Each member has veto power, which results in plenty of log rolling. NYMTC is divided into three subregions, each with their own Transportation Coordinating Committee: Mid-Hudson South, NYC and Nassau-Suffolk. These subregions are congruous with the state regions, except for Mid-Hudson South, which includes only the three southern counties of Region 8.
The MPO's are supposed to play a major role in the funding process, determining which projects to include in the Transportation Improvement Program, a list of projects eligible for federal money. As it turns out, NYMTC's power is usurped by the methods NYS DOT and Region 11 use to distribute funds.
The State divides transportation dollars up amongst the regions and then each region decides which projects to implement, bypassing the MPO process. As a hypothetical example, say the state has $3 b. for projects in the NYMTC area. The state decides that Mid-Hudson gets $1 b., NYC gets $1b. and Nassau-Suffolk gets $1b. Then Region 11 splits their funds between itself, the City DOT, and the MTA using a percentage agreed upon by three agencies.
Everyone gets their own pot and that's it. NYMTC does nothing to prioritize projects in the region. The Mid-Hudson and Nassau-Suffolk TCC's refuse to discuss funding allocations with the NYC TCC because they fear loosing big sums to the city.
The nation's government sets programmatic areas broadly and provide major funding. Much of that revenue goes to State highways, East River bridges and the MTA.
New York City has three separate, though interrelated budgets: capital,
expense and revenue. The Capital Budget deals with physical improvements
which can be paid through bond issues. Standard equipment and annual costs
are covered by the Expense Budget. Income is planned in the Revenue
The City has separate accounts to keep its money in. Each account, called a "fund," has a distinct function and its own balanced accounting. The General Fund is used for daily expenditures and revenues, including transfers to the Debt Service Funds. Expenditures for capital projects come from the Capital Projects Fund. The CPF gets is money from City bond issues plus state and national grants. Some work on capital assets, such as repaving and engineering, is done by city employees. In order to pay these workers, money is transferred from the CPF to the General Fund using Inter-Fund Agreements. The Debt Service Funds are used to pay off the City's long term obligations. The City also operates several trust funds for pensions.
Items and projects can be included in the Capital Budget if they are physical improvements or equipment that will last at least five years and cost over $15,000. Scheduled appropriations for a project are required to be adequate for the item's completion without further increases. The Mayor can increase a project's appropriation by 15% if it is necessary to advance the item and other funds are available. The Council must be notified of such increases. Obligations or commitments can only be made during the fiscal year that it is appropriated for, though the Council generally reappropriates funds for all projects that have yet to advance.
Once a project is put into the Capital Budget, the department must produce a scope for it in consultation with the affected Community Board(s). A Scope of Services identifies the project's purpose, programs at facility, space/bulk, needed consultants, along with an estimated time frame, total cost, construction cost per year, annual operating cost. It also needs to explain any variances from the project's descriptions in the Budgets and Commitment Plans and reasons for delays. This documentation is to be submitted to the Mayor, Council committee, Borough Presidents and Community Boards. The Mayor is supposed to take action on the scope within 60 days, though this deadline is regularly missed.
Preliminary and final designs can be reviewed by Borough Presidents, Council committees or Community Boards. The Mayor is to ensure the project as designed conforms with its scope.
To increase accountability, the Capital Budget is categorized into departments and then smaller units defined by purpose. The DOT is Agency 841 and its project types from 1979 to the present are as follows. Franchise Transportation (FT) is the category for purchasing buses operated by private bus companies. FT was split out of Equipment in 1991. Equipment (TD) now deals with cars, trucks, paving equipment and computer systems, though not work stations added later. Splitting out FT projects from the TD category shows the City realized buses serve an important and distinct function and are not just another piece of equipment. Highways (HW) exists to pay for resurfacing and reconstructing streets. Bridges are broken into two project types, Waterway Bridges (BR) and Highway Bridges (HB). HB was created in 1982, before which such projects were a part of HW. The Ferries and Aviation project type (FA) covers the Staten Island Ferry. Traffic (TF) generally covers parking lots, traffic signals and street lights. A small portion of Traffic is for what used to be categorized as Electric Control (GE), a project type that came to the Department of Transportation from the Department of General Services. GE projects include using DOT's streetlight poles to hold lights the illuminate parks and other public places.
City projects for the MTA are listed under the Transit (T) and Staten Island Transit (ST) project types. The TA's department number is 998.
Fiscal planning for capital projects takes several forms. The Budget adopted by the Council contains appropriations. An appropriation is a legal procedure by which the Council allows city funds to be spent on item. Just because an item has an appropriation does not mean money is actually going to be spent on it. Hence, the Adopted Budget can be construed as a wish list of projects that the Council is willing to pay for.
The City's capital program is so large that there is no way all of the
projects in the budget can be worked on or paid for at one time. Capital
tasks are generally contracted out to consulting engineers and construction
firms. These contracts require the contractor to do the work and commit the
City to pay for it at specified benchmarks. Registering the contract with the
Comptroller is therefore termed a commitment. Commitments is also a
colloquialism for the dollar value of registered contracts. These obligations
are estimated and scheduled in the Capital Commitment Plans, which come out
three times per year.
The following analysis of budget trends looks at planned and actual capital
commitments, excluding IFA, from 1986 through 1994. A fiscal year's planned
amount comes from the particular year's estimate in the September Capital
Commitment Plan issued during the fiscal year being discussed. Actuals come
from the Monthly Transaction Analysis, June, Year End reports of that
Adherence to Commitment Plans
Making actual capital spending adhere to planned levels is hard to do. Projects can be delayed by many factors, including hitches in the review process or unexpected discoveries about the site during engineering and/or construction. These delays result in not meeting the year's goal. Commitments for some projects or departments may need to be cut in order to allow other to proceed. Additionally, OMB or the Comptroller can call for all plans to be cut due to the latest economic forecasts being poor. Despite this mayhem, the better the management is, the more accurate estimates become and the closer one keeps to targets, hence the following reviews.
FY HB BR TD FA FT HW TF DOT MTA TSPT CW 1986 (61%) 32% (16%) (96%) (13%) (55%) (12%) (13%) (12%) (19%) 1987 (42%) 93% (26%) (80%) (22%) (31%) (22%) (43%) (31%) (31%) 1988 5% (4%) 243% (97%) (25%) (36%) (14%) (71%) (46%) (26%) 1989 (66%) 74% (60%) (72%) (5%) (33%) 3% (24%) (11%) (20%) 1990 (11%) 55% (59%) 4% (19%) (35%) (13%) (41%) (26%) (31%) 1991 (36%) (11%) (85%) (17%) (43%) (56%) (60%) (39%) (14%) (29%) (43%) 1992 (58%) (20%) (57%) (17%) (99%) (46%) (61%) (50%) (1%) (35%) (31%) 1993 (23%) 160% (45%) (4%) (9%) (59%) (84%) (29%) (6%) (23%) (20%) 1994 (33%) 47% (43%) (13%) (73%) (20%) (40%) (15%) (9%) (14%) (40%) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mean (36%) 47% (16%) (44%) (56%) (30%) (48%) (21%) (25%) (25%) (29%) Median(36%) 47% (45%) (17%) (58%) (22%) (40%) (15%) (14%) (26%) (31%) Note: FT was not created until 1991
Another project type given importance is Highways, which stuck close to the DOT variance. This trend is disrupted for three years from 1991 through 1993, when they fall far short of their goals. The disturbance arose when the entire Highway program was scrutinized for unnecessary projects by incoming Commissioner Lucius Riccio.
The worst project type at meeting commitments was Ferries and Aviation between 1986 and 1991. Its record dramatically improved when a new manager was hired, now they are better than the department as a whole. The honor of being worst is now held by Franchise Transportation.
The DOT did well at meeting their Commitment Plans from 1986 through 1990. In that same time frame, City commitments for MTA projects fell far short of plans. This shifted in 1991, when MTA related commitments were well managed and the DOT's were not. Throughout the entire time frame transportation commitments stayed close to, though somewhat better than, the city as a whole.
There seems to have been a tradeoff between prioritizing DOT and MTA commitments, though this may only be circumstantial. This change may have been caused by one of two factors related to the City contributions reducing in size. One factor could be stricter adherence is needed to complete promised projects. The second factor could be that the smaller funding was going into a still massive pool of waiting MTA projects, so if the intended project was delayed another could take its place and use the funds instead. These possibilities are just conjecture and have yet to be confirmed.
Project Types' Portion of DOT's Actual Commitments
Waterway Bridges is averaging about 28% of the DOT's program, though it jumps around, with a high of 45% and low of 10%. These fluctuations are likely due to the uncertainties of capital programs being magnified by the large cost for most BR contracts. Highway Bridges has been increasing its share to 25% of commitments and the bridge program as a whole has been doing the same, now checking in at 60%. The growth in Highway Bridge commitments has come at the expense of Highways, which shrank from a high of 60% down to 30%. Adding the total bridge and highway program together produces a steady average of 85%. All the other project types in the DOT are quite small and no significant patterns exist.
FY HB BR TD FA FT HW TF HB+BR HB+BR+HW 1986 4% 34% 6% 0.1% 53% 3% 38% 91% 1987 9% 11% 6% 1.5% 64% 6% 19% 84% 1988 11% 20% 14% 0.2% 47% 5% 31% 78% 1989 4% 43% 2% 0.2% 45% 7% 47% 92% 1990 25% 18% 4% 6.3% 42% 5% 43% 85% 1991 22% 43% 1% 1.3% 1.7% 28% 4% 64% 92% 1992 20% 35% 2% 2.9% 0.3% 37% 3% 55% 92% 1993 30% 18% 2% 3.1% 22.2% 23% 1% 49% 71% 1994 25% 34% 2% 1.4% 1.4% 32% 4% 59% 91% Note: FT was not created until 1991
FY HB BR TD FA FT HW TF DOT MTA TSPT CW 1986 44% 10% 87% (454%) 86% 70% 14% 56% 57% 83% 1987 11% 43% 83% 97% 75% 76% 29% 64% 66% 87% 1988 61% 7% 13% 72% 81% 55% 26% 59% 53% 86% 1989 58% 13% 84% 100% 76% 62% 17% 46% 48% 82% 1990 26% 20% 68% 85% 77% 77% 23% 50% 54% 90% 1991 31% 13% 74% 101% 89% 85% 59% 19% 39% 42% 91% 1992 45% 16% 100% 100% 100% 88% 82% 26% 51% 54% 93% 1993 66% 27% 100% 100% 8% 85% 83% 51% 62% 52% 90% 1994 53% 31% 100% 100% 52% 73% 69% 40% 52% 54% 86% Note: FT was not created until 1991.
The City supported MTA projects are 100% city funded. The DOT's share of city funds wavers around and is now a bit over 50%. The entire City program receives about 80% of its funds from the City.
The City wants to pitch in $991 million for the MTA's Third Capital Program, 15% of the Transit Authority's commitments, less than half of the 34% they gave for the Second Program. In addition, this is $697 million (41%) short of the MTA's request.
This budget proposal puts transit spending at an all time low. The MTA will only account for 4% of the City's capital commitments, though historically it received twice that. DOT commitments will remain around 15%. Underinvesting in transit is likely to have grave consequences. Railroad investments generate returns twice as large as highway investments and accrue positive results three times faster. Maintenance will be deferred, which is what brought the transit system to its knees during the 1970's.
It is true that some of the DOT funds support transit related objectives. Ferries and Aviation along with Franchise Transportation account for about 5% of the DOT program. The East River bridges, which carry subway service, comprise 25% of the DOT's bridge commitments (Ten-Year Capital Strategy, May 1994). The subways are allocated 17% of the space on those bridges (6 lanes out of 30), thus they are using an estimated 3% of DOT's resources. Adding together the 5% for buses and 3% for bridges, transit gains $236 m., still leaving it in the dust at 28% of transportation spending.
The numbers shown in these reports only include changes to the previous version of the Financial Plan, so does not contain a detailed listing of every Unit of Appropriation. These changes are called PEG's, from Program to Eliminate the Gap. The Mayor's proposals become Financial Plans when adopted by the Council. These plans, hence, are the Modified Budget.
Generally, the agency is given a target of 80% of what is planned in the last plan, though the targets are modified if something very unusual happens. Data about Managing Agency Contracts, which are contracts managed by the agency being analyzed but are paid for by another agency, are also included. The report also shows programmatic indicators, such as lane miles paved or summonses issued, to examine the agency's efficacy and explain what they are doing.
These hearings have lots of bark but little bite. Commissioners can be relentlessly grilled by Council Members, and some interesting things learned, but the Council doesn't seem to modify the budget much with what they find out. It's more a forum for the Council Members to get their pet peeves across when the commissioners are most vulnerable.
The Budget Message is a separate presentation required by the Charter in which the Mayor has to perform several tasks:
The Council must take action on each of the Borough Presidents' recommendations and the Mayoral advice thereto.
The Budget is effective from the moment of adoption. The Mayor can veto Council modifications within five days. A veto can be overridden within ten days by a 2/3 majority of the Council, otherwise the Mayor's changes shall stand and that considered the Adopted Budget.
If not adopted by 5 June, the Expense Budget and tax rates in the current adopted budget as modified are extended into the next fiscal year until the new budget is adopted. Under the same circumstances, the capital appropriations from the current fiscal year are considered to be effective in the next year.
Any differences between the Adopted Capital Budget and the Ten-Year Capital Strategy needs to be explained by the Mayor and included as an appendix to the Strategy.
During the year, an agency can juggle costs within U/A's. In addition, OMB can move funds between U/A's if the change is less than 5%.
The Council can amend the Adopted Capital Budget after receiving a written request from either the Mayor or a Borough President. Such changes can only increase appropriations upward if additional funds become available within that project type. Proposed increases by a Borough Presidents must be offset by a reduction of projects in their Borough Allocations. Changes proposed by the Mayor that affect projects of the Borough Presidents need the approval of that President.
Publications not available in the MRL, though on hand at various agencies, should be made readily available to the public. My first two attempts at gathering information from the Transaction Analyses were greeted openly by OMB staff, who quickly provided access to the documents. By the time of the third attempt, that staff person's manager learned of my inquiries and required me to file a Freedom of Information request. The manager's hostility needlessly delayed my research by two weeks.
Information needs to be better preserved. There is little point in collecting information if it is not going to be kept in tact. OMB is missing several of the IFA Transaction Analyses. FISA has purged some of the OTPS object codes from the IFMS data tapes.
A release date should be imprinted on all documents, making potential relationships between publications clear.
While the Metropolitan Transportation Authority has data on actual commitments by agency for each capital program, they don't have a historical record of actual annual commitments readily available. The information I needed had to be printed out from their database.
Narrate Each Document
Each budget document needs a detailed narrative explaining the document's purpose and how to read it. In addition, a listing of all budget documents the City publishes, containing a summary explanation of each and the relationships between them, should be compiled and included in the front of every budget document.
While Financial Plans detail the changes that are going to be made in each department, it would be helpful to include the variance those changes will cause to the Adopted Budget by department and Unit of Appropriation.
Inter-Fund Agreements are not reported in the same fashion in all budget documents. Standardization should occur in order to make all publications comparable.
Report Contain IFA? Clearly Marked? Commitment Plans No Yes Ten-Year Plans No No Budget Yes No Monthly Transaction Analyses Report 1 Yes Yes Report 2 No Yes Report 3 Yes Yes Comptroller's Report Yes NoCreate the Independent Budget Office
It would be interesting if each Council Member took their role of budget modification and approval more seriously, since they are the officials most accountable to the public. For this to occur, the Council leadership will need to loosen its stranglehold. The idea of giving Council Members a bit of discretionary funding for their district is a good one, because they are supposed to be in close contact with their constitutents' need. The only problem, from my understanding, is the dollar value available for all Member Projects is not distributed evenly amongst all members, allowing the leadership to manipulate the Members.
Budget hearings held by the Council are poorly scheduled. Each agency is questioned at length, far beyond the time allotted. Each time slot needs to be expanded and those limits adhered to. As it stands now, each agency has about half an hour to testify and be questioned. This rudimentary treatment can by no means be considered oversight.
Transportation providers need to be prioritizing all of the region's capital projects in one ranking system, providing the greatest return for everyone, not just their fiefdom.
The process of creating Capital Commitment Plans very insular. Public input should be sought and taken seriously.
Project scopes can be un/intentionally misleading. Each scope needs to be reviewed by knowledgeable and impartial observers. This process will be cumbersome because there are so many projects involved, but it is necessary. Perhaps the IBO can take on this role when it is created.
Diagram of Fiscal Years and how they relate to each other: Agency FY Name 1994.1995 MTA 1994 JFMAMJJASOND. State 1994-95 AMJJASOND.JFM City 1995 JASOND.JFMAMJ Federal 1995 OND.JFMAMJJAS(back to text)
1982-1993 MTA Capital Program Summary Report of Commitments by Agency by Year. Computer printout. MTA, 6 May 1993.
1992-1996 Capital Program Proposal. MTA, October 1992.
Actual Inter-Fund Agreements for DOT from FY'79 to FY'83. IFMS printout. FISA, 20 October 1994.
Adopted Budget. NYC OMB, annual.
Anagnost, Mr. NYC OMB. Phone conversation. 3 May 1994.
Annual Report. Prior to 1992 titled: Report to the Governor. MTA, annual.
Capital Commitment Plan. NYC OMB, three/year.
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Comptroller. NYC Comptroller, annual.
DOT Expenditures for Available Budget Codes by Fiscal Year. IFMS Printout. FISA, 7 October 1994.
Executive Budget. NYC OMB, annual.
Fahner, John. NYC DOT. Interviews. Various dates.
Fuchs, Bob.. NYC OMB. Phone conversations. Various dates.
The Green Book: The Official Directory of The City of New York. NYC Dept of General Services, intermittent.
Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New York, 1988- 89. NY Dept of State.
May 1992 Approved Capital Plan Amendment. MTA, c. 1992.
The Mayor's Management Report. Mayor's Office of the City of New York, twice annually.
Miller, Robert. NYC DOT. Interviews. Various dates.
Monthly Transaction Analysis, June, Year End Report. NYC OMB, annual.
"Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York." Public Authorities Law, Article 10, Title III. McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated. West Publishing Co.
Nessel, Rick. NYC DOT. Interview. 5 April 1994.
The New York City Charter. City Books.
New York City Charter and Administrative Code. New York Legal Publishing Corp.
"New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York." Chapters 868...870. McKinney's 1975 Session Laws of New York. West Publishing.
The Official Compilation of the Rules of the City of New York. Lenz & Reicker, Inc.
Operating Budget. New York City Transit Authority, annual
Operating Budget. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, annual
Operating Budget. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, annual
Preliminary Budget and Financial Plan. Mayor and OMB, annual.
Preliminary Capital Budget. NYC OMB, annual.
Results of Operations. NYCTA, annual
Richwerger, Kurt. City Council. Interviews. Various dates.
Scafa, David. NYC Comptroller. Phone conversations. 25 February 1994.
Spitzer, Michael. NYC Comptroller. Interview. 16 June 1995.
Statements of Net Revenue and Applied or Retained Revenues. TBTA, annual.
Statements of Operations and Operating Deficit. SIRTOA, annual
Tymus, Paul. NYC OMB. Interviews. Various dates.
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