Category: Real Estate

It’s Been 6 Years, and Finally a Regulator Forces a CEO to Resign

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Rather unsurprisingly, the regulator in question, is New York Superintendent of Financial Services Benjamin Lawsky, who has had nothing to do with the Obama administration.

He went after the astonishingly corrupt and incompetent mortgage servicer Ocwen, and uncovered self-dealing by the CEO that forced his resignation.

It would have been nice if William Erbey were breaking rocks somewhere, but it is a start:

Let’s say you run a company whose misdeeds are splashed across the front pages of the business section on an almost weekly basis. You might reasonably expect to be fired without delay. But then let’s also stipulate that you’re in the financial services industry. Recent history suggests you’ll be able to keep your job and your handsome bonus, and that even if law enforcement officials penalize the company for improprieties, somebody else—like your shareholders— will pay those fines, leaving you to continue your charmed life unscathed.

 William Erbey, the billionaire chairman of the mortgage servicing giant Ocwen, probably thought that would be his fate as well, but he didn’t anticipate the determination of New York Superintendent of Financial Services Benjamin Lawsky. On Monday, Lawsky announced Erbey would step down chairman of Ocwen and four related businesses, as part of the settlement of an investigation into the company’s sad enduring legacy of ripping off homeowners.

 It isn’t a prison sentence. But on the spectrum of accountability for financial industry executives, “forced to resign” beats “suffered no consequences while staying in power.”

 Lawsky has been chasing Ocwen for several years. A mortgage servicer handles day-to-day operations on loans, from collecting monthly payments to making decisions after a default. Ocwen has grown almost ten-fold since 2009 by purchasing the rights to service distressed loans from the likes of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Ally Bank. Big banks have engaged in a fire sale of their mortgage servicing rights, because of increased compliance standards for servicing, and because of new bank capital rules that make servicing loans costly. As a non-bank, Ocwen has more wherewithal to handle mortgage servicing, and this has made it the 4th-largest servicer in America. ………

 ………

 The federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found similar problems with Ocwen and reached an agreement on a $2.1 billion settlement. But most of the money went toward modifying loans that Ocwen serviced but didn’t own, allowing it to pay the fine with other people’s money.

 More recently, Lawsky uncovered more Ocwen secrets. He discovered that four other public companies chaired by Ocwen chairman William Erbey have close business relationships with the mortgage servicer (Erbey is also the largest individual shareholder for all the companies). One subsidiary hosts nearly all of Ocwen’s online auctions; another handles all Ocwen post-foreclosure real estate transactions. So Ocwen profits by funneling default-related business to closely associated companies, providing an incentive to push borrowers into default.

 Lawsky also found that Ocwen backdated letters to borrowers, making it impossible for them to challenge denials of their mortgage modifications within a specific time frame. He also investigated whether Ocwen stalled short sales, where homes get sold for less than the balance on the mortgage, in order to collect additional fees.

And here is the special sauce:

This time, Lawsky did not spare top executives. Erbey will resign both Ocwen and the four related companies by January 16, and subsequently hold “no directorial, management, oversight, consulting, or any other role at Ocwen or any related party.” Any other Ocwen employees also working for one of the other four companies will have to drop those responsibilities.

 Under the agreement, Ocwen will add two new independent board positions, and an Operations Monitor will work directly with the board on oversight functions, and determine whether other senior management will have to be fired. Ocwen cannot acquire other mortgage servicing rights without the consent of the Operations Monitor.

 Ocwen will also pay $150 million to New York homeowners harmed by the company. Instead of a “soft-dollar” promise of mortgage modifications that Ocwen can pass on to the owners of the loans they service, these are cash penalties—$100 million to the Department of Financial Services for housing counseling and community redevelopment programs, and $50 million to be split by Ocwen foreclosure victims, with $10,000 for each borrower on whom Ocwen completed foreclosure, and the rest handed out to those with active foreclosures in process. Ocwen will also have to re-evaluate borrowers in foreclosure after paying the penalty, “in light of their improved financial condition resulting from such payment.”

Ocwen cannot take a tax deduction on any of these payments, per the agreement. The company also agreed to provide all of its New York borrowers with their complete loan files upon request, along with assurances to detail reasons for any denials of mortgage relief. As the loan files represent evidence in private borrower misconduct litigation, it could expose Ocwen to further legal headaches.

Seriously, if there had been any appetite for even a cursory investigation of the banksters by Obama and His Evil Minions™, we would have seen a lot more of this.

Then again, if we did that, Obama would not be able to get his 6 figure speaking gigs from Wall Street execs when he leaves offices.

One has to have priorities.

If Mario Cuomo were Dead, He’d Be Spinning in His Grave

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I am not a big fan of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo. (See my post F%$# Andrew Cuomo)

Well, in addition to his fervent retreat from anything resembling economic liberalism, unless it is of the Neoliberal variety, we now know that he’s a corrupt hypocrite.

In the small change category, we have the fact that while he was a “crusading” Attorney General, his primary adviser for mortgage fraud by the banksters was a lobbyist for the mortgage banksters:

In early 2007, when he was New York State attorney general, Andrew Cuomo brought on a longtime confidant as a consultant on mortgage industry investigations, a move that has gone undisclosed until now.

The friend was Howard Glaser and he had another job at the same time: consultant and lobbyist for the very industry Cuomo was investigating.

 Glaser, who went on to become a top state official in Cuomo’s gubernatorial administration, was operating a lucrative consulting firm, the Glaser Group, with a host of mortgage industry clients.

 Later that year, Glaser provided insights on Cuomo’s investigations to industry players on a conference call hosted by an investment bank.

 Cuomo’s office ended up giving immunity to one of Glaser’s clients a year into his term as attorney general.

 In the end, experts say, the mortgage investigations Cuomo touted as “wide-ranging” came to little, even as he held one of the country’s most powerful prosecutorial positions through the financial crisis and its aftermath.

(emphasis mine)

Not surprising, though the story of how the denial of a Freedom of Information Act accidentally let the cat out of the bag to Pro Publica is prize.

The bigger story is how Cuomo set up an anti-corruption commission, and then shut it down when it began to point in his diriection:

With Albany rocked by a seemingly endless barrage of scandals and arrests, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo set up a high-powered commission last summer to root out corruption in state politics. It was barely two months old when its investigators, hunting for violations of campaign-finance laws, issued a subpoena to a media-buying firm that had placed millions of dollars’ worth of advertisements for the New York State Democratic Party.

 The investigators did not realize that the firm, Buying Time, also counted Mr. Cuomo among its clients, having bought the airtime for his campaign when he ran for governor in 2010.

 Word that the subpoena had been served quickly reached Mr. Cuomo’s most senior aide, Lawrence S. Schwartz. He called one of the commission’s three co-chairs, William J. Fitzpatrick, the district attorney in Syracuse.

 “This is wrong,” Mr. Schwartz said, according to Mr. Fitzpatrick, whose account was corroborated by three other people told about the call at the time. He said the firm worked for the governor, and issued a simple directive:

 “Pull it back.”

 The subpoena was swiftly withdrawn. The panel’s chief investigator explained why in an email to the two other co-chairs later that afternoon.

 “They apparently produced ads for the governor,” she wrote.

 The pulled-back subpoena was the most flagrant example of how the commission, established with great ceremony by Mr. Cuomo in July 2013, was hobbled almost from the outset by demands from the governor’s office.

 ………

 While the governor now maintains he had every right to monitor and direct the work of a commission he had created, many commissioners and investigators saw the demands as politically motivated interference that hamstrung an undertaking that the governor had publicly vowed would be independent.

 ………

 But a three-month examination by The New York Times found that the governor’s office deeply compromised the panel’s work, objecting whenever the commission focused on groups with ties to Mr. Cuomo or on issues that might reflect poorly on him.

 Ultimately, Mr. Cuomo abruptly disbanded the commission halfway through what he had indicated would be an 18-month life. And now, as the Democratic governor seeks a second term in November, federal prosecutors are investigating the roles of Mr. Cuomo and his aides in the panel’s shutdown and are pursuing its unfinished business.

 ………

 Mr. Cuomo said early on that the commission would be “totally independent” and free to pursue wrongdoing anywhere in state government, including in his own office. “Anything they want to look at, they can look at — me, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, the comptroller, any senator, any assemblyman,” he said last August.

 In a 13-page statement responding to The Times’s questions, Mr. Cuomo’s office defended its handling of the commission. It said the commission was created by and reported to the governor, and therefore he could not be accused of interfering with it.

 While he allowed the commission the independence to investigate whatever it wanted, the governor’s office said, it would have been a conflict for a panel he created to investigate his own administration.

That last bit is, dare I say it, Nixonian in its phrasing.

Read the whole article, it’s pretty long, and you cannot help but come away with the impression that Cuomo quashed an investigation because it came too close to him and his.

Rather unsurprisingly, the United States attorney for the Southern District of New York has expressed similar concerns:

Federal prosecutors investigating Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo’s shutdown of an anticorruption commission have subpoenaed the assistant to its former executive director to testify before a grand jury in Manhattan, suggesting that the criminal inquiry has moved to a new stage, people briefed on the matter said on Thursday.

Federal agents served the subpoena on the assistant, Heather Green, on Wednesday morning, appearing at her doorstep before 7 a.m., the people said. Ms. Green, who is not believed to be a target of the inquiry, worked as an executive assistant to the anticorruption panel’s former executive director, Regina Calcaterra, until Mr. Cuomo announced he was disbanding the panel, known as the Moreland Commission, on March 29.

The subpoena, according to two people who have seen it or been briefed on its contents, asked for documents and correspondence, including any communications with Mr. Cuomo and his senior aides. It also directed Ms. Green to appear July 28 to testify before a grand jury in Manhattan, the people said.

Separately, Mylan L. Denerstein, counsel to the governor, has agreed to be interviewed in early August by federal prosecutors about her involvement with the panel, one of the people said.

Mr. Cuomo created the Moreland Commission in July 2013, saying he wanted to root out corruption and reform state laws that for decades have enabled it. But he abruptly shuttered the panel in March after striking a deal with legislative leaders that netted only modest reforms.

The governor said at the time that in exchange for terminating the panel’s work, he had won tougher laws on bribery and corruption and improved enforcement of election law. But the action angered Preet Bharara, the United States attorney for the Southern District of New York. Mr. Bharara appeared on a radio show days later and, in an unusual move, sharply criticized Mr. Cuomo’s decision, saying his actions made it appear as though the governor had bargained away corruption cases as part of a political deal.

(emphasis mine)

Cuomo’s opponent in the Democratic primary, Zephyr Teachout (her birth name, her parents are very bad people) has gone from demanding answers to calling for his resignation.

Political realities being what they are, Ms. Teachout has no chance of winning, and Cuomo is likely to win the general by at least 20 points, we will almost certainly see 4 more years of his conservative f%$#ery, but I think that he is now officially out of the running for President 2016, and hopefully forever.

How Barack Obama Made People Stop Believing in Government

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Do you remember the history HARP?

Barack Obama and Timothy Geithner, said that they had a program to help distressed homeowners, when it was actually a program that consistently screwed homeowners in order to “foam the runway” for the banksters by allowing them to puff up their balance sheets.

Well, people remember this, and now that Obama is (allegedly) trying to provide real aid to homeowners, they are finding that have no takers because the homeowners in question do not trust the government to help them any more:

We all remember the fable of The Boy Who Cried Wolf. The moral of the story: Lie one too many times and nobody will believe you, even when you’re telling the truth. Now we have a case of The Government Who Cried Wolf, showing how the failure of the Obama administration’s foreclosure mitigation programs haunt them to this day.

 The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, wants to help around 676,000 homeowners it has identified as eligible for refinancing under the government’s Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP).

 ………

 But these remaining homeowners appear to have no interest in the program, and Watt explained why in Chicago. “We have written to them. We have called them, and they’re saying this is too good to be true,” he said.

 Why would homeowners exhibit so much skepticism in a government program that they feel inclined to turn down thousands of dollars in free money? You can track it back to all the promises made over the past five years to help homeowners, and the unfortunately sorry results.

 In 2009, when the foreclosure crisis was most acute, President Obama promised to save 4 million homes through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Today, only around 900,000 hold active permanent HAMP modifications, while millions of others either re-defaulted or were rejected by the program. Mortgage servicing companies, which had a greater financial incentive to foreclose over modifying home loans, quickly figured out how to game the system, using it to pile more bad debt on borrowers for their own reward.

The process devolved into a horror show for homeowners. Servicers prolonged trial modifications well past the three-month period set out in HAMP guidelines so that they could rack up late fees. They deliberately lost borrower’s income documents to extend the default period, even shredding documents and purging records to do so. They pursued foreclosure while negotiating the modification, against HAMP rules. They granted modifications that folded servicer fees into the principal of the loan, increasing the unpaid principal balance — and thus their profit — while pushing the borrower further underwater. And they trapped borrowers after denying modifications, demanding back payments, missed interest and late fees, with the threat of foreclosure as a hammer.

This sometimes forced borrowers into “private” modifications with the servicer, usually on worse terms than the status quo. Or it led to many of the 5.6 million foreclosures we’ve seen since the collapse of the housing bubble. One set of employees at Bank of America testified that they were given bonuses like Target gift cards for pushing homeowners into foreclosure.

 Subsequent government programs, like the “Hardest Hit Fund” directed at states with the most nagging foreclosure crises, similarly failed to deliver. The failure to restructure mortgages and avert foreclosures is seen as the biggest policy mistake of the Great Recession.

It’s easy to prove to people that government cannot work, you just have to do things like HAMP, and lie to people and design programs to fail when view through the lens of their professed goals.

On the far side, however, when you actually want to help people, they no longer trust you, forever and ever.

Note that Obama and His Evil Minions™ had a completely free hand in designing these programs, so they own the fallou, or as Atrios notes:

Plenty of things are genuinely beyond Obama’s control, but we have an example of something which was 100% in his control. And it was horrible.

The Sound You Hear is Another Bubble Collapsing

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Remember those stories about all those investors paying cash to acquire rental properties?

Remember how they were going into single family rentals?

Well, it looks like the rush for the door has begun:

A year ago, buying foreclosed homes to rent out was the sure-thing trade for investment firms backed by money from private equity companies, hedge funds and pension systems. But with the supply of cheap foreclosed homes dwindling, some early investors are looking to cash out a bit by flipping homes to competitors.

The Waypoint Real Estate Group, one of the first companies to raise money from private investors to buy foreclosed homes, is quietly shopping as many as 2,000 houses in California that it acquired in the last few years in several private investment funds, said three people who had been briefed on the matter but were not authorized to discuss it. The homes, which are largely rented, are being shown to other companies backed by investor money that have also scooped up distressed houses in states including Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois and Nevada.

Waypoint is considering selling about half of its 4,000 homes. Some of the biggest institutional investors in the market for foreclosed homes — companies like the Blackstone Group, American Homes 4 Rent and American Residential Properties — have slowed their pace of acquisitions in response to an increase in home prices and a dearth of foreclosed homes that do not require significant renovation.

Waypoint is following other early investors like the Och-Ziff Capital Management Group and Oaktree Capital Management, which have sold homes bought near the start of the financial crisis. But unlike Och-Ziff and Oaktree, Waypoint is not leaving the single-family home market. It is still managing more than 7,000 homes for a publicly traded real estate investment trust, or REIT, it formed last year with the Starwood Capital Group called Starwood Waypoint Residential Trust.

Jason Chudoba, a spokesman for the trust and Waypoint’s management company, said the firm did not comment on market speculation.

The single-family home market, after a wave of acquisitions by companies backed by Wall Street money, is changing as institutional buyers now focus more on expanding their operations to manage tens of thousands of homes across the United States. Industry participants say that the rapid buying of foreclosed homes has ended and that they expect other early institutional buyers to sell homes to lock in profits. They say they also expect the business to consolidate into the hands of a few large companies.

So, the small operators are getting out, and the big operators, aka the too big to fail operators are doubling down, because they figure that they know better.

In a way, the TBTF players are right:  When this comes tumbling down, the taxpayers will find a way to bail them out, yet again.

We are f%$#ed.

So Not Surprised: Hedge Funds as Slumlords

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Hedge funds have gone big time into small and single family rentals, and in turn, they have illegally ignored their responsibilities as landlords:

The yawning gap between private equity landlord sales talk and what they are delivering is finally being exposed.

One of the reasons many investors have been skeptical of the way private equity firms have gone full bore into buying distressed single family homes is that property management is a hands-on business even when it’s done it the most favorable possible setting, an apartment building. Individuals who have invested in single family home rentals almost without exception report that even when they found it to be an economically attractive proposition, it was still oversight-intensive. Admittedly, there are some private equity firms who have bought rental properties who actually do seem to be targeting markets and renters in such a way that they might be able to do a decent job of property management, for instance, by buying homes where they can rehab the kitchen and bath plumbing using the same fixtures, screening tenants in person, and then inspecting the properties monthly and giving the tenants points for passing that they can convert into credits against a purchase or take in cash.

But the biggest fish in this ocean, Blackstone, is clearly taking the opposite approach, of doing as little as they can to maintain the houses and trying to fob off the responsibility onto the tenant, even when local regulations clearly prohibit it. So managing dispersed homes is no problem if you never planned to do the job in the first place.

Blackstone tries to evade this duty formally, through lease terms, and informally, by making themselves inaccessible. And because Blackstone is the largest and highest profile player in this space, they may be hoping that if enough PE landlords follow their lead, communities will accept the new finance-dictate bad standards, just as they have with foreclosure abuses.

But the difference here is while stressed borrowers were the ones that were hurt in foreclosures, and foreclosures and bankruptcies are seen as shameful event, there’s no reason for a victim of a bad landlord to be seen as unsympathetic. Moreover, deliberately negligent PE landlords like Blackstone traditionally have hurt the value of neighboring properties. If this trend continues, abused tenants and their neighbors face a common threat.

Notice that contracts that violate local law are almost certain to fail a legal challenge. In New York, which has more extensive tenant protections than other cities, landlords sometimes try to include provisions that are impermissible, like prohibiting a tenant from having a roommate. Housing court judges exhibit a bit of zeal in smacking down landlords when challenges to those leases come before them.

………

Now to the update on Blackstone’s latest escapades, via some original reporting at In These Times. The article, Game of Homes, makes for good one-stop shopping if you want to get friends and colleagues up to speed on this topic. For NC readers, the first two-thirds of the article covers familiar terrain. Here are the sections that discuss how Blackstone, which is using “Invitation Homes” as its brand for its single-family rentals, is trying to evade its duties as landlord:  ………

If you thought Wall Street was bad as a lender, just imagine how badly they can f%$# you up as a landlord.

As an FYI, I was in a dispute with a landlord and property management company in Texas, one of the less tenant friendly jurisdictions, we lawyered up and won, because even the professional property management firm did not grasp the actual rights of tenants.

Here’s hoping that we will see some major court losses for the hedge fund pukes.

And the Banksters Scuttle Back into the Shadows as Their Latest Bubble Begins to Deflate

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This sounds a lot like the collapse of a pump and dump:

Rents collected on the collateral for the first U.S. rental-home securities declined by 7.6 percent from October to January, according to Morningstar Inc.

Payments declined as expiring leases and early tenant departures left residences backing the bonds of Blackstone (BX) Group LP’s Invitation Homes vacant, Becky Cao and Brian Alan, analysts at Morningstar’s credit-ratings unit, said in a report. While 8.3 percent of the properties were vacant or occupied by delinquent renters in January, renewals on 78.5 percent of leases that expired the prior month exceeded the analysts’ expected rate of 66.7 percent.

The deal’s performance is being watched as Wall Street bankers and institutional property investors seek to follow Blackstone’s $479.1 million transaction in November with additional offerings. Initial lease expirations for the 3,207 homes are scheduled to peak from January through March, Morningstar said. To woo investors and rating firms in the new market, the transaction started with all of the units leased, unlike bonds backed by apartment-building loans.

They are claiming that this is going to improve, but these protestations of improving prospects sound awfully hollow.

Understand that this is in some way even scarier than what they did with the alphabet soups like MBS and CDS, because these psychopaths are now responsible for fixing things like broken heaters, plugged drains, etc.

There are already anecdotal reports that the banksters are horrible landlords (big surprise), and one wonders what is going to happen when tenants start suing them or organizing rent strikes.

Not Enough Bullets………

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To no one’s surprise, this involves real estate developers, a scurvy lot who depend on the kindness of taxpayers while extolling the virtue of “free market heroes” like themselves.

Case in point, Seattle developers are suing because they think that the city is charging too much for them to break zoning laws:

A coalition of several developers filed a lawsuit in King County Superior Court on January 15 that would make Seattle, already booming with construction cranes, more friendly for developers. Their issue? One of the city’s affordable-housing programs.

Since 2006, the city has struck a deal with developers in the downtown core: In exchange for setting aside a few modestly affordable units or paying fees toward a city housing fund, developers get to build taller buildings. For example, developers could build a 400-foot tower where they’d otherwise have to keep it under 300 feet. The Seattle City Council raised those fees by about one-third in December 2013. In their lawsuit, which cites three Supreme Court decisions, the developers claim that fee hike is “an out-and-out extortion.”

So they’re asking a judge to invalidate that higher fee, making it cheaper and easier to build the tallest buildings allowed downtown—while throwing even fewer scraps to the city’s growing affordable-housing needs.

“This just shows developers are not willing to do their fair share,” says Rebecca Saldaña of Puget Sound Sage, an affordable-housing advocacy group. She says Seattle’s taxpayers fund a housing levy, and politicians have eased other development requirements. This latest uptick in fees, Saldaña says, is “really just asking developers to come up to speed.”

………

For example, Smith’s Second and Pike project is a proposed 400-foot tower, with 290 residential units above retail and restaurant space. Normally, the height limit there is 290 feet. Under the new fee regulations, in exchange for that extra height, Smith would have to pay a one-time fee of around $2.5 million into the city’s housing fund. The lawsuit says the city should revert to the former requirements, which require paying only $1.8 million. (In an odd twist, Smith will pay the $1.8 million either way, because he applied for a permit under the old rules.)

“My hope is that most people won’t actually pay the fees,” says O’Brien. “They’ll just provide the housing” inside the new construction. In Smith’s building, that would mean setting aside 20 or so moderately affordable units—around $1,300 a month for a one-bedroom apartment.

Clearly, even that isn’t particularly affordable, and 20 apartments don’t amount to much housing. And the city knows its program isn’t good enough. Which is why housing advocates, developers, and lawmakers have been meeting since last summer to overhaul the program.

$1300/month.

If you figure that 25% of pre-tax income should go to housing, that translated to about $62K a year.

For a one bedroom apartment.

And this is too much for the developers to tolerate.

You know, when Mao came to power in China, he executed the landlords, basically the real estate developers of China of the time.

I’ve always found it hard to condemn this act.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Goes to Work

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CFPB Alleges Mortgage Insurer Operated 15-Year-Long Kickback Scheme – Consumerist

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has begun proceedings against PHH Corporation for its involvement in a 15-year-long mortgage insurance kickback scheme that collected hundreds of millions of dollars from homeowners.

 The CFPB announced Wednesday that it is seeking a civil fine, an injunction to prevent future violations and victim restitution from PHH Corporation and its residential mortgage origination subsidiaries, PHH Mortgage Corporation and PHH Home Loans LLC, as well as it’s wholly-owned subsidiaries, Atrium Insurance Corporation and Atrium Reinsurance Corporation, for violating the Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act and harming consumers through a kickback scheme beginning as early as 1995 and continuing until at least 2009.

 ………

 An investigation by the CFPB showed that when PHH originated mortgages, it referred consumers to its mortgage insuring partners. In exchange for the referral, the insurers purchased reinsurance – a product that transfers risk to help mortgage insurers cover their own risk of unexpected losses – from PHH’s subsidiaries. As a result, consumers ended up paying more in mortgage insurance premiums.

Good, but this will not send anyone to jail.

Until we start people, not just corporations, start experiencing the direct consequences of the misdeeds, nothing will change.

5 Words that Strike Terror into My Heart

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“Wall Street’s New Housing Bonanza“

Wall Street’s latest trillion-dollar idea involves slicing and dicing debt tied to single-family homes and selling the bonds to investors around the world.

 That might sound a lot like the activities that at one point set off a global financial crisis. But there is a twist this time. Investment bankers and lawyers are now lining up to finance investors, from big private equity firms to plumbers and dentists moonlighting as landlords, who are buying up foreclosed houses and renting them out.

 The latest company to test this emerging frontier in securitization is American Homes 4 Rent. The company talked to prospective investors at a conference in Las Vegas last week about selling securities tied to $500 million of debt, according to people briefed on the matter.

 American Homes 4 Rent, which went public in August, has tapped JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo as its bankers for a debt deal that is expected to be sold by the end of the first quarter, these people said.

This will not end well.

Another complex deal that will leave banksters richer, and rest of us stuck with the f%$#ing tab.

What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

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Yes, the folks who gave you complex financial instruments based on mortgage backed securities that nearly destroyed the world, are looking to apply their special genius to the rental market:

You’d think that investors would run away from a new Wall Street innovation as fast as Congress runs away from a good idea.………

Ummmm, no. Wall Street’s primary model is to convince a potential investor is that there is another idiot further down the chain that they sell this crap to.

So, no, I do not think that investors would run away.

………But instead, they’re flocking to the latest product peddled by large banking interests, even though they look almost exactly like the mortgage-backed securities that were a primary driver of the financial crisis. These new securities, backed by rental payments, also have real-world implications for millions of renters, who could end up turning in their monthly checks to Wall Street-based absentee slumlords.

 Over the past couple years, private equity firms and hedge funds have bought up over 200,000 single-family homes, mostly discounted foreclosed properties in communities wrecked by the housing crash, such as Phoenix, Atlanta, Tampa, Sacramento, Los Angeles and Riverside, California. They have spent billions to scoop up these vacant homes at fire-sale prices, renovate them, and rent them out, promising investors double-digit annual returns on the rental revenue. Private equity firms like Blackstone, which owns more than 40,000 single-family homes, think they can build an entirely new asset class out of this scheme, controlling the rental market for single-family homes. The irony is rich: Wall Street created the conditions for millions of foreclosures, then they sweep in to buy up the homes and rent them out, often to the same people they kicked onto the street.

 ………

 Like mortgage-backed securities, the bonds would get sold in tranches, with the senior levels getting rental revenue first, and the junior tranches taking the rest. Rating agencies like Kroll, Morningstar and Moody’s have blessed the deal, presenting the senior tranches with a triple-A rating, essentially labeling it as perfectly safe for investors. You’ll remember that mortgage-backed securities were bestowed triple-A ratings during the housing bubble, and that this spurred massive purchases, fueling demand for more and more home loans to create more securities. You can see the same thing happening in the rental market if these securities catch on. In fact, while the most attractive foreclosed properties have already been snapped up, homebuilders are constructing new properties specifically for single-family rentals. Some analysts are concerned that this gold rush will create a new housing bubble in the communities where Wall Street firms are purchasing homes.

 ………

 But securitizing rental revenue is beset with unknowns. The rating agency Fitch underscored many of these concerns when they justified their opposition to rating the Blackstone bond.

So, this sh%$ is so toxic that even the massively corrupt ratings agencies won’t touch it.

The consequences for 14 million single-family renters in America could be worse. Fears that Wall Street firms would try to trim costs by ignoring maintenance and upkeep have so far been realized. As Ben Hallman at The Huffington Post recently detailed, Wall Street-owned rental homes are riddled with mechanical and plumbing problems. The firms basically freshened up foreclosed properties with a coat of paint and rented them out, ignoring serious deficiencies like broken toilets and even vermin infestations. And predictably, the landlords are impossible to reach to get repairs done. “I’ve been renting homes for 15 years and I’ve never had a landlord be this ridiculous about getting stuff repaired,” said one renter of Invitation Homes, Blackstone’s single-family rental subsidiary.

 ………

 Plus there’s the concern that securitization of rental payments will lead to the same kind of risky, illegal practices we saw with securitization of mortgages. Nobody should welcome a return of innovations like CDOs (where the riskiest tranches get sliced up and repackaged as “safe” securities) or adjustable payments (what if renters were sold “teaser” rates on their monthly payments that reset to prices they couldn’t afford?). And nobody wants to think about the strong-arm tactics that would be applied to force payments out of tenants, regardless of the circumstances. This is a rerun, and the first movie ended rather badly.

We know how the banks handled managing mortgages.  They sucked.  They screwed it up even when all they needed to do was sit back and collect the money.

Their response to tenants demanding that their homes be maintained will be a hearty f%$# you, followed by an aggressive use of bribes political donations so that they can continue to extract rents completely without consequence.

If this sort of bribery worked in DC to emasculate financial regulations, it will work on Teaneck New Jersey zoning board.

Rinse, lather, repeat.

More Lying Liars

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This time it’s Attorney General Eric “Place” Holder, and he is lying about prosecutions for mortgage fraud.

Not only did he puff up the about the numbers and amount of mortgage prosecutions, but the DoJ retroactively edited the transcript of his speech on this subject:

Not sure that even the Bushies ever tried pulling the “modify the text of old archived speeches a year later” trick.

Yes, this is a level of mendacity that would impress Karl Rove.

Linkage

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Finally a performance, by The Anarchists, my kids band at the Rock Star Jam Summer Music Camp:

Natalie was much more comfortable on stage this year.

Here is No Surprise

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In a lawsuit, Bank of America* has been accused of giving bonuses to staff for foreclosing on people:

Bank of America Corp. (BAC), the second-biggest U.S. lender, rewarded staff with cash bonuses and gift cards for meeting quotas tied to sending distressed homeowners into foreclosure, former employees said in court documents.

 Mortgage workers falsified records and were told to delay U.S. loan-assistance applications by requesting paperwork that the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank had already received, according to statements from ex-employees filed last week in federal court in Boston. The lender improperly disqualified applicants to the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, according to a May 23 statement from Simone Gordon, a loss-mitigation specialist who left the company in 2012.

 “We were regularly drilled that it was our job to maximize fees for the bank by fostering and extending delay of the HAMP modification process by any means we could,” Gordon said. Managers instructed staff to “delay modifications by telling homeowners who called in that their documents were ‘under review,’ when in fact, there had been no review,” she said.

Bank of America, which has spent more than $45 billion to settle claims tied to its 2008 takeover of Countrywide Financial Corp., is being sued by homeowners who didn’t receive permanent loan modifications after making payments under trial programs, according to court papers. Statements from seven former loan employees were included in a filing last week as part of plaintiffs’ attempt to gain class-action status. The lender has denied the allegations.

(Emphasis mine)

Seriously, why we haven’t put banksters in jail, particularly, the former CEO of Countrywide, Angelo Mozilo, who created the mess that BoA is trying to sweep under the carpet?

Also, why did the Obama administration set up HAMP as a Petri dish for mortgage servicer abuses?†

*Full disclosure, it is my bank.
†Actually, we know why. Geithner‡ wanted to let the banksters to cheat homeowners so as to protect the bank.
‡Laying it all at Geithner’s feet is not completely fair, because as I often say, the Cossacks work for the Czar.

This Has Disaster Written All Over It

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You’ve doubtless heard about the rebound in housing prices.

Well, it turns out that it’s a flood of Wall Street money behind much of this.

This is completely insane. You cannot manage single family rental housing from

The last time the housing market was this hot in Phoenix and Las Vegas, the buyers pushing up prices were mostly small time. Nowadays, they are big time — Wall Street big.

Large investment firms have spent billions of dollars over the last year buying homes in some of the nation’s most depressed markets. The influx has been so great, and the resulting price gains so big, that ordinary buyers are feeling squeezed out. Some are already wondering if prices will slump anew if the big money stops flowing.

“The growth is being propelled by institutional money,” said Suzanne Mistretta, an analyst at Fitch Ratings. “The question is how much the change in prices really reflects market demand, rather than one-off market shifts that may not be around in a couple years.”

Wall Street played a central role in the last housing boom by supplying easy — and, in retrospect, risky — mortgage financing. Now, investment companies like the Blackstone Group have swooped in, buying thousands of houses in the same areas where the financial crisis hit hardest.

Blackstone, which helped define a period of Wall Street hyperwealth, has bought some 26,000 homes in nine states. Colony Capital, a Los Angeles-based investment firm, is spending $250 million each month and already owns 10,000 properties. With little fanfare, these and other financial companies have become significant landlords on Main Street. Most of the firms are renting out the homes, with the possibility of unloading them at a profit when prices rise far enough.

………

The story, though, often looks more complicated on the ground. Joe Cusumano, a real estate agent in Riverside County, Calif., said that in recent months 90 percent of his business had been for companies like Invitation Homes, a Blackstone subsidiary. Home values in Riverside County have risen by 15 percent in the last year, according to CoreLogic.

But Mr. Cusumano said he wondered if faraway investors would properly maintain the homes they buy. He said that Invitation Homes had been willing to put money into the properties, but he was not so sure about the other players. He also worries what will happen when these investors start selling, as they inevitably will.

The first question is not whether the big investors will keep up tens of thousands of properties. It’s whether they can manage tens of thousands of single family homes.

I have dealt with a single family home managed by a local property management firm. It was a complete clusterF%$#.

If they honestly think that they can manage single family homes for properties they are nuts.

Or maybe they are just lying.  They are banksters, after all.

It’s Jobless Thursday!!

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And initial jobless claims rose by 10,000 to 354,000, with the 4-week moving average rising 6,750 to 347,250, continuing claims rising by 63,000 to 2.99 million.

The number of emergency claims fell by 50,000 to 1.73 million, but much of that could be claim exhaustion.

So the numbers are a bit worse than they were last week, but still not too bad.

An unalloyed good number however is that pending sales of existing homes sales hit a three-year high, though I am worried that the purchase of homes as rental properties might be the latest bubble.

This is a Feature, Not a Bug

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At Salon, David Dayen observes that it, “Turns out much-hyped settlement still allows banks to steal homes,’ even after the much hyped mortgage settlement.

This is not an oversight.  The Obama administration has aggressively allowed banks to cheat customers an investors since day one.

Basically, they see this as a way of making sure that the banks appear solvent.

See my writings on HAMP. Here is one quote:

Warren asked Geithner repeatedly about HAMP. After several evasions, Geithner said about the banks, “We estimate that they can handle ten million foreclosures, over time… this program will help foam the runway for them.”

By “them”, he means the banks.

By foaming the runway, he means that it allows them to delay writing down bad loans, and continue to extract payments and fees by cheating the public.

The suggestion that this is anything but deliberate policy is simply naive.

This is Perhaps the Most Egregious Example of Control Fraud This Far

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Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times relates to us the tale of CommonWealth REIT, which has a long history of aggressive acquisitions at excessive prices.

Their profits have suffered, and their share price has suffered.

In fact the only thing that seems to get a decent return on investment is the management company that the founders set up to conduct their operations.

They make lots of fees, and they get a fee for every misguided acquisition:

The annals of business history abound with stories of entrenched corporate executives building fortifications to maintain their plush status quo. But recent maneuvers by the board of the CommonWealth real estate investment trust put the company in a class by itself. CommonWealth REIT owns office buildings in and around major metropolitan areas in the United States. Founded in 1986 and based in Newton, Mass., CommonWealth, like many REITs, is not taxed on its income, which it distributes to shareholders. Its hefty payouts — 4.75 percent based on its share price of $21.04 — have made it a favorite among individual investors looking for income.

But CommonWealth, with $7.8 billion in buildings from Hoboken to San Diego, is unlike most other real estate investment trusts in one crucial way: its structure creates a significant conflict of interest. What sets CommonWealth apart is that it employs an outside management company, known as REIT Management and Research, to run the company’s operations and acquire properties. Many REITs were set up this way in the 1980s because they were small, but external managers are an anomaly among today’s much larger REITs.

To make matters more interesting, the outside management company is run by Barry M. Portnoy, CommonWealth’s founder, and his son Adam. Both father and son, moreover, serve on CommonWealth’s five-member board.

REIT Management and Research is paid an advisory fee based on the size of CommonWealth’s assets, rather than on how the investments perform. This is a stark incentive to simply expand the company through acquisitions and, in fact, since March 2010 CommonWealth has issued 88 million new shares to acquire new properties. The number of new shares is almost triple the stock outstanding before the sales. Such issuance dilutes existing shareholders’ stake because it increases the number of investors that share in the company’s income and payouts.

The incentive structure also encourages the management company to pay top dollar for properties. As noted in a recent report from Green Street Advisors, a research firm specializing in REIT analysis, “Selling equity and buying assets, without management rigorously asking ‘At what price?,’ can bleed shareholder value over the long term.”

Sure enough, since 2005, CommonWealth has underperformed the index of commercial office building REITs. In 2012, CommonWealth’s shares fell 7 percent. It cut its dividend last fall.

But because the assets have increased, the management company run by the Portnoys has been raking it in, earning $118 million in advisory fees in the last three years.

This might not be a concern if CommonWealth’s outside managers owned a sizable investment in its shares, aligning themselves with the company’s owners. They do not; the management firm’s executives and trustees on the board own 0.33 percent of CommonWealth stock.

The founders have adopted a series of increasingly extreme poison pills to stay in control.

Ms. Morgenson casts this as a shareholder rights fight, but I think that it is more than that.

This is management, who have almost no equity stake, are simply looting the company.

It is Called Fraud

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When lenders lose original loan documentation, and their response is to fabricate documents that have nothing to do with reality, it is not a business plan, it is criminal fraud:

It is hard to credit, but lenders routinely mislay the card and loan agreements their customers originally sign. But even more astonishingly, if there has been a dispute later on, the lenders have used computer software to ‘ recreate’ the original documents, sometimes with less than accurate results.

Being able to recreate agreements in this way helps banks pursue borrowers over debts, but there is growing evidence that when lenders ‘recreate’ contracts they often do not stick to the original terms.

The result is that borrowers who are often already in financial trouble are left in worse difficulties.

Document ‘recreation’ is in the spotlight after a court case last month involving a number of borrowers with credit cards issued by HBOS, Barclaycard, MBNA and HSBC. Part of the case, heard in the High Court in Manchester, was to assess the circumstances in which banks could ‘ reconstitute’ lost agreements.

Judge David Waksman concluded that in future, lenders would have to explain why they did not have the original agreements. He said they would have to prove that the recreated document was a true copy of the original contract.

This is in the UK, not the US, that this is happening in right now.

There should be arrests and criminal charges, but all they are getting is a slap on the wrist from the Office of Fair Trading guidelines.

The UK is like us in this way, and it is a pity.

More Judges Criticize Bankster’s Get Out of Jail Free Cards

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First, it was federal Judge Jed Rakoff, who has refused to accept “no harm, no fowl” deals with the SEC, and now U.S. District Judge Sidney Stein is questioning the fairness of a settlement of shareholder lawsuit:

A Manhattan federal judge on Monday signaled he will not rubber-stamp Citigroup Inc’s proposed $590 million settlement of a shareholder lawsuit accusing it of hiding tens of billions of dollars of toxic mortgage assets.

U.S. District Judge Sidney Stein asked lawyers for the bank and its shareholders to address several issues at an April 8 fairness hearing, including requested legal fees and expenses of roughly $100 million, and the absence of payments by former Citigroup executives.

………

Stein joined other judges in recent years to question the fairness of large legal settlements in the financial industry.

Citigroup awaits a decision from the federal appeals court in New York on whether Stein’s colleague Jed Rakoff properly rejected a $285 million settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission over the alleged defrauding of investors.

On Thursday, U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero in Manhattan cited that case in delaying a decision to approve the SEC’s $602 million insider trading settlement with a unit of Steven Cohen’s hedge fund SAC Capital Advisors LP.

………

According to court papers, the shareholder settlement also resolved claims against several former top Citigroup officials, including Chief Executive Charles Prince and senior adviser Robert Rubin. Stein asked whether this was proper.

“Does the absence of any payments from the individual defendants render the settlement unfair to class members who still hold the Citigroup stock they purchased during the class period?” he asked both sides to address.

More of this, please.