Category: Defense Procurement

USAF’s 2018 Bomber Looks Dead

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Or at least significantly delayed. (paid subscription required)

The concept out there was for a 20,000 lb payload stealthy bomber, which is really only suited to the nuclear strike, you probably want twice that to match the payloads of the B-52, B-1, and B-2, and it really does not have much of a mission beyond the nuclear strike role.

Additionally, the current arms control agreements are likely to be rather unfriendly to nuclear bombers, which are typically counted on maximum theoretical loadout, as opposed to actual weapons loads.

USAF Sees Writing on the Wall

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The US Air Force Chief of staff, General Norton Schwartz, is now saying that maybe, just maybe, the service should look at procuring a “light strike” capability.

The current aircraft operate too far from the front, and do not have the endurance to stay on station a meaningful length of time.

He was talking about something like the an armed turboprop trainer, though the basic needs are very similar to the A-10, and there are a lot of those in the boneyard.

I would also argue that a turbofan based new airframe, designed to roughly the same specs as the A-10 would be superior, because you could incorporate narrow band stealth to address the issue of the radar guided AAA.

My guess is that a replacement for the A-10 would be, considering advances in armor, propulsion, and cannon, would be at less than ¾ of the weight.

The problem would be how to deal with mission/feature creep.


Video courtesy of the DEW Line.

Swiss Push Back Fighter Deal Competition

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The official word is that they are looking for more industrial involvement by Swiss industry, but the effect is to push back the date of the decision.

The competitors still standing are the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and the SAAB Gripen

Of note is the fact that they are still evaluating noise data, which would tend to favor the smallest aircraft (Gripen), and it looks like they want the Swedes to purchase their Pilatus trainer should they win.

Lockheed Martin Rolls Over on F-22 Cancellation

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This is an unexpected but welcome development:

A top Lockheed Martin executive says the company will not oppose the Department of Defense’s proposal to halt F-22 production. The company stands to lose production lines for the F-22 and the VH-71 presidential helicopter under fiscal year 2010 budget proposals announced by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on 6 April.

I can’t imagine what gun that they are holding to LM’s head to make them do this, but it needs to used across the entire Pentagon procurement process.

Lessons Learned in Defense Budgeting

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SecDef Gates says, and I agree, that the non-disclosure agreements that he required participants to sign made the process work better:

“[It] was critically important as we considered dramatic changes in the way we were going to procure things and programmatic changes to specific programs was that we be able to have those deliberations among the senior military and the senior civilians in the department without the newspapers printing, every single day, the results of our deliberations the preceding day,” Gates said last week, speaking at the Naval War College, Newport R.I.

Gates took the unusual step earlier this year of requiring everyone involved in the 2010 budget deliberations sign nondisclosure agreements. The 2010 defense budget had already become politically hot well before deliberations began in earnest when news got out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared a draft budget request of $584 billion (an 8 percent increase over 2009), putting the incoming Obama administration into the position of having to “cut” defense. The Obama administration’s 2010 defense budget request is $527 billion.

The military budget process has become so politicized and pork laden that it was the only way to get things done.

A Mindset that Bob Gates and His Successor Need to Break

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SecDef Gates is looking to insource acquisition expertise into the Pentagon, hiring 4,100 people in this area by 2010, and 9,000 by 2015.

This is a good idea, but the mindset in this article shows why it will be hard, starting with the title, Top Talent Won’t Pick Pentagon for Pay.

The first assumption is that junior hires, “they won’t know enough to make much of a difference for at least six or seven years,” is simply wrong.

A good person can be online and doing good work in under 6 months, one who is merely competent can do the same in 18.

What’s more, with the expansion of internal positions at the Pentagon, the job prospects for outside consultants shrink accordingly, which will both bring new people in, and dissuade people who have done a few years in there from moving into outside positions.

It’s not going to be easy, but it will be much better than what we have now.

Indian Air Force says Rafale Remains in MMRCA Competition

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Remember when I said over the weekend that the Dassault Rafale had been dropped from the Indian MMRCA competition?

Well, it appears that the reports of the French Fighter’s demise have been exaggerated.

The Indian Air Force has denied reports that the Dassault Rafale has been eliminated from the country’s medium multi-role combat aircraft competition.

“We have not ruled anyone out yet in the MMRCA competition,” says an IAF spokesman, who confirmed that the service is responsible for evaluating the contenders. “All of the tests have not been completed. The technical evaluations are only just over and we are scheduled to begin the flight tests next month. Everyone is still in the competition.”

Last week, several Indian newspapers reported that the Rafale was eliminated after failing the technical evaluation. …..

No clue as to what is going on here, or why.

Indian Drops Rafale from MMRCA Trials

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Unofficial reports from a “senior Indian Defence Ministry” are that, “Dassault was unable to give full technical bid requirements, but this is obviously a rather vague and uninformative.

I find this very odd. Dassault and India have a long and established relationship, with India owning and operating Mirage 2000s, and at one point, offered to transfer the whole Mirage 2000 line to India.

The idea that they did not cross their “I”s and dot their “T”s, and thus was dropped from the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition is curious.

In any case, it appears that the Official MMRCA trials in August, with the, Boeing F/A-18, Lockheed Martin F-16, Eurofighter Typhoon, RSK MiG-35 and Saab Gripen.

Dutch Soft Pedal JSF Order

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It turns out that the Dutch Government did not have the votes to buy two JSF test aircraft without a firm fixed price commitment (Yeah, what are they smoking?*)

They managed a compromise, in which they order the test aircraft, but defer the production order from 2010 to 2011 or 2012, when the price should be firmer. (Yeah, what are they smoking?*)

The problem is that the last sale was what was clearly a phony price (around $80m a pop), and the opposition expects massive cost and schedule problems….And they are probably right.

*Well, it’s Holland, so we have a pretty good idea.

Contest for Brazilian Fighters Kicks Into High Gear

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The lead competitors are the SAAB Gripen, Dessault Rafale, and the Boeing Super Hornet, with Super Bugs systems being their selling point, the Gripen’s short/rough field capabilities being their selling point, and the Rafale’s independence of US political restrictions being their selling point.

The down sides are, single engine for the Gripen, poor aerodynamics for the F/A-18E/F, and cost, lack of other export orders, and a relatively limited number of weapons qualified for carriage for the Rafale.

It appears that Brazil looks at this order as a way to expand its domestic aerospace capabilities through offsets and tech transfers, which probably would favor the French, who are desperate to get an export order.

This raises an interesting question: This is a large order, but just how many are one Brazilian?

Yeah, I know, lame joke.

Electro-Magnetic Catapult on Ford Class CVN in Trouble

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It looks like there are serious problems with the Navy’s new Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which is intended to replace steam catapults on the new carrier.

The GAO is highlighting potential delays and cost overruns, and the fact that testing is not intended to start until next year, even though the keel of the lead ship, the Gerald Ford, has already been laid.

It makes me wonder if SecDef Gates proposed slowdown on carrier production might be in some part by concerns over the maturity system, as retrofitting steam catapults would involve major changes to the ship, and possibly to its propulsion, which was not designed to supply steam to catapults.

Of course, as always, the US Navy is being less than forthcoming about potential problems, and continues to paint a happy picture, though there are stories suggesting that EMALS would be shelved, though it is unclear if replacing the system with steam would save money or keep the program on schedule, at least for the Ford.

SecDef Gates Warns the Generals

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Gates just issued a statement urging legislators to look beyond their districts, but the important statement comes further down:

The thing that is important is to reinforce within the building, in terms of dealing with the Hill, that there is a chain of command,’ he said. ‘Once the decision is made, and particularly once the president signs off on the budget, then there needs to be discipline about people not conducting guerilla warfare against decisions the president has made.

(emphasis mine)

He is telling the generals that the decisions have been made, and behind the scenes lobbying will be punished.

This has been a consistent problem with the Pentagon for at least 15 years, and it has only become worse in the last 8 or so, and it needs to be shut down.

Military officers should answer questions honestly, but the lobbying for weapons systems is simply corrupt and a repudiation of civilian control.

Good for Bob Gates for putting the Generals on notice.

SecDef Gates Unveals FY 2010 DoD Budget Proposal

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You can read his speech, but here is the nickel tour:
Additions:

  • More UAVs
  • More ISR Assets
  • More Helos
  • More Spec Ops
  • More Littoral Combat Ships
  • More Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
  • Accelerate production of F-35
  • More money terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)
  • More Cyber warfare assets.
  • Will go ahead with tanker purchase.
  • Start replacement program for Ohio SSBN.

Reductions:

  • Delay next generation CGN aircraft carrier (Ford class) by shifting to a 5 year schedule.
  • Delay CGX BMD missile cruiser and reevaluate the requirements.
  • Delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs.
  • Reduce the number of contractors in the Pentagon, and replace them with government employees.

Surprise, he’s saying that Dick Cheney’s brainchild when he was Bush I’s Sec Def, using the Department of Defense as a way to reward political contributions privatizing functions and expanding the number of contractors, does not work.

Kills:

  • Retire 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10.
  • End production of the F-22 fighter at 187 (current 183 +4)
  • End acquisition of C-17s in FY 10.
  • Terminate the VH-71 presidential helicopter.
  • Terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program.
  • Terminate the $26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, and instead will purchase two more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites as alternatives.
  • Terminate he second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft, and move program to technology demonstation.
  • Terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program.
  • Terminate the DDG-1000 and restart the DDG-51 Aegis destroyers.
  • Terminate the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program’s vehicle,* and fold in the technology developed elsewhere.

I love his money quote:

Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today’s conflicts.

Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over $87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.

(emphasis mine)

This translates to, “They are not worth much in a counter-insurgency scenario, and once again the Lead System Integrator (LSI) model of procurement has given us an overpriced piece of crap.”

*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, “wrecker” variant of the FCS-MGV† from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
†Future Combat Systems-Manned Ground Vehicle. These are the ones that are the tanks and APCs. As opposed to the various unnmanned vehicles, networking technologies, etc. that form the full FCS along with the MGVs.‡
‡Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can’t hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as “technical hit man”, where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

FCS MGV on Chopping Block

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The Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicles (FCS MGV)* are on the chopping block, though it still looks like the howitzer version, the NLOS-C (shown) will still be procured.

The program is over budget and behind schedule, and the vehicles, originally in the 17 ton class (stripped for transport) and C-130 transportable, and now a 27 ton concept requiring larger transports, so this is not unforeseen.

The supporters of the program are claiming that :The development of the FCS network is linked to the development of FCS Manned Ground Vehicles. Each MGV acts as a node in the ground based aspect of the network. So cutting MGVs reduces the viability of the network,” but truth be told, if the communications suite can be developed, it can be retrofitted to the legacy fleet and give the desired situational awareness.

There are really only 2 downsides that I see, that the troop carrier FCS MGV, the ICV, carries more troops than the Bradley, which has always been light in that department, and the legacy systems require more fuel and maintenance (the specs for the FCS MGV on maintenance are pretty amazing).

Canceling the MGVs would also serve to put the Pentagon, and the defense industry, on notice about cost and schedule creep, which is desperately needed because the weapons system development process is completely broken.

*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, “wrecker” variant of the FCS-MGV† from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
†Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can’t hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as “technical hit man”, where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

FCS Active Protection System is Not Working

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The Active Protection System (APS) is designed to intercept RPGs, ATGMs, and long rod penetrators, to protect the smaller and lighter manned vehicles of the Future Combat System (FCS), and it now seems that it simply does not work, according to the latest GAO report.

The interesting thing is that the Israelis have a system that does work, Trophy, though it is less ambitious than the APS, but it was rejected and hundreds of millions of dollars directed towards Raytheon.†

One of the interesting bits about FCS is that is as much an industrial base preservation system as anything else, with bizarre separations of work to ensure that various contractors get sufficient workshare.

I believe that the high technology band tracks are the responsibility of the BAE Systems†, and the suspension is the responsibility of General Dynamics, for example, which makes no sense whatsoever.


Army Rejects Trophy


Trophy Promotional Video

*Full Disclosure, I worked for Raytheon a number of times, both in Texas and in Maryland over the past 15 years or so.
†Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, “wrecker” variant of the FCS-MGV from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).‡
‡Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can’t hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as “technical hit man”, where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

More JSF Problems

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The first is a report from the GAO revealing the least well kept secret in defense procurement, that the JSF is over budget and behind schedule, to the tune of about $2 billion, the GAO also believes that the F-35 will need about 1000 additional flight test hours than the F-35 Joint Programme Office (JPO) does, and notes that the time to assemble the first production airframes was 40% greater than predicted.

Additionally, as I have noted before, it appears that there are some very concerning issues regarding thermal management for the aircraft, and it looks like the fuel-air heat exchanger, which not only cools the avionics, but the electro-hydrostatic flight controls is not sufficient in hot weather conditions, like the Middle East.

Additionally, the author of the linked article, Bill Sweetman, notices another potential heat issue, this one having to do with IR signature, that the location of the exhaust for the integrated APU/EPU exhaust has been relocated in the production models.

In the pre-production models, it was located on the top of the aircraft in front of the left vertical stabilizer (you can see where the heat cooked off the paint in the top picture), but in the production models, it has been relocated to the bottom of the fuselage.

The exhaust does not look particularly stealthy from a radar perspective to my untrained eye, and I would have to imagine that it would be a big infra-red “kick-me” sign for Marine STOVL JSFs which would be minutes from the battlefield with APUs running on unimproved strips when the aircraft is used to provide close air support.

A400M Troubles Continue

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Best evidence of this is that the seven partner nations in the program have agreed to a moratorium on cancellation until July.

They are not agreeing to continue, they are just saying that they won’t cancel in the next 4 months, because the program is 4 years behind schedule, and well over budget.

I think that the new lesson of defense procurement is never buy anything unless you can cancel it when costs escalate and schedule slips.