Category: Defense Procurement

Prodigious Puffed up Phallus Produces Peril for Passaic, Paramis, Packanack, Pascoag, Pelham, and Philadelphia*

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Everything the military does tends toward the phallic.
Compensating for Something?

Every time we drive north on 95 from Baltimore, we see some aerostats (tethered blimps}.

It’s all a part of the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) and today, a tether broke:

The U.S. military has two giant, unmanned surveillance blimps it uses to watch the East Coast from a base in Maryland. And one of them escaped its tethers Wednesday and floated aimlessly over Pennsylvania, downing power lines and cutting off electricity for tens of thousands of residents.

The incident started shortly after noon, when the blimp became detached from its anchor, NORAD said. Two F-16 fighter jets were scrambled to ensure it didn’t collide with other aircraft. By late afternoon, the dirigible had come down to the ground near Moreland Township in Pennsylvania — after drifting more than 100 miles — but not before leaving a trail of damage in its wake.

It was unclear how the aerostat got loose and how it came down, said John Cornelio, a spokesman for NORAD. He added it was possible that the aerostat’s helium could have run out.

………

The blimp wreaked plenty of havoc. Frederick Hunsinger, the public safety director for Columbia County, Pa., said in an interview that the blimp’s heavy tether dragged for 20 miles across his county. There were no injuries within county borders, but the damage caused 35,000 to lose electricity, he said. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania canceled classes as a result; 911 phone lines were overwhelmed.

………

Known as the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System, or JLENS, the blimp is technically an aerostat — a term for a lighter-than-air craft that is tethered to the ground. The $2.7 billion program is on a three-year test run to see whether it can help detect cruise missiles or enemy aircraft from 10,000 feet above ground.

………

The JLENS program “continues to drain money from taxpayers even though it serves no strategic purpose,” Rep. Jackie Speier (D-Calif.) said. “This incident is just another example of the problems inherent in an ill-conceived network of floating blimps that don’t provide any advantage over aircraft we’ve already bought.”

I am sure that the 35,000 people who lost power would agree with Representative Speier.

It does see  to be yet another DoD program where they are procuring without a meaningful need.

*What can I say? The juxtaposition of penis humor and alliteration are comedy gold., and yes, it is one of the reasons that I made this post..

Another Benefit to the Libs Winning in the Great White North

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It looks like the elections in Canada make it far less likely for there to be any purchases of the F-35:

British Columbia — Canada will see a major shift in defense policy with the election of a new Liberal Party government and its planned withdrawal from the Iraq coalition air campaign and the US-led F-35 program.

 Prime Minister-designate Justin Trudeau promised both during the election campaign leading up to Monday’s vote. Trudeau won a surprise landslide victory, forcing the ruling Conservative Party government into the opposition ranks of the House of Commons.

 Trudeau said Tuesday he talked to US President Obama about Canada’s changing role in Iraq and the battle against the Islamic State militant group.

 “I committed that we would continue to engage in a responsible way that understands how Canada has a role to play in the fight against ISIL,” Trudeau told journalists in a televised news conference from Ottawa, using an alternative acronym for the Islamic State group, also known as IS. “But (President Obama) understands the commitments I’ve made around ending the combat mission.”

 ………

 Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper said if he was re-elected, he would approve a long-term commitment to the Iraq and Syrian wars.

 Although Trudeau intends to end Canada’s role in the bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria, he has promised to boost the number of soldiers available to train Iraqi troops.

 ………

 Trudeau also has promised to move quickly on replacing Canada’s aging fleet of CF-18 fighter aircraft and to pull out of the F-35 program. He said Canada does not need a stealth fighter for its defense needs and that the F-35 is too expensive.

 The Liberal Party released its 88-page election platform Oct. 5, which included some details about how it would proceed with replacing the CF-18s. “The primary mission of our fighter aircraft should remain the defence of North America, not stealth first-strike capability,” the platform said. “We will make investing in the Royal Canadian Navy a top priority. By purchasing more affordable alternatives to the F-35s, we will be able to invest in strengthening our Navy.”

 ………

 Alan Williams, who signed the original memorandum that brought Canada into the F-35 program in 1997, said the planned withdrawal from the fighter jet project would be embarrassing for the US.

 But he said that Canada has to base its decisions on its own defense needs, and not only on the security and industrial concerns of its allies.

 ………

 The other potential contenders to replace Canada’s CF-18s are the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale, Boeing’s Super Hornet and Saab’s Gripen.

 Williams said holding an open competition for a CF-18 replacement would ensure Canadian aerospace firms have the best chance at obtaining work on such a project.

 Trudeau has suggested that the F-35 would not be considered in any competition.

There is an interesting comparison of capabilities at this page, and you will notice that, apart from low observability performance (stealth), the F-35 does not seem to be a particularly good deal:


 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II Saab Gripen JAS 39E/F Eurofighter Typhoon Dassault Rafale Boeing F/A-18E/F/G Super Hornet
Crew 1 1(E), 2(F) 1 or 2(Trainer) 1(C,M), 2(B) 1(E), 2 (F,G)
Engines 1 1 2 2 2
Power 28,000 (43,000 with afterburner) 13,000 (22,000 with afterburner) 26,000 (40,000 with afterburner) 22,500 (34,000 with afterburner) 26,000 (44,000 with afterburner)
Thrust-to-weight ratio (with 100% fuel and A2A weapons) 0.87 1.06 1.07 0.99 0.93
Max speed (in mach) 1.6 2 2 1.8 1.8
Supercruise No1 1.2 (with 2 WVR and 2 BVR missiles) 1.3 (with 2 WVR and 4 BVR missiles) 1.4 (with 6 WVR/BVR missiles) No
Combat Radius (Air to Air mission) 1,100km (internal fuel only) 1,300km (with centreline 290 gallon tank) 1,389km 1,000+km 1000+km (internal fuel only)
Ferry Range (with external tanks) 2,220km (internal fuel only)2 4,000+km 3,790km 3,700+km 3,300km
Service ceiling: 60,000ft3 50,000ft4 55,000ft 55,000ft 50,000ft+
Wing loading (lower = better): 91.4lb/ft2 58lb/ft24 64lb/ft2 62.8lb/ft2 94lb/ft2
Rate of climb: Classified 50,000ft/min4 62,000ft/min 60,000ft/min 44,882ft/min
Radar: AN/APG-81 AESA Raven AESA CAPTOR-E AESA (planned) RBE2-AA AESA APG-79 AESA
Infrared Search and Track: AAQ-40 EOTS Selex “Skyward G” IRST PIRATE IRST, LITENING pod SAGEM-OSF IRST mounted in external fuel tank
Helmet mounted display System: HMDS (still in development) Cobra HMDS Eurofighter HMSS TopSight HMD JHMCS






Electronic warfare and countermeasures: AN/AAQ/37 DAS missile warning system, AN/ASQ-239 Electronic Warfare system, stealth design resulting in decreased radar and infrared signature. ECM pods, BOL advanced countermeasure dispenser, MAW (missile approach warner), Laser Warning System, towed decoy, internally mounted RF jammers. ECM pods, flares, IR decoy dispenser, chaff pods, radar warning receiver, MAW, laser warning receiver, towed decoy, Thales SPECTRA electronic warfare suite ECM pods, towed decoys, chaff, flares, AN/ALE-165 jammer pod, AN/ALR-67 radar warning reciever
Gun: GAU-22/A 25mm 4-barrelled gatling cannon 27mm Mauser BK-27 Revolver cannon (E model only) 27mm Mauser BK-27 Revolver cannon 30mm GIAT 30/719B autocannon 20mm M61 Vulcan gatling cannon
Hardpoints: 4 internal, 6 external 10 13 (4 semi-conformal) 14 11
Payload: 18,000lbs (using external pylons) 15,875lbs 16,500lbs 21,000lbs 17,750lbs
“X-Factor”: Stealth, advanced sensors Can operate from unprepared runways, low operating cost. Legendary air-to-air performance, twin engine. Ground strike ability, naval version available, twin engine. Naval airframe, easy transition, twin engine.
Problems: Troubled development, questionable performance, high operating cost. Smaller design, less payload. Troubled history, high operating cost. Proprietary systems and weapons. Old design, unremarkable performance.

1Unofficially, the F-35 can supercruise at mach 1.2 for a distance of 241km.
2External fuel tanks are planned for the F-35, but none have been flight tested yet.
3The F-35 has only been tested to 43,000ft so far.
4Gripen C information, Gripen E data is unavailable

I would note here that the F-35 is more than 50% more costly than any of the competition, and has a direct operating cost more than that of an F-15, which was never known as an aircraft that was cheap to operate.

Further, it appears that the use of external tanks in a combat configuration will not be something that we will see in the near future, the Pentagon has its eggs in the stealth basket, and adding a combat tank would require its cooperation.

This means that its range in a typical combat configuration will typically be no better than its competitors.

In an air to air mode, the F-35 either needs to carry missiles externally, negating stealth, or to limit itself to just two missiles, placing the aircraft at a disadvantage.

Furthermore, much like Donald Trump’s hair, it’s fat, heavy and slow.

Finally, the F-35 is a roach motel: Data goes in, but it does not come out until it reaches Lockheed Martin in Ft. Worth, which means that there will be a heavy rent collected for developing new weapons, which will suppress the defense industries in partner nations.

The inability to access the source code of the aircraft also means that there will be some serious tactical issues, as data collected on new threats cannot even be examined by anyone but LM and the Pentagon, which could make for lots of flaming debris when an opponent deploys a heretofore unknown air defense system.

I do understand why Trudeau wants to drop the program:  It is less a defense program than it is an industrial base preservation program centered on the US defense industry.

This is a Feature, Not a Bug

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It turns out that Lockheed-Martin and the Pentagon are adding insult to injury, and requiring that F-35 customers fund software upgrade laboratories, because these will be the only entities capable of maintaining the aircraft.

So in addition to everything else, the JSF will be a “forever” source of revenue for LM, while ensuring that foreign operators will never develop expertise necessary to be a competitor: (Paid subscription required):

Foreign air forces using the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are being compelled to build and fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats.

This regime is more stringent and far-reaching than earlier U.S. fighter export deals. Those usually withheld key software — known as source code — from the customer, but in most cases allowed local users to manage their own “threat libraries,” data that allowed the electronic warfare (EW) system to identify radio-frequency threats, with in-country, locally staffed facilities.

For the U.K. in particular, the reliance on U.S.-located laboratories looks like a pullback from its earlier position. In 2006, concern over access to JSF technology reached the national leadership level, and prompted a declaration, by U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, that “both governments agree that the U.K. will have the ability to successfully operate, upgrade, employ, and maintain the JSF such that the U.K. retains operational sovereignty over the aircraft.”

That promise seemingly contrasts with the severe limits now being imposed on non-U.S. access to the system.

………

Another source close to the U.K. user community notes that Lockheed Martin has advertised the capability of the “fusion engine” — the software that combines inputs from different sensors and datalinks — to identify targets and implement rules of engagement automatically. But if the logic of the fusion engine itself is not understood at the U.K.’s operational level, he says, “You can imagine that this slaughters our legal stance on a clear, unambiguous and sovereign kill chain.”

The restrictions are also likely to be cumbersome. By contrast, “Swedish air force Gripens are often updated between sorties,” a Saab spokesman says. Signals intercepted and recorded by the fighter’s EW system on one sortie can be analyzed and the system updated in hours.

If this sounds like incompetence, it’s because you do not understand the goal of the program.

The goal is maintaining and extending US hegemony in the weapons market, so that they have money for overpaying retired generals as “consultants”.

This is Satire, and it Sucks to Have to Say It

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No, the Pentagon is now requesting a budget authorization to purchase gold plated F-35s, it is parody from Duffelblog:

The Pentagon released a report today requesting Congressional authorization for 500 gold-plated F-35 fighter planes.

The F-35 Lightning II is a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter intended to replace numerous aging aircraft, including the A-10 Thunderbolt II and the F-16 Fighting Falcon. The F-35 program has been fraught with problems, including numerous delays, cost overruns, and failure to deliver on promised operational performance.

The new variant, dubbed the F-35G, is proposed as an upgrade over existing F-35 models. In addition to 24K gold plating encasing its exterior, its cockpit is trimmed with wood grain paneling harvested from the endangered African blackwood tree and leather upholstery from the hide of the northern white rhinoceros. Its GAU-12/A 25mm rotary cannon is able to fire solid platinum rounds at a rate of 3300 per minute. Each round is handcrafted by a Swiss jeweler.

“In an ever-evolving battlefield, it is imperative to have a military equipped with tactical vehicles that offer versatility, adaptability, and mother of pearl ice buckets to keep champagne bottles cold during missions,” reads the Pentagon report. “Our service men and women deserve to fly in only the finest combat aircraft.”

Each F-35G unit is projected to cost 8.2 billion dollars, approximately twice the average annual GDP of some of the countries it is expected to bomb. The total cost, including development, procurement, operation, and sustainment, will top $15 trillion over the life of the program.

I will note that this is not that far from the truth.

Each B-2 bomber, for example, costs about $2.1 billion dollars.

With an empty weight of 158,000 lbs, and the current price of gold being $1,147.00/ troy ounce, it costs almost as much as if it were made of gold. (158,000 lbs of gold would cost $2,642,878,402.00)

Us weapons procurement is well and truly broken.

F-35 Testing Beginning to Resemble Lance Armstrong Blood Tests

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It turns out that the recent “successful deployment of the F-35 in US Marine Corps exercises was nothing of the sort:

The Marine Corps triumphantly declared its variant of the F-35 combat ready in late July. In the public relations build-up, the recent demonstration of its performance on the USS Wasp was heralded as a rebuttal to the program’s critics.

But a complete copy of a recent memo from the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) — obtained by the Project On Government Oversight through the Freedom of Information Act — reveals that a number of maintenance and reliability problems “are likely to present significant near-term challenges for the Marine Corps.”

The Marine Corps named this demonstration “Operational Test One,” but it turns out it wasn’t actually an operational test, “in either a formal or an informal sense of the term.” To count as an operational test, conditions should closely match realistic combat conditions.

But DOT&E found the demonstration “did not — and could not — demonstrate that Block 2B F-35B is operationally effective or suitable for use in any type of limited combat operation, or that it was ready for real-world operational deployments, given the way the event was structured.”

The details buried inside the report’s annexes also show just how much trouble the crew faced in attempting to keep the F-35s selected for the demonstration flightworthy. Before the demonstration even began the Marine Corps had to swap out one F-35B with another “due to a fuel system fault that would have been impractical to fix at sea given the maintenance workload.”

In combat, not only would this kind of replacement be impractical, it would likely be impossible.

It goes on to state that the the WASP was emptied of other aircraft in order to facilitate F-35 ops, critical hardware and software not being present on the system, around 80 civilian contractors on board to keep the aircraft running, a prognostics and maintenance system that is basically non-functional, and a much lower operational tempo than promised.

This aircraft is a turkey, and I see no prospect of it being fixed.

What a Surprise

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We now have a $1,000,000,000 cost overrun on the new Boeing Tanker:

Boeing is, once again, taking a charge on its books to keep the U.S. Air Force’s KC-46 aerial refueler program on track.

The after-tax charge is $536 million; that is $835 million before taxes. The lion’s share – $513 million – comes from Boeing Commercial Airplanes, which is providing the 767 baseline platform, while Boeing Military Aircraft, a division of Boeing Defense Space and Security, is paying $322 million. More detail is expected in an earnings call for the second quarter scheduled for July 22.

The past two years of Boeing KC-46 charges amount to a pre-tax burden of $1.26 billion for the program.

This most recent overrun is a result of technical problems with the tanker’s complex integrated fuel system, which provides fuel to fly the KC-46 as well as to receivers taking on fuel from a centerline boom or wing-mounted pods. The fuel system is the heart and soul of an aerial tanker, and Boeing’s extensive experience building tankers was a major selling point in its bid against Airbus for the KC-X competition. The problems arose as the company “prepared for and conducted test and verification of that system during the second quarter,” the company’s July 17 announcement says. Multiple Boeing spokesmen declined to say when the test problems came to light beyond pointing to the second quarter, or April – June.

On May 26, however, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney told Aviation Week the program appeared on track. “If there were any cost overruns [anticipated] we would tell you. Could things go wrong? A test [anomaly] that would cause a delay or an extra charge? It’s a possibility. But it’s not what we see today. We have a high degree of confidence,” he said.

This raises the question of when the design failures came to light and when they were briefed up the company’s chain of command. The spokesmen declined to provide input on this point, citing the forthcoming earnings call.

“[Boeing is] working through the qualification process of the complete KC-46 weapon system, and not surprisingly the integrated fuel system is a large part of that effort,” said Brig. Gen. Duke Richardson, program executive officer of tankers for the Air Force. “With EMD-1 exiting fuel dock and preparing to return to flight and the entry of EMD-2 into fuel dock, Boeing continues to make solid progress. While we have more heavy lifting coming up, we believe it is achievable and do not see any technical showstoppers.”

Boeing took a $272 million after tax charge – or $425 million pre-tax – last summer due to an inadequate design for wiring bundles on the aircraft. The Air Force requires redundancies and “safe separation” between some wiring components in the militarized 767, and the design fell short, prompting an extensive redesign and months-long delay to the first flight of the tanker.

………

Following last year’s charge, Pentagon procurement chief Frank Kendall predicted more overruns, to the chagrin of the company. “Boeing has taken a pretty large loss that they recently booked against the tanker. We expected that. There’s potential for additional loss that Boeing would have to absorb. But there’s a lot of business for Boeing at the end of this, and that’s one of the reasons we did it this way. They have a business case to finish the program and deliver the tanker,” he told Aviation Week in November.

How the f%$# does Boeing, which pretty much invented the airborne tanker, manage to f%$# up making a tanker out of a design that has its origins from about 40 years ago, when Israel has already deployed and sold 767 tanker conversions to foreign customers, and the Airbus A330 tanker is currently flying with 4 nations.

How the hell do you have a 22% cost overrun on crap like this?

This is happening because Boeing knows that the Washington State Congressional delegation has its back, so they delivered an unrealistic bid, and executed it poorly, because it is a heads Boeing wins tails the taxpayers lose.

And from the Only Country with a More Dysfunctional Weapons Development Program than Ours………

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It appears that India’s Tejas light fighter ,already more than 30 years in development, will face further delays:

Delayed by more than 15 years, India’s homegrown Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mark-1 is ready for critical test flights necessary for its final operational clearance (FOC) at the end of the year, but analysts and Indian Air Force (IAF) officials say that clearance will slip again, to next year.

Though he did not provide a date for the test flights, a Defence Ministry official said they will include firings of a variety of weapons, including air-to-air missiles and Israeli-made Derby beyond-visual-range missiles. The Russian-made close-combat missile R-73 has already been integrated on the aircraft.

………

“FOC would most probably slip to sometime in 2016,” Kak said. “But given the track record, these kind of slippages have over the years been accepted as par for the course.”

The Air Force ordered 20 of the Mark-1s after the aircraft’s initial operational clearance in December 2013, and is set to order an additional 20 following FOC. State-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) will produce all 40 aircraft under limited series production and says it has the capacity to produce eight LCA Mark-1s a year once the full order is placed.

But so far the Air Force has received only one aircraft to use for weapon integration and testing, not the four it wanted to have at this stage.

“Weapons integration has been on for quite some time and the LCA has fired the R73 missile and laser-guided bombs during [the Air Force’s] firepower demonstration in February 2014,” said Daljit Singh, retired Air Force air marshal. “However, more weapons are required to be integrated. In addition to weapons integration, test flights are also required to integrate and test other avionics and systems.

This program has been in development for 32 years, and they still cannot deliver the number of aircraft needed for qualification trials, and those that they do develop will have a lower performance engine than the original domestic powerplant.

This is a complete cluster f%$#.

The F-35 is Dysfunctional in Long Range Air to Air Combat as Well

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In the recent discussions of the failings of the F-35 in close in combat, it ignored the other rather obvious bit which is that it is sub par in a longer range combat involving missiles as well:

The Pentagon’s new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is dead meat in a close battle against even a dated two-seat F-16D fighter jet, according to a scathing test pilot report War Is Boring obtained.

Don’t sweat it, JSF-maker Lockheed Martin responded. “The F-35’s technology is designed to engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances,” Lockheed’s F-35 team wrote in a press release on July 1

As a rebuttal to the test pilot report, Lockheed’s claim is a cynically useful one — it sidesteps the criticism without really confirming or denying it. But that doesn’t mean the company’s test-report rebuttal is actually true.

Can the F-35 really engage, shoot and kill its enemy from long distances? There are reasons to believe it can’t. The stealth fighter lacks the sensors, weapons and speed that allow a warplane to reliably detect and shoot down other planes in combat. Especially when those planes are shooting back.

In short—the F-35 isn’t much of a dogfighter. And it’s probably not very good at long-range aerial combat, either.

………

To this end, the F-35 does have a high-tech radar, high-fidelity cameras and other advanced gear that can detect airplanes. But foremost, Lockheed optimized these sensors for spotting targets on the ground — and at relatively short distances.

The F-35 can see great. It just can’t see all that great into the air. At least not compared to modern Chinese- and Russian-made jets — the planes the F-35 is most likely to face in battle in some future war.

First, we have to look at how the F-35’s sensors compare to its rivals. The latest Russian radars, such as the one on the new Sukhoi Su-35, at least match the JSF’s APG-81, according to data compiled by Carlo Kopp at Air Power Australia.

While the specific details remain secret, Kopp estimates the APG-81 can detect an aircraft with a radar cross-section of three square meters—a MiG-29, for example—just over 100 miles away. Russian radar-maker Tikhomirov claims the Su-35’s Irbis-E can spot a similar-size target at greater than twice that distance.

………

JSF pilots shouldn’t expect to automatically get the jump on their enemies. And once everyone has detected everyone else and the long-distance shooting starts, the F-35 is in even more trouble.

The American AIM-120, the Russian R-77 and the Chinese PL-12 are all comparable long-range missiles, each with a nominal range of around 60 miles. But the F-35 is slower than rival Russian or Chinese fighters, making it a less effective missile-shooter.

A fast-flying jet can impart extra energy to any weapon it fires. That means a “supercruising” fighter such as the Su-35 — that is, a fast-flying plane that exceeds the speed of sound without a fuel-guzzling afterburner — can potentially fling its missiles farther than a missile’s advertised range.

Unable to supercruise like its rivals, the JSF can’t launch its own weapons with nearly as much extra power.

More importantly, depending on the variant, the R-77 boasts radar guidance or can home in on heat signatures — a fighter pilot can also use his plane’s radar to point the weapon near its target, at which a passive sensor on the missile takes over.

………

Not that the F-35 has much room for different kinds of missiles. In stealth mode, with its weapons tucked into an internal bay, the F-35 can only carry four AIM-120s. And that’s only if it’s not also carrying its standard load of GPS-guided bombs.

The Chinese J-20 apparently has room for four missiles inside its main weapons bay, along with two more missiles in smaller bays on the sides of the fuselage. The more conventional Su-35 can carry a whopping 10 missiles under its wings and fuselage.

………

“You up your chances of success with a multiple-missile shot,” says Thomas Christie, an analyst who worked with legendary Air Force Col. John Boyd on his “energy-maneuverability” dogfighting concept. In the past, fighter pilots trained to fire two missiles at a time, Christie explains.

Using this method, a JSF flier might get just one shot or two before he’s out of missiles. Meanwhile, Russian or Chinese jets could easily manage twice as many individual engagements — or boost their chances of a kill by firing three or more missiles at a time

As I’ve noted before, this may not as big a deal as one would think, as achieving air superiority comes down to training and tactics, so even with an inferior platform, particularly when backed up by superior numbers and logistics.

With limited sensors, compromised stealth, not enough energy and too few weapons, the F-35 is probably already outclassed in a long-range fight. Never mind merely staying out of short-range dogfights. America’s new stealth fighter should probably avoid aerial duels at any distance.

The F-35 is going to be a major pig, and advances in sensor fusion and computing are are currently in the process of eviscerating what might be its sole advantage, stealth.

From a tactical perspective, as I’ve noted before, this may not as big a deal as one would think, as achieving air superiority comes down to training and tactics, so even with an inferior platform, particularly when backed up by superior numbers and logistics.

The consequences of flushing trillions of dollars down the toilet, particularly when bridges, roads and water mains are falling apart are a much bigger deal though.

White elephants do not come cheap.

Russia Resets its Armor

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Click any Image for Popup Slideshow

T-14 Armata Tank, Side View
1
T-14 Armata Tank, Front Qurter View
2

T-14 Armata Tank, Rear Quarter View
3
T-14 Armata T-72 Size Comparison
4

Medium IFV, Kurganets-25
5
T-15 Heavy IFV

6

T-14 vs T-72 on Parade
7
AMX-13 with bustle for autoloader for comparison
8

T-14 Armata Tank, Labeled
9
T-15 Armata IFV,  Labeled
10

New Wheeled “Boomerang” 8X8
11
Koalitsiya-SV Self Propelled Artillery
12

T-15 Engine and Drive Detail
13
T-15 Engine and Drive

14

Nothing has gotten more buzz across the military journalism sphere than the 75th May 9 VE day parade in Moscow.

It appears that Russia is going with completely new designs for pretty much all of its armor.

There appear to be a completely new tank, a heavy IFV (a vehicle that has never before been in the Russian/Soviet inventory), medium IFV, wheeled IFV, and SP Howitzer.

It appears that the Russians are upgrading their entire armored inventory, with the exception of the light airborne elements, over the next few years.

The T-14 Armata tank is perhaps the most significant departure from past practice, dispensing with a crewed turret, and placing the crew, commander, gunner, and driver, in the hull.

Of note is the rather large bustle on the back of the turret. (Picture 1)

It looks rather, like the bustle arrangement for AMX-13 light tank of the 1960s (Picture 8), but it appears even less integrated.

In the AMX-13, the bustle was used to accommodate magazines for the auto-loader, but there does not appear to be enough volume for this application with Russian 125mm rounds.

My (not particularly educated) guess is that the structure accommodates the mechanism for the auto-loader.

I would also note that the turret has an unfinished appearance to it, and I’m wondering if discussions are still ongoing regarding the level of armor on the turret.

Even with the possibilities for space savings from the new configuration, the T-14 is larger than the T-72 family it succeeds.

My guess it is being driven by the following factors:

  • The platform will be used on a new heavy APC/IFV, the T-15.
  • Additional ground clearance allows for greater resistance to mines and IEDs.
  • More space for survivability, particularly in terms of separating ammunition storage from critical components and crew.
  • Improved crew accommodations and comfort.

Among other things, I think that the new platform indicates a focus on counterinsurgency, particularly as it applies to the T-15, which is a vehicle that has not existed in the Russian arsenal before.

The T-15 is in many ways similar to the Israeli Namer IFV, which is derived from the Merkava main battle tank.

One significant difference though is that it appears that the platform has been turned around for the T-15:  The engine and drive sprockets are in the front for the T-15, and in the rear for the T-14.  (Pictures 1, 6, 10, 13, & 14) (The Merkava and Namer both have front mounted engines and drive sprockets)

The T-15 likely reflects a new strategic vision:  A heavy IFV does not gain one a lot in “Fulda Gap” scenario, where tanks would still likely be able to take them out with impunity, but it would be useful in counterinsurgency and occupation scenarios.

The new medium IFV, in the 25 ton class, is the Kurganets-25, and once again, it is larger than its predecessor, though it carries the same remotely operated turret as the T-15.

It is larger than its BMP predecessors, and has greater ground clearance as well as greater height, indicating easier entrance and egress from the vehicle, which in turn suggests that the vehicle is likely to be deployed like an IFV than an APC.  (Basically troops in the vehicle until much closer to the line of battle)

Like its larger sibling, and unlike the BMP, the engine will be front mounted, which should further aid in deploying troops.

For lighter deployments, the Russians appear to be replacing their BTR with the “Boomerang”.

Much like the other IFVs, the engines have been moved forward to allow for rear dismount, and much like its western counterparts, and unlike the BTR, it has a deep “V” hull for better resistance to mines and IEDs.

Finally, there is the Koalitsiya-SV self propelled howitzer.  It is the only one of the new tanks that is derived from an existing platform, specifically a chassis from the T-80, which is shares with its predecessor, 2S19 Msta-S.

It has an auto-loader, and it is reported to have some sort of fractional propellant system, which could allow for simultaneous rounds on target.

What may be most telling is what we did not see.

Specifically,  the absence of updated airborne armor indicates that the strategic view of the Russian armed forces is significantly different from that of the Soviet ones.

They clearly do not expect to project power much beyond countries on their boarders, which, for example, a heavy IFV makes sense.

If you are looking for world wide operations, the heavy IFV does not make a whole lot of sense, which is why the US Military, which these days is an imperial military, screwed the pooch with their now-abandoned Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

As an aside, there is a big difference between a 45-50 ton heavy IFV (the T-15) and a 65-75 ton IFV (GCV) in terms of cost, logistics, maintenance, and support as well.

This is a remarkably ambitious program for the Russian military, and the fact that they actually have something resembling functional hardware in public is remarkable.

In comparison to my experience with the Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV), where much of the time was spent on (I am not kidding here) dealing with General’s demands that the PowerPoint slides protection color coding be made more consistent (really, not kidding here) until after more than a decade, it was canceled, the Russians seem to have achieved a remarkably competent military design and procurement process.

Various links I used below, in no particular order:

Russia’s armour revolution – IHS Jane’s 360

Photo Gallery: Red Square Revelations | Aviation Week

New Russian Armor – First analysis – Armata | Defense Update:

New Russian armor – First analysis Part II: Kurganets-25 | Defense Update:

Updated: Russian Armata unveiled: a new family of armored combat vehicles | Defense Update:

New Russian armor – Part III: Boomerang 8×8 AFV | Defense Update:

SNAFU!: Close up, Hi Rez pics of the Armata MBT Turret!

SNAFU!: Size comparison between the Armata and T-72…

Russian Armata unveiled: a new family of armored combat vehicles | Defense Update:

Kurganets-25 – a new family of medium troop carriers from Russia | Defense Update:

SNAFU!: Quick and dirty on the Armata MBT…

SNAFU!: What is with the new Russian Heavy IFV?

The French Finally Start Making Foreign Sales for the Rafale

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For a number of years now, the Rafale has been the bridesmaid, and never the bride, on foreign sales.

The logjam broke when India selected the Dassault aircraft as the winner of its MMRCA competition.

The contract was for 126 aircraft, with the first 18 being delivered by Dassault, and the remainder being locally manufactured by state owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

At this point contract negotiations because Dassault was unwilling to offer performance guarantees for the aircraft manufactured by HAL:

After months of seeing Dassault Aviation being browbeaten in the Indian press, French arms procurement agency DGA defended its contractor, asserting that a 2012 agreement to provide India with Rafale fighter jets never committed the company to guarantee aircraft manufactured in India at state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL). However, a recent senior adviser to HAL’s management tells Aviation Week that guaranteeing HAL’s work is not the issue, but that the French are being “rigid” and refusing to stand behind the integrity of the design.

 “Dassault will not be responsible for the whole contract. It is a co-management setup,” says French defense procurement chief Laurent Collet-Billon, who was clear that France will not assume full liability for HAL-built Rafales. “It cannot be a problem, because it was not in the request for proposals [RFP].”

 Speaking to reporters during an annual media address Feb. 9, France’s arms procurement chief said the €10.2 billion ($12 billion) agreement—which has been under negotiation for more than three years—calls for the first 18 of 126 Rafale jets to be built in France. After that, HAL would take over production of the remaining 108 aircraft.

 ………

 Moreover, a retired senior Indian military officer who was involved in the drafting of the original RFP and has been a senior advisor to HAL, tells Aviation Week that “the French don’t want to be accountable in any way. The original equipment manufacturer [OEM] has to stand guarantee with respect to design and integrity of design. The French are trying to get away from the OEM’s responsibility.” He added that the defense ministry would eventually have to choose between the Rafale and the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), a HAL-developed variant of the Sukhoi T-50.

 ………

 Dassault’s response to the RFP was influenced by a planned partnership with Reliance Industries, a $75 billion private-sector energy-based conglomerate that planned to expand into aerospace and defense. Reliance would have performed much of the manufacturing work on the locally built Rafales in new-build facilities. However, the Indian government has insisted that HAL build the aircraft. The original manufacturers of the Su-30MKI and Jaguar were not asked for similar guarantees.

The subtext here is that Dassault has absolutely no confidence in the ability of HAL to make Rafales in a timely or competent manner.

After much negotiation, it was offered that HAL be upgraded to co-contractor status, which would have the effect of increasing technical transfer at the cost of HAL being responsible for any guarantees on the aircraft that they build.

While all of this was going on, an actual sales deal was signed with Egypt, which would have 24 jets pulled out of the current pipeline for the French AF, and modified slightly. (Basically pulling wiring for nuclear weapons and going with a non-NATO communications system)

The fact that Rafael finally had some export orders, along with the fact that India has a desperate need for new airframes, (it’s aging fleet of MiG-21s are crashing with alarming regularity) India and France cut a deal for a government to government transfer of 36 of the fighter jets:

India will now negotiate direct purchase of 36 Rafale jets from France through a government-to-government deal worth around $4 billion, without any “Make in India” or technology transfer component, to meet IAF’s urgent “critical operational necessity” for new fighters.

 After Modi held extensive talks with French President Francois Hollande in Paris on Friday, it was announced that fresh commercial negotiations will now be held for the direct acquisition of two Rafale squadrons (each has 18 jets) in “flyaway” condition.

 “France has agreed to fast-track the deliveries and give us better terms for the outright purchase and longer maintenance support for the jets. Finding the money for this contract should not be a problem since it will have to be paid in installments linked to deliveries,” said a source.

Basically, the French came away with the upside of an Indian deal, it removed uncertainty in other nations about being a “first mover” on the export front, which led to the Egypt deal, and they did not have to hitch their wagon to the famously f%$#ed up HAL, which, as evidenced by the 30+ year and counting development of the Tejas lightweight fighter, is something that would have bitten Dassult in the butt at a later date.
.

And now there is the announcement of the sale of an additional 24 aircraft to Qatar.

After what must have been over a decade of uncertainty, it appears that Dassault will stay in the fighter business.

Exactly the Wrong Idea

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JCS Chairman Ray Odierno says that the problem with US defense procurement is that the Uniformed military has insufficient authority, and the civilians have too much authority:

The U.S. Army’s top officer said service chiefs rather than civilians should play a bigger role in deciding what kinds of weapons the military buys.

Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno this week called on lawmakers to consider the move while debating ways to reform the Defense Department’s acquisition process.

“There’s a message that gets sent throughout the acquisition force that they don’t work for the uniformed military, they work for the civilians,” he said on Wednesday during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “That’s a dangerous message because I think our experience in support of the process is very important.”

He added, “We should play a bigger role in approving where we’re going, milestones, how the requirements meet with what’s being done by the acquisition. I think an oversight by the military would be more important and could add some potential positive energy towards building better acquisition programs.”

While the service’s top civilian, Army Secretary John McHugh, offered mild support for the idea, saying it “makes some sense,” it’s unclear whether lawmakers would back the proposal. The Army, arguably more than any other service, has a long and troubled history of procurement efforts gone awry.

A government report released in 2011 concluded that since 1996, the Army spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were ultimately canceled — and that since 2004, the figure climbed to between $3.3 billion and $3.8 billion a year.

While the Army has since implemented a slew of the report’s recommendations, it continues to spend billions of dollars on systems that never enter production. In recent years, for example, the service canceled the Ground Combat Vehicle, or GCV, designed to replace a portion of the fleet of Bradley fighting vehicles, and the Armed Aerial Scout, meant to replace the OH-58 Kiowa helicopter.

The GCV, or more accurately, the FCS, a family of manned and unmanned vehicles, was arguably the most expensive clusterf%$# yet canceled by the military.

The biggest problem was the uniformed military.

A new military program manager would rotate in every 3 years or so, the priorities were changed, and the program suffered more delays and cost growth.

What’s more, as a matter of policy, the army, the lead service on the program, had (and perhaps has) a policy of not stating what they want.  They will only say when they don’t like something.

So we had interminable meetings about dominated about questions from senior army officers talking about how how disappointed they were that the the colors of models produced by various divisions of BAE and GD did not match up.  (I am not kidding here)

If anything, the evidence is that the uniformed military needs to be further removed from the procurement process.

Lockheed Martin Promises a Pony………

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Lockheed Martin is now saying that it will be able cut the cost of the F-35:

Lockheed Martin is on track to slash 30 per cent from the cost of each F-35 joint strike fighter, bringing the price of the controversial aircraft below that of previous, less capable generations of fighters, Marillyn Hewson, the company’s chief executive, said on Wednesday.

The reduction would bring the cost of each F-35A — the version for the US air force — down to less than $80m from between $110m and $115m each. Such a saving could save billions of dollars in procurement costs for the programme, currently estimated at $396bn for more than 3,000 aircraft for the US and key allies.

Winslow Wheeler, of the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) estimates the cost of the F-35 to be at least twice that.

I would also note that the F-35, as delivered, is not combat capable.

It will will have beta software, its maintenance software will not be close to operation, and it will be unable to carry the bomb that is crucial to its mission until 2022.

Am I the only one who thinks that Lockheed’s price estimates are based on the economics of the 1954 Looney Tune Design for Leaving?

You know that one. Daffy Duck is trying to sell a push button house of the future, and the final punch line is, “For a small price, I can install this little blue button to get you down!”

All I can say is that whoever is going to deploy this clusterf%$# is going to be paying for a lot of blue buttons.

USAF to English Translation: If You Cannot Dazzle Them With Brilliance, Baffle Them With Bullsh%$

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Now that the US Air Force’s ongoing (As in: the wild blue yonder crowd has been trying to kill the plane since it was fielded) attempt to retire the A-10 close air support (CAS) aircraft is running into opposition, they are looking to, “reshape the discussion away from a binary A-10 versus F-35 fight.”

This translates to, “F%$# you. We want our new toy, and we don’t like doing CAS anyway”.

The Air Force even went so far as to release dishonestly cherry picked data to support getting rid of the A-10.

And now they want to redefine the debate:

Few procurement issues—with the exception of the unsuccessful fight to continue F-22 production—spark the kind of impassioned pleas among U.S. Air Force officers as the unsuccessful struggle to retire the A-10 and make way for the Lockheed Martin F-35.

………

Not so in the case of the A-10. The Air Force is for the second year pushing to quickly retire the fleet in part because it is a single-mission aircraft, designed to provide close air support (CAS). Amid the budget crunch, the Air Force is shedding single-mission fleets.

Yet, the focus of its mission is exactly what has congealed support for the aptly named Warthog. The A-10 has been a visible savior for ground troops for decades and especially so in recent fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is being replaced by the multi-mission, single-engine, stealthy F-35. A-10 boosters fear the CAS mission will be lost if it is only one among a host of missions to be handled by the F-35, which is also replacing F-16s in the Air Force. Some say the Air Force has lost it way on the CAS mission. “That’s a ridiculous statement,” says Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh, bristling at the notion during a roundtable with reporters Feb. 13 at the annual Air Force Association symposium in Orlando. “Guess how many CAS sorties we’ve flown? It’s about 20,000 a year. When is a little bit of credit given for that? . . . Let’s not change the facts to match whatever story we’re trying to tell.” Welsh also notes that CAS is “all the Marine Corps is buying [the F-35B] for, to replace the Harrier.”

………

Now the Air Force is on the offense, reaching out to officers in its sister services to outline the future of CAS in an attempt to reshape the discussion away from a binary A-10 versus F-35 fight.

Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle is hosting a week-long, multiservice summit on CAS early in March. Among the topics to be discussed are conducting CAS in a “contested” environment, a term referring to airspace that is defended, though not with high-end integrated defenses seen in the anti-access area-denied (A2AD) situations. An example would be if the Islamic State posed a strong threat to allied jets in Iraq and Syria—although the A-10 has an armored cockpit, it would be susceptible to such a threat and CAS sorties would be forced to fly higher and to use different tactics.

The summit will address CAS as it stands today, as well in the future when the F-35 enters service, Carlisle told reporters at the annual symposium. Among the alternatives, already in use for years, are precision-guided munitions deployed from a host of aircraft—B-1s, B-52s, F-16s, F-16s, and others—to provide support for troops in the midst of a fight. The F-35, however, will bring stealth to the table. “We just have to get to the point where the services all understand what the future looks like in this arena because there is a thread of conversation going on that really has become a little ridiculous,” Welsh, an A-10 pilot himself, said. The F-35 “will be a good CAS platform. It will take us a while to get to the point we want it to be, like it has with every other airplane [with which] we’ve fought, including the A-10,” he argues.

………

Welsh says that the CAS discussion is intended to reset the mindset about the mission to allow for new operational concepts and technologies, including the next-generation of CAS weapons. “How do you just change our mindset? Let’s have gun pods with bullets this long and put 50,000 of them in the pod instead of everybody trying to get 1,000 or 600 out of the airplane during a CAS sortie,” Welsh said. “There are just different ways to look at this problem that technology can help us solve. . . . None of this is new. But we’ve just got to energize it.”

I want to have the bullsh%$ concession at the CAS discussion, because the demand for bullsh%$ when the USAF presents their case will be at levels approaching that of a Republican Presidential debate.

And I Thought that US Defense Procurement was Tortuous………

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After 32 years development, India’s first indigenous fighter has entered service, albeit with far less “indigenous” content than originally envisaged:

The Indian Air Force (IAF) today received the first indigenously built Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) designed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and built by Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL). The LCA, also named ‘Tejas’, was handed over today by Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar to the Indian Air Force Chief Air Marshal, Arup Raha, in Bangalore. Parrikar congratulated all parties involved in the program for their achievement and called upon them to ‘think out of the box’ to meet the schedule and challenges by applying the right management tools. “Work culture should modify by adapting better technology and tools to achieve better results” Parrikar urged his audience.

 LCA-SP1, the first aircraft handed over to the air force, rolled off the HAL assembly line in September and, since then, has been inspected to Initial Operational Clearance II, attesting its airworthiness for operational missions. Previous Tejas fighters delivered to the IAF since 2011 have been used primarily for training, as they were qualified only under ‘IOC-I’ rating. Full operational clearance of the LCA is expected by the end of 2015.

 Initially HAL will produce only six aircraft per year, the goal is to build 20 aircraft by 2018 to equip Bangalore based No. 45 Squadron (Flying Daggers) – the first IAF squadron to fly the Tejas. Production will slowly ramp up to 16 aircraft per year. Overall the IAF plans to deploy 10-14 squadrons, each equipped with 21 Tejas.

 ………

 Meeting deadlines has not been the strong side of the LCA program. [You can say that again —mgs] Launched in 1983 to replace India’s Russian-made MiG-21 fighter jets, the LCA took 32 years to mature to this stage – an extremely long process, even by Indian standards. Most of the MiGs it was supposed to replace have already been phased out; about a hundred that still remain in service are to be retired by 2017. With the French Rafale contract signing nowhere in sight, and LCA gearing up slowly to deliver only a single squadron in two years, the IAF will have to deactivate 10 squadrons by 2017, against a force structure requirement of 42 squadrons originally planned.

 ………

 As production gears up, the Tejas is expected to begin to produce a return on investment – the unit cost of the aircraft is expected to be between $27 and $32 million (170-200 Crore), which is less than half the cost of an Indian-built Su-30MKI and significantly lower than other, fully equipped western alternatives, such as the Gripen and F-16. However, the Tejas will be more expensive than the less-equipped Chinese or Korean fighters, such as the JF-17 and F/A-50.

At a production rate of 6 a year? Puh-lease.

Although India presents the LCA as an indigenous aircraft, even HAL admits it is not fully domestic, as its engine, some of the avionics, and some of the weapon systems are foreign. In fact, only 60 percent of the aircraft is ‘indigenous’. When the program began the intention was to make the LCA fully indigenous. This would have required Indian industry to master new production techniques and to develop an indigenous engine, as well as indigenous electronic, electro-optical and electro-mechanical systems, and software systems, including flight controls and mission management systems.

The relatively high level of foreign content is likely to make those numbers impossible.

I do not doubt that there will be 1-2 squadrons equipped, but not 200 aircraft, particularly when it still needs a lot of development to match payload and range capacity of its near peers. (At least according to Wiki)

Seriously, the USAF Has Degenerated into a Shill for Defense Contractors

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Case in point, Major General James Post, USAF, just said that praising the A-10 close support aircraft to Congress is treason:

A top U.S. Air Force general warned officers that praising the A-10 attack plane to lawmakers amounts to “treason,” according to a news report.

Maj. Gen. James Post, vice commander of Air Combat Command, was quoted as saying, “If anyone accuses me of saying this, I will deny it … anyone who is passing information to Congress about A-10 capabilities is committing treason,” in a report published Thursday on The Arizona Daily Independent.

This is all about making sure that Lockheed Martin gets it’s vig, and that retiring generals get their cut.

They just deployed the A-10 to fight ISIS because they don’t have anything else than can do the job, and an Air Force senior leader is telling his subordinates to conceal information.

Making the USAF an independent branch of the military was a seriously stupid thing to do.

When Given a Choice, the Pentagon Pulls the “Wicked Stupid” Lever

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A little bit over a year ago, I wrote about how the Marine Corps was lobbying for the C-2 Greyhound with the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor in an attempt to lower the unit cost of theier purchase.

The V-22 is more expensive to buy and to operate, it is slower than the C-2, it must fly at lower altitudes because it lacks pressurization, and its internal volume (7.6 m3) is far less than that of the Greyhound (24 m3).

I called it “Wicked Stupid.

Well, it appears that the Marines have managed to bamboozle the Navy into replacing hte C-2 with the V-22:

The Navy will buy V-22 Osprey tiltrotors to replace its aging C-2A Greyhound turboprop aircraft in flying carrier on board delivery (COD) missions. Breaking Defense obtained a Jan. 5 memo, signed by Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert, and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford. It stipulates that the Navy will buy four V-22s each year from fiscal 2018 to 2020.

 The MOU marks a major triumph for the Naval Air Systems Command V-22 program office, the Marine Corps and other Osprey advocates, who have argued for years that the Navy should replace its aging conventional take off C-2As with vertical take off and landing V-22s.

 “The Navy is responsible for modifying these V-22s into an HV-22 configuration for the COD mission,” the MOU states. “The parties agree that subsequent documents will provide details on the concept of operations and milestones. A memorandum of agreement will detail reimbursable Marine Corps support for the Navy’s HV-22 transition, which includes training and potential deployment of Marine MV-22 aircraft and personnel to support COD requirements.”

 The Navy-Marine Corps agreement must be ratified in the next defense budget and by Congress. It also depends in part on a prospective third V-22 multiyear procurement contract that would begin in fiscal year 2018. C-2A maker Northrop Grumman has proposed building a modernized version incorporating features of the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye tactical early warning aircraft.

I guess that a bunch of admirals concluded that there was better opportunity for them to score lucrative post-security jobs with defense contractors with the ruinously expensive Osprey than there would be with the cheaper Greyhound.

Seriously, our military-industry complex is circling the drain.

It’s really beginning to evoke the Arthur C. Clark story Superiority, which describes how military superiority is sacrificed at the alter of technological whiz-bang:

But I cannot be held responsible for my future actions if I am compelled any longer to share my cell with Professor Norden, late Chief of the Research Staff of my armed forces.

Not a Vote of Confidence in the JSF

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The Israeli cabinet has rejected a proposal to purchase additional F-35s: (Paid subscription required)

An Israeli cabinet panel has rejected a decision by the defense minister to procure an additional 31 Lockheed Martin F-35A Joint Strike Fighters and has limited the procurement of Israel’s second batch of JSFs to only 13.

It is unprecedented for the ministerial committee on defense procurement to reverse an air force requirement already approved by the defense minister, the former government and the National Security Council. The Israeli air force (IAF), which currently has 19 F-35s on order under a $2.74 billion contract, will have to be satisfied with a total of 32 aircraft in the coming years, and will not be able to complete two full squadrons as planned.

Israel’s decision to cut back on the near-term buy is notable; surrounded by existential threats, the country has been one of the most aggressive buyers of the single-engine, stealthy jet. It was the first F-35 nonpartner nation to sign up for a foreign military sale; Japan and South Korea quickly followed.

In Tel Aviv, Defense Minister Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon, who had already concluded the terms of a $4.4 billion contract for an additional 31 F-35s with the Pentagon, is now asking for the same terms for a smaller number of aircraft. The U.S. has agreed to grant Israel $2.4 billion in credit for the deal, as well as to conduct offset procurement totaling $5.3 billion, under the expectation that Israel will acquire a total of 50 F-35s. The JSF procurement is financed through the $3.1 billion annual military aid that the U.S. provides to Israel.

It is unclear, however, if the U.S. will agree to provide Israel with the same terms for the smaller deal. “Minister Ya’alon will try to convince the Pentagon that this is a minor delay and that eventually Israel will procure the 50 aircraft,” a senior defense source told Aviation Week.

………

“For maintaining stealthiness, this aircraft has compromised maneuverability, shorter operational range and significantly less payload capability,” a senior Israeli official told Aviation Week. “We shouldn’t be buying so many of them when it is unclear whether the stealth is effective, or there is a countermeasure that would negate it. There are vast gaps in performance between the F-35 and fourth-generation fighters.”

This is a big deal.

Israel’s participation in the F-35 program provides much of the credibility for foreign sales:  They were the first non-JSF partner nation to ink orders for the aircraft, and they have provided a lot of credibility to the program.

This Reeks of Desparation

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The JSF Program Office is looking to accelerate deliveries of the F-35 to Canada in an attempt to induce them to finish their purchase of the aircraft:

A radical fast-track plan to jump-start Canada’s stalled effort to buy the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is revealed in a briefing document obtained by Aviation Week.

 The Oct. 27 brief from JSF Program Executive Office director USAF Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan to Air Force secretary Deborah James calls for Canada to receive four F-35s next year, by diverting them from U.S. Air Force low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 7 orders. Canada would then buy four Lot 9 aircraft that would be delivered to the Air Force in 2017. According to the briefing, Canada would sign a letter of intent within days — “mid-November” — and Congress would be notified by the end of November.

 Neither the JSF Program Office nor the Canadian Department of National Defense responded to repeated inquiries about the planned deal this week. The legal basis for such an exchange, absent an urgent operational need, is uncertain. The proposed LRIP 9 replacement aircraft are not on contract, and as far as is known, negotiations for them have not started.

 According to the briefing, the Air Force has said it can spare four aircraft — budgeted at more than $160 million each — but with “no flex left” in the schedule for the aircraft to achieve initial operational capability. Aircraft availability is already a risk factor in meeting the objective initial operational capability date of August 2016.

 Canada is a founding partner in the JSF program, with one of the largest near-term export orders. Its plan to buy 65 F-35As has been controversial since 2010, when prime minister Stephen Harper’s government attempted to bypass Canadian law that states that all major government acquisitions must be competed. The government asserted that the F-35 was the only aircraft that could meet Canadian requirements, but was forced to back down after Canada’s auditor-general reported in 2012 that the project’s costs had not been presented correctly and the air force’s “statement of requirements” had been compiled after the decision to make a sole-source procurement had been made.

 The program to acquire new fighters has been supervised since 2012 by a special secretariat within Canada’s public works department. The most recent development was the announcement at the end of September of a plan to extend the life of Canada’s Boeing Hornet fleet to 2025. This was seen as confirming that Harper’s team had accepted the need to defer the JSF decision past the next general election, which is due no later than October 2015.

 According to one Canadian industry observer close to the fighter program, the F-35 swap proposal is being pushed by Lockheed Martin and the JSF Program Office. “It would be a huge game changer,” the source says, and another observer, former procurement official Alan Williams, calls it “explosive.” The industry source is dubious that it can happen as scheduled: “The decision to go with the F-35 has not been made. This requires three key ministers to sign off and that hasn’t happened yet.” A Harper attempt to lock Canada into the F-35 program before the election would risk an electoral backlash, sources say. “The fighter file is simply toxic right now,” the industry observer says.

This reeks of desperation.  The Air Force is sacrificing its margin in an attempt to prevent Canada from cancelling its order.

If Canada, or for that matter any of the the Nato countries that have signed on, cancels its F-35 order, it’s going to set off a death spiral of cancellations and unit price escalation.

The problem is that the F-35 is too expensive, not just for Canada, and not just for the US, but the entire f%$#ing world.

BTW, the Canadian government is categorically denying this report:

Canada’s Public Works Department denied reports it’s decided to purchase F-35 fighter jets from the U.S.

Reports suggested a leaked U.S. Defence Department document revealed Canada agreed to buy up to four of the controversial planes from the U.S., to be delivered as early as 2016.

The Conservative government shelved its plan to buy the F-35 from Lockheed Martin in 2012 after a scathing report from the auditor general that highlighted cost overruns and other mismanagement problems in the procurement process.

Like I said, desparation.

Finally………

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Brazil has finally made its selection of the Saab Gripen for their air force:

Buying a new jet fighter can be a long-drawn-out process. Brazil, after many years of planning and procrastination, has finally signed a contract for its future combat aircraft.

Officials from the Brazilian Defense Ministry’s Aeronautics Command and the Swedish Saab Group put pen to paper recently, and the Brazilian air force is now set to receive 36 Gripen NG fighters.

The jets, worth a little over $5.4 billion, include 28 single-seat Gripen Es and eight twin-seat Gripen F aircraft. Deliveries will begin in 2019 and will be completed in 2024.

………

In late 2007, the government formally relaunched the new fighter project, and at the time excepted to acquire 36 multi-role jets at a cost of $2.2 billion. By July 2008 the F-X2 project had split into two phases. In the first, Brazil would get 36 new fighters, blowing the $2.2 billion budget.

………

By September 2009 it looked as if the twin-engined Rafale had cinched F-X2. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced the Rafale’s victory even before the competition was over. Saab and Boeing were both furious, and Lula instead declared that the government would delay the F-X2 decision until after a new president took office.

In January 2011, new president Dilma Rousseff deferred the decision to 2012 owing to budgetary problems. As the defense budget began to feel the cutbacks, the pricey Rafale started to lose its edge. At this stage, the program cost ballooned to $8 billion. Rousseff launched new comparative studies and called upon Embraer for its opinion.

The two cheapest options now became the front-runners. The Super Hornet offer—for 36 fighters—was for $7.5 billion, while the Gripen offer cost $6 billion. The Rafale offer exceeded $8 billion.

There are a number of ways to cost aircraft, and it can vary by a lot.

The numbers here run to about $150 million a plane, which I believe is the total weapons system cost, while the quotes that we normally see in the press for US systems are flyaway costs, which looks to run something like 50% of total system cost, so this is actually significantly cheaper than the F-35 JSF.

Still, $150 million a pop?

That’s a big jump from the less than $5 million that the F-4 Phantom in its heyday.

Streamlining = Enabling Fraud, Waste, and Inefficiency

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I am very dubious of this proposal to, “streamline military acquisitions.”

Basically, the problem is a lack of adult supervision of either the defense contractors, or the Pentagon, or the resulting revolving door, is the problem with our current system,. not excessive regulation:

The Pentagon and Congress have better odds of reaching agreement on how to streamline myriad overlapping laws that slow the process of buying military equipment and services, a top Defense Department official said.

“I am optimistic,” Andrew Hunter, a former congressional aide who helped draft many of those laws before joining the Pentagon four years ago, told reporters Thursday. He said he saw emerging consensus among industry, lawmakers and defense officials about the need for changes.

Hunter, who runs the Pentagon’s joint rapid-acquisition initiative, also has led a drive to simplify current laws, which Frank Kendall, an arms buyer for the Department of Defense, has said put “an extraordinary and unnecessarily complex burden on our program managers and staff.”

U.S. defense officials have been in talks with congressional committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and hope to submit some reform legislation as part of the fiscal 2016 budget process, said Hunter, who is moving to a job with the Center for Strategic and International Studies next month.

“We’ve come up with some proposals that we hope will be favorably received,” he said. Hunter said the goal was to build on some key legislation already in place while giving program managers more flexibility to focus on the main issues.

The Pentagon initiative dovetails with fresh efforts by the House and Senate armed services committees to reform the slow, cumbersome U.S. military acquisition process and reverse years of schedule delays, cost overruns and other challenges.

Sorry, but the problem ain’t excessive regulation, it’s a system which is corrupt and dysfunctional to its core.