Category: Defense Procurement

Saab Gripen Deal Pending Between Brazil and Argentina

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It appears that SAAB wasn’t kidding when they promised that the Brazilians could involve their defense industry more heavily with the Gripen than with competing platforms.

It appears that non only are the Brazilians going to manufacture their own fighters, but they will be manufacturing Gripens for Argentina as well:

Saab AB (SAABB) said it’s close to sealing a contract with Brazil that will secure 36 export orders valued at $4.5 billion for the Swedish company’s Gripen jet-fighter while establishing production in the South American country.

Negotiations on the deal are moving forward according to plan and the ambition is to reach an agreement “in the near future,” Saab said today in a statement.

Saab signed a memorandum of understanding with Embraer SA (EMBR3) in July granting the Brazilian planemaker a leading role in Gripen production tied to the signing of an order. According to that deal, Embraer will share joint responsibility for developing a two-seat version of the latest upgrade of the jet and lead marketing efforts to sell it in Latin America.

Partnering with Brazil could give the Gripen a new lease of life after the program suffered a blow in May when Swiss voters rejected a 3.1 billion franc ($3.3 billion) order for 22 fighters that had been awarded 2 1/2 years previously.

Saab, where third-quarter operating profit of 258 million kronor ($35 million) fell short of the 300 million kronor expected by analysts, is pushing the Gripen against rival offerings from companies including Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT:US), the No. 1 defense contractor, just as tighter military spending makes U.S. and European orders harder to come by.

Argentina Interest

A bridgehead in Brazil, where local firms may build as much as 80 percent of the Gripen E model and take on the bulk of development on the two-seat Gripen F, could open up sales to markets where defense budgets are under less pressure. A carrier version of the plane may be an option for Brazil, with Argentina, Ecuador and Mexico among possible export targets.

Brazil is already poised to discuss a possible deal to sell the Gripen to Argentina as part of a plan to boost aerospace cooperation, the defense ministry said this week, adding that terms could include some production component for its neighbor. Brazil’s own contract should be signed by December, it said.

Saab was chosen to fill Brazil’s F-X2 fighter requirement last December, fending off the Boeing Co. (BA:US) F/A-18 Super Hornet after allegations that the U.S. spied on President Dilma Rousseff. Paris-based Dassault Aviation SA (AM)’s Rafale also lost.

The Gripen is cheaper to own, and cheaper to operate than the competition, even platforms that are a half generation older like the F-16 and F-18.

If Saab can keep the line open until the true cost of the F-35 becomes clear to potential customers, and this is by no means a sure thing, they could have the Mirage III of this generation.

Canada Defers F-35 Decision

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They have decided to rebuild and extend the life of their F-18 Hornets, and defer their decision on the F-35: (paid subscription required)

Canada’s conservative government, which has spent four years pushing for a noncompetitive purchase of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, announced at the end of September it would delay retirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s Boeing CF-18A/B Hornets for up to five years, until 2025. Canada will, however, continue to support JSF.

 With an election due next year, Prime Minister Stephen Harper appears to have passed the Next-Generation Fighter Capability (NGFC) decision to the next administration, after reports in June that the announcement of a JSF buy was imminent. “Harper was poised to pull the trigger,” one industry source suggests, “but he backed away” following negative public and media reaction. An F-35 buy could have been portrayed as an attempt to foreclose options before the election, and a decision to conduct a competition would be seen as a capitulation, the source suggests. The latest announcement indicates intent to maintain RCAF strength without rushing the NGFC choice.

 The move is not a complete surprise. Lockheed Martin says it is “not news” and that planned Canadian JSF deliveries extend through 2025. (The schedule spanned 2017-22, based on late-2011 plans.) However, there are no programs under contract that support Hornet operations beyond 2020: L-3’s Military Aircraft Systems unit, which supports the Hornet airframe and systems for Canada, had no comment, and Canada’s Department of National Defense (DND) also declined to respond.

 The future of the NGFC depends on the pending election: A decisive Conservative win would favor the F-35, while opposition parties could move toward a competition or delay the entire program. A September report stating Canada had short-listed the F-35 and Super Hornet has been dismissed as inaccurate. “It will either be the F-35 or an open competition,” says a source associated with a potential NGFC competitor.

 The contentious next-gen fighter debate started when DND—then led by Peter MacKay—sought to bypass Canadian law that forbids sole-source procurements except under strictly defined circumstances. In 2008, the DND defined key NGFC requirements and concluded that two aircraft other than the JSF could meet them. But in 2010, to justify a sole-source JSF buy, DND issued a revised set of requirements that it claimed only JSF could meet.

 After a scathing report in 2012 by the auditor-general, the government stripped the DND of authority over the next-gen fighter, shifting authority to the Public Works Department for the acquisition. In February, an independent review panel validated the air force’s new process for evaluating four contenders: the F-35, the Boeing Super Hornet, the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

I would argue that of those 4, the F-35 is the least well suited to their requirements, which is for domestic defense, operating at long ranges, over uninhibited land, where it was always better to lose AN engine than it is to lose THE engine.

The F-35 will cost more to purchase, and more to operate, than any other of the alternatives.

It’s low observability characteristics have no advantage in the interceptor role.

It is a closed system which makes it effectively impossible for Canada’s domestic defense establishment from qualifying new weapons on it.

The only advantage is that it generates “Poodle Points” with the US.

Poodle points can, of course, be cashed in for ……… Nothing at all.

Canada Puts off Decision on F-35 Purchase

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I think that they will still buy it, PM Harper is determined to buy it, but it is significant that they are looking at doing a full up competition with other aircraft:

O, Canada, land of “peace, order and good government.” Land of compromise and polite politics. Land of turmoil over whether to buy the F-35.

As in the United States, the fighter plane has become a rancorous political issue. What once looked like a sure buy of 65 planes has been bogged down by infighting and un-Canadian vitriol, and the purchase is on hold while Canadian officials consider whether to buy another plane.

The decision effectively pushes the purchase decision past elections, and I don’t think that anyone beside Boeing will submit a bid, the idea that Canada would purchase a non-US airframe being ludicrous, particularly for Harper, who really buys into the whole “special relationship” thing with the US.

JMR Demonstrators Downselected

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Valor


Defiant

Bell’s Tilt Rotor and the Sikorsky/Boeing coaxial rotor helo have been selected to produce the two Joint Multi Role technology demonstration (JMR TD) vehicles:

Bell Helicopter and Sikorsky/Boeing have been selected to build high-speed rotorcraft technology demonstrators for the U.S. Army. Both aircraft are scheduled to fly in 2017.

 Bell will build the 280-kt. V-280 Valor tiltrotor and Sikorsky/Boeing the 230 kt.-plus SB.1 Defiant rigid coaxial-rotor compound helicopter under the $217 million first phase of the Joint Multi Role technology demonstration (JMR TD).

 JMR TD is the precursor to the Army’s planned Future Vertical Lift Medium (FVL-M) program to replace the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter from the mid-2030s onward. Later an attack derivative could replace the Boeing AH-64 Apache and a marinized version of the Navy’s MH-60 Seahawk.

 The two other competitors for JMR TD Phase 1, small companies AVX Aircraft and Karem Aircraft, are expected to receive Army contracts for some level of continued technology development. AVX was proposing a 230-kt. coaxial-rotor compound and Karem a variable-speed tiltrotor.

Both demonstrators have about the same installed HP, around 3300 KW, which is about double that of the Black Hawk helicopter which they are slated to replace, though to be fair, the gross weight is about is about 35% more than the Black Hawk.

I’m inclined to go with the helicopter over the tilt rotor, because I like the idea of being able to autorotate if things go bad, and because the history of tilt-rotors is one of high costs, low reliability, and a large footprint, while coaxial helicopters have been in deployment (albeit Soviet/Russian deployment) for over 40 years.

Su-25 Attack Aircraft Production May Resume

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I do not see a big export market, so I gotta figure that new production is intended for use in what the Russians call the “Near Abroad”, and what Americans call the “Former Soviet Union”:

The Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant (UUAP) may resume the production of Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets, the plant’s managing director Leonid Belykh said.

“We used to produce the Su-25 jets and today our equipment is still in good condition, so the question is under consideration. Some serious investment will be needed, and it is likely that another factory will take up the production. But if the government orders us to do it, we shall do it. If the production is to be transferred to somebody else, so be it,” Belykh told RIA Novosti.

Su-25 is a heavily armored subsonic strike attack aircraft designed for the close air support of ground forces in daytime and at night, the targets being within visible range. It is also used for the support of installations with given coordinates on a 24-hour basis in all weather conditions.

To be clear, this is not a formal request from Moscow, but rather a sales pitch made to Moscow from a defense plant.

Still, it does say something about the mindset on the side of both Russia’s defense industry and Russia’s military.

Someone Runs the Actual Cost of an F-35 JSF

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And the numbers are horrifying:

The F-35 is not just the most expensive warplane ever, it’s the most expensive weapons program ever. But to find out exactly how much a single F-35 costs, we analyzed the newest and most authoritative data.

 Here’s how much we’re paying.

 A single Air Force F-35A costs a whopping $148 million. One Marine Corps F-35B costs an unbelievable $251 million. A lone Navy F-35C costs a mind-boggling $337 million. Average the three models together, and a “generic” F-35 costs $178 million.

 It gets worse. These are just the production costs. Additional expenses for research, development, test and evaluation are not included. The dollars are 2015 dollars. This data was just released by the Senate Appropriations Committee in its report for the Pentagon’s 2015 appropriations bill.

Let’s go into the methodology for this article:

The methodology for calculating these F-35 unit costs is straightforward. Both the president’s budget and each of four congressional defense committees publish the amounts to be authorized or appropriated for each model of the F-35, including the number of aircraft to be bought.

 The rest is simple arithmetic: Divide the total dollars for each model by the quantity.

 ………

 There are just two things F-35 watchers need to be careful about.

 First, it’s necessary to add the funding from the previous year’s appropriation act to the procurement money the government allocated for 2015. This is “advance procurement” for 2015 spending, and pays for “long lead” components that take longer to acquire.

 Second, we have to add the cost of Navy and Air Force modifications.

 For the F-35, these costs are for fixing mistakes already found in the testing process. With the aircraft still in its initial testing, the modification costs to existing aircraft are very low. But the 2015 amounts for modifications are surrogates for what the costs for this year’s buy might be. If anything, this number can be an under-estimate.

 ………

 In a briefing delivered to reporters on June 9, F-35 developer Lockheed still advertised the cost of airplanes sans engines. Highly respected Aviation Week reported on July 22 that taxpayers put up $98 million for each F-35A in 2013.

 In reality, we actually paid $188 million.

 Some of these numbers are for the airframe only. In other cases, you get a “flyaway” cost. But in fact, those airplanes are incapable of operative flight. They lack the specialized tools, simulators, logistics computers—and much, much more—to make the airplane useable. They even lack the fuel to fly away.

 ………

 Here’s another curious fact. The unit costs of the Marines’ short-takeoff, vertical-landing B-model and the Navy’s aircraft-carrier-capable C-model are growing.

 The cost of an F-35B grew from $232 million in 2014 to a bulging $251 million by 2015. The cost of the Navy’s F35C grew from $273 million in 2014 to a wallet-busting $337 million by 2015.

 The quantity numbers for the F-35B have not changed, remaining at six per year. The number of F-35Cs to be produced has slipped from four to two, but surely learning processes on the F-35 line have not been going so far backward as to explain a 23 percent, $64 million per unit cost increase.
………

 Next time an advocate tells you what the current unit cost is for a program, ask: “What is Congress appropriating for them this year?” And, “How many are we buying?” Then get out your calculator. The result might surprise you.

At these prices, I cannot see how the United States can afford to buy this aircraft, much less the partners in the program, as well as other customers.

BTW, to run some numbers, the F-35A has an empty weight of 13,199 kg, the price of gold is $42.01/gram, and the price of silver is $0.64/gram.

Running the numbers then, a similar weight of gold would be $554 million, and for silver, it would $8.4 million.

So, it costs about 1/5 of its weight in gold, and pretty much every fighter since the F-4 Phantom II has cost more than its weight in silver.

That is kind of depressing.

Japan Rolls Out Stealth Demonstrator

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It’s called the ATD-X Shinshin:

Japan has rolled out its ATD-X Shinshin fighter technology demonstrator, is considering buying more Lockheed MartinF-35s and will decide within four years whether it will develop its next combat aircraft alone or with a foreign partner.

 When the ATD-X was launched in 2007, Japan’s vision was to progress from its then-current fighter program, a heavily modified F-16, to independent development. Now, with a policy change allowing defense exports, the technology from the demonstrator may end up in aircraft that emerge from foreign production lines as well as from one in Japan.

 The single ATD-X aircraft, about the size of a Saab Gripen, is undergoing ground tests, says the defense ministry’s Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), the sponsor of the program. TRDI is due to fly the ATD-X this year, beginning an evaluation program that will run until 2016. The aircraft has been built to demonstrate technologies—including stealth shaping, skin sensors and fly-by-light controls—that the ministry hopes to apply in its next fighter development program (AW&ST Aug. 6, 2007, p. 26).

 Official photographs taken on May 8 show the ATD-X on the apron outside a factory building of airframe builder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) at the Komaki South plant in Nagoya. The airframe underwent static testing last year. The ATD-X will be powered by two 11,000-lb.-thrust IHI XF5-1 -engines.

 U.S. involvement in the program, probably peripheral, appears in TRDI’s budget statement for the fiscal year to March 31, 2014, which lists contracts signed with the U.S. Air Force in support of the program. One item, costing ¥114 million ($1.12 million), is for testing outside Japan. Another, for ¥760 million, is for unspecified training from the U.S. Air Force. Japanese authorities have not mentioned a plan to fly the ATD-X outside Japan. The U.S. clearly has refused to supply stealth technology for the ATD-X, since Japan sent a radar model of the intended design to France in 2005 for evaluation.

Not a surprise on the last bit.

The Pentagon is desperate to sell as many F-35s as possible, to drive down their price, but the basic mathematics of Stealth have been known for over 40 years, when the equations were published in a public Soviet academic journal, so the secret sauce ain’t so secret.

Of interest is that the Japanese also intend to use the Shinshin as a radar target to develop counter-steath techniques.

One function of the ATD-X is to serve as a radar target, supporting development of counter-stealth technology, because, TRDI has said, stealth aircraft are hard to simulate. In 2008, it hoped to use the ATD-X to validate the abilities of the FPS-5 radar, E-767 AWACS and Airboss infra-red turret to detect stealth aircraft. Six years later, it would not be surprising if other sensors have been added to the list.

The aircraft is clearly too small for internal carriage, which could be amelorated with stealthy pylons and pods, bu I don’t expect them to look into this at this stage, since they are doing this on the cheap:

The ATD-X appears to be costing ¥77.1 billion, including airframe and engine development and manufacturing, plus the flight-test program. Engine development cost ¥14.7 billion, basic design of the stealth configuration with thrust-vectoring control ¥13.4 billion and system integration ¥7 billion. TRDI spent ¥2.7 billion researching airframe structure suitable for the skin sensor. Manufacturing and flight testing is budgeted at ¥39.3 billion, but spending of ¥22.5 billion under that heading last year alone suggests that that figure will be exceeded.

Even so, Japan appears to be spending much less than half of the present-day value of what Britain and partners spent on airframe and engine technology demonstrator programs that preceded the Eurofighter Typhoon. Admittedly, those 1980s efforts resulted in full-scale equipment, whereas the ATD-X is probably half as big as the fighter for which it is laying groundwork.

Given that there are about 101 Yen to the dollar, the program looks to run less than $1 billion.

This is a lot more than the Have Blue ran in the 1970s, Wiki says $35 milion, but the ATD-X is far more capable than the Have Blue, and military procurement inflation is insane, in 1978, an F-16 sold for $3 million.

My guess is that tis is more than a hedge against F-35 costs.

Another Example of the US Failure in Iraq

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In response to the advance of ISIS, the Iraqi military has taken an emergency deliveries of Su-25 ground attack fighters:

A video uploaded by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and a subsequent announcement shed light on Iraq’s first success in acquiring a combat capable platform to stop the advance of the Islamic State. The latter has made great progress in capturing large areas of Iraq and is now slowly advancing to Iraq’s capital Baghdad.

”The Ministry of Defence announced the arrival of the first out of five Russian combat aircraft Su-25 into Iraqi territory under a contract with the Russian ministry, which will contribute to increasing the combat capability of the Air Force and the other branches of the armed forces to eliminate terrorism.”

The Iraqi Army and Air Force have proved anything but capable to halt the Islamic State’s advance and have been desperately looking for other ways to fill the caps currently posed in Iraqi’s Armed Forces. With the United States reluctant to provide close air support or speeding up the delivery of Iraq’s F-16s, Iraq has been increasingly looking to countries in Eastern Europe to strengthen the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF). It is now clear a batch of five ex-Russian Su-25s are the first to have arrived.

The first Su-25, still in Russian Air Force (RuAF) camouflage and with a hastily applied Iraqi flag, arrived onboard a Russian An-124-100 cargo plane together with ground support equipment on the 28th of June. The Su-25s are believed to have been stored at the Aircraft Repair Plant 121 (ARZ 121) in Kubinka before being flown to Iraq. The contract also included new engines for the aircraft, which were installed just before the delivery flight.

The Iraqis have been waiting for the delivery of F-16s, but they got these surplus Su-25s in a matter of a few weeks.

It also of note that the Iraq AF operated this under Saddam, and the Iranians operate them today, so there is operational experience that can be tapped.

Additionally, under the current tactical situation, it’s a better weapon system than the F-16, because what is needed is a dedicated close air support (CAS) and strike aircraft with low operational costs.

What’s more the aircraft’s agility at low speed and low altitude allows it to maximize the effect of unguided munitions, which comprise the bulk of Iraqi munitions.

Additionally, it constitutes a major change in Iraqi policy. It shows that they are moving away from Western weapon systems, and the US defense contractors. (Yet another goal of Bush/Cheney that has turned into a fail)

So, the failure of the Neocon’s Iraq adventure continues to damage the interests of the United States.

Our Dysfunctional Pentagon

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Winslow Wheeler at War is Boring makes an interesting point about the sequestration games that the Department of Defense is engaging in: Iit is systematically cutting cheaper and more effective programs in favor of expensive systems:

There has been a short-sighted eagerness in some news articles and commentaries to disparage two actions by the House Armed Services Committee in the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.

The HASC seeks to retain in the military force structure the Air Force’s A-10 Warthog close support aircraft and the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington. The Air Force and the Navy want to retire these systems prematurely, thereby seeming to save money.

But the longer-term game being played is to smooth the way for far more expensive, truly unaffordable, replacements the Air Force and Navy have cued up. And in the case of the A-10, the older, cheaper alternative is the inestimably more effective one.

Like, I said, it’s not about defending our nation, it’s about our Generals getting lucrative post retirement consulting gigs.

That old Iron Triangle.

This is an Interesting Concept

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When one looks at doing more with less from a naval perspective, repurposing an existing hull for a new mission seems like a good way to get the capabilities that you need.

Case in point, Huntington Ingalls Industries shipyard is shown a mockup of an LPD converted to a missile platform:

Among the many striking displays at the recent Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition was this marvel — an amphibious warfare ship adapted for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), with three times the radar size and missile capacity of current BMD vessels, as well an electromagnetic rail gun that can launch shells to the edge of space.

The concept from Huntington Ingalls Industries’ (HII) is based on the hull of the LPD-17 San Antonio Class, a component of the three-ship “Amphibious Ready Groups” that stage Marines at forward, sea-based positions. In this incarnation, HII has removed the Marine’s berthing, vehicles, helicopters and landing craft, and installed air defense equipment with greater range and capacity than any ship in the fleet.

Atop the superstructure is a massive S-band phased array radar, over 21 feet on each side. Compare that to the 12.5 ft. diameter of the SPY-1 radars aboard Ticonderoga Class Cruisers and Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers. For radars, larger size means greater range and better resolution and these arrays have three times the area of those which equip current BMD vessels.

Starting behind the superstructure and continuing along the periphery to the stern is a vertical launch system (VLS) with 288 cells to carry surface to air missiles (SAMs), Tomahawk cruise missiles or Vertical-launch Anti-submarine rockets (VLAs). For comparison, Ticos have 122; later Burkes 96 and earlier Burkes 90. So, that’s triple the average missile load to start, with plenty of room to install more. Plus, the ship is taller than the surface combatants, which means it can hold future missiles of greater length and range.

Forward of the superstructure, you see what looks like a standard five inch gun, the kind one finds on the Ticos and Burkes. But an engineer responsible for this design explains that’s not what it represents. In fact, it’s an electromagnetic rail gun.

Certainly, there is a lot of capability there.

The well deck of an LPD has a lot of volume, and assuming that the necessary power and maintainability issues can be resolved, it could be promising.

The potential inclusion of a rail gun is troubling though: It is precisely this sort of “bleeding edge” technology that creates the delay-price increase-quantity reduction death spiral.

Of course, this is just an industry proposal right now.

I Did Not Know This

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I was aware that the Chinese had developed the JF-17 for Pakistan, and that it was dirt cheap, but I did no know that it is technically a MiG-21 derivative:

In 1989, the Chinese Chengdu Aerospace Corporation unveiled a major upgrade for its locally-made F-7 jet fighter, a licensed copy of the classic Soviet MiG-21. The new F-7 variant moved the engine air intake from the nose tip to the sides of the fuselage, making room in the nose for a more powerful radar.

Twenty-one years later, this upgrade—now named JF-17 Thunder—is flying combat missions with the Pakistani air force, so far its sole user. Further enhanced with a new wing, a cutting-edge intake design and a new, more powerful engine, the JF-17 is Pakistan’s most important front-line fighter—and a remarkable extension of a basic plane design dating back to the 1950s.

In essence, the JF-17 is the ultimate MiG-21. In a sector increasingly dominated by American-made stealth fighters, European “canard” planes and variants of the Russian Su-27, the JF-17 is an outlier—a highly evolutionary plane that doesn’t try to be revolutionary.

(emphasis original)

The report is that the agility is similar to that of early model F-16s, which is to say better than that of later, heavier, models.

I’m not sure how much of the original MiG-21 remains.  The fuselage immediately behind the cockpit looks vague similar, as does the landing gear arrangement, but the wing, horizontal tail, and vertical tail are completely different.

At $25 million a pop, it’s dirt cheap, and the new engine should improve range, though considering  the limited range of the MiG 21, this is not a high bar to clear.

It’s a lot smaller than most of the other fighters currently in production.  It’s the size of the Gripen, and smaller than the successor Gripen E/F, though both of those aircraft have significantly greater payload and range.

If I were a budget despot, it would be on my list.

If the Gripen Were in the US Inventory, It Would Be a World Beater

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We are getting some new details on the updated Saab Gripen, and its a good example of what happens when you take procurement away from the generals, and give it to procurement professionals like the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV): (paid subscription required)

Saab, its Swedish air force customer and Selex-ES have disclosed new details of the JAS 39E Gripen fighter, which has been in full development for just over a year following a six-year risk-reduction and demonstration effort. The JAS 39E is a new aircraft in detail, with only a few structural or systems components in common with the current JAS 39C/D, but it shares enough with its predecessor to take full advantage of weapon-integration experience and uses an evolved version of the C/D’s software.

 Compared with earlier Gripen variants, the JAS 39E has a higher gross weight and can carry 2,400 lb. more internal fuel, mostly due to a redesigned main landing gear that retracts into underwing bulges rather than the body. The nose gear has also been changed, from a twin-wheel unit to a larger single wheel that is compatible with emergency arrester cables on runways. The main structure has been redesigned with continuous wing-fuselage frames that extend to the inboard wing pylons, where the outer wings are attached, and the fuselage contours have been changed, partly to accommodate more fuel. However, the redesign has reduced the airframe’s proportion of the empty weight, boosting useful load.

 The JAS 39E will be able to engage stealth targets with a fused, multispectral sensor suite (see article below), according to program officials. It will be able to cruise at Mach 1.25 without using afterburner, and will enter service in 2018 with a full suite of weapons including the MBDA Meteor ramjet-powered air-to-air missile (which enters service next year on the JAS 39C/D). The Swedish air force’s fixed-price contract for 60 complete aircraft, converted from JAS 39Cs but with new engine, avionics and primary structure, equates to a flyaway price of $43 million.

The JAS 39E is not a classically stealthy aircraft, but the development contract stipulates a significantly lower radar cross-section (RCS) than the JAS 39C. In conjunction with the all-new Saab-developed electronic warfare system, which uses gallium nitride antenna technology and is described as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensor in its own right, and the new Selex-ES Brite Cloud expendable active decoy, the reduced RCS is expected to allow the fighter to survive against advanced threats, including the Sukhoi T-50 fighter and “double-digit” surface-to-air missiles, while avoiding the cost and risk of an F-35-type stealth configuration.

The first customers, Sweden and Switzerland, are buying only single-seat aircraft, but codevelopment of the two-seat JAS 39F is being discussed with Brazil, which selected the new Gripen to reequip its fighter force in December.

 The JAS 39E is intended to have a lower acquisition cost than the JAS 39C, despite its greater capability, and to have a lower operating cost than any other fighter. The Swedish air force reports an hourly operating cost of $7,500 for the JAS 39C, including fuel. For development costs (also covered by a fixed-price contract), Saab’s goal is to spend only 60% as much as it would have cost using the same tools and processes that were used on the JAS 39C.

………

Gripen Upgrade

JAS 39C JAS 39E
Empty weight, lb. 13,000 less than 14,000
Internal fuel, lb. greater than 5,000 greater than7,400
Max takeoff weight, lb. 30,900 36,400
Engine Volvo RM12 GE F414-GE-39E
Intermediate/Max thrust, lb. 12,150/18,100 14,400/22,000
Supercruise No Mach 1.25
Radar Mechanical scan AESA
IRST No Yes
Cockpit display 3—6 X 8 in. 1—8 X 20 in.

Interestingly, they accomplish this with a remarkably small amount of commonality with the prior models.

For the upgrade that they offer from the “C” to the “E”, they will, “retain almost none of the previous airframe, but will reuse parts of its fuel and air systems, plus its ejection seat, windshield, canopy and outer wing elevons.”

They will be producing a completely new aircraft, one that is more capable than its predecessor, with better avionics, more payload, more performance, more range, and lower purchase and operating costs.

What’s more, it looks that through sensor fusion they may achieve some fairly impressive anti-stealth performance: (Paid subscription required)

New sensors being developed for the JAS 39E and close to starting flight tests on the JAS 39-7 Gripen Demo testbed will be able to detect low-radar-cross-section (RCS) targets, and will provide the pilots in a Gripen formation with a new level of situational awareness, according to Bob Mason, Selex-ES marketing director for advanced sensors.

The JAS 39E will have three Selex-ES sensors. The Raven ES-05 active, electronically scanned array radar (AESA), developed by the company’s Edinburgh unit, will be the first production AESA to be mounted on a “repositioner,” a rotating mount that gives the radar a ±100-deg. field of view around the nose. The Skyward-G infrared search and track (IRST) system (from Nebbiano, Italy) is based on experience with the Eurofighter Typhoon’s Pirate IRST and Selex-developed land- and sea-based IRSTs. The fighter also has a new identification friend-or-foe (IFF) system with three electronically steerable antenna arrays, which matches the radar’s range and field of view.

The three main sensors will cue one another automatically to display to pilots a fused picture of airspace around the fighter; it will also be fused with the JAS’s new electronic-warfare system. Finally, sensor data can be shared between Gripens in a flight via data link.

One of the interesting things is that they use “kinetic ranging” to get range on target through the IR sensors, where, “the aircraft performs a weaving maneuver and the range is determined by the change in azimuth angle to the target—or the IRSTs on two aircraft can triangulate the target over the TAU-Link.” (The data network that Gripens share).

Notice how the Swedes, and Saab, have gone pretty much in the opposite direction that the US did on the F-22 and F-35:

  • Segregated as opposed to integrated software.
  • Keeping cost as a primary consideration as opposed to bleeding edge.
  • Seeing the planes as integrated into an open battlefield network, as opposed to being data roach motels.  (Data goes in, but it doesn’t come out)
  • Using existing technology wherever possible. 

The progress of the Gripen is an example of how defense procurement can work, and how our defense procurement doesn’t work.

Aviation Week Comes to the Right Decision While Ignoring the Obvious

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They have an editorial where they argue (Correctly IMNSHO) that the 50 year old U-2 is a superior reconnaissance platform to the Block 3 Global Hawk UAV:

With the presentation of the Obama administration’s fiscal 2015 budget request last week, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced his decision in a battle that had been brewing for some time: U-2 (below) versus Global Hawk. With money as tight as it is, everyone knew it was becoming too expensive to have both options for high-altitude intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) missions.

It would be easy to portray this as a contest between modernity and nostalgia, pitting a cutting-edge unmanned system against a piloted Cold War relic—Hal the computer versus an aging jet jockey with a silk scarf. Indeed, when Hagel announced his decision, he said he is opting to phase out the “50-year-old U-2 in favor of the unmanned Global Hawk” beginning in 2016 (see page 30). But that comparison is not just an oversimplification, it is the wrong way to approach the question.

 Hagel was more forthright when he acknowledged this was “a close call.” It surely is. The operating costs of the two fleets, for example, have been about the same.

They note that the U-2 is cheaper to buy, more flexible in its operations, flies higher, and has a sophisticated ECM suite.

But their editorial ignores the elephant in the room.

The reason that the Air Force, and the Congress, are supporting the very expensive ($200 million a copy) and inferior solution is because of pork and post-retirement employment opportunities for retired officers at defense contractors.

We really need to move to something like the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), to take the uniformed military out of the procurement equation.

Additionally, such an agency should have as its remit the analysis of subcontracting, to ensure that work is allocated on the basis of efficiency, and not in an attempt to spread work to politically significant Congressional districts.

The Navy Just Tried to Pull Out of the JSF Program

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It’s not particularly surprising. The F-35C is the most expensive variant, and it has no potential exports (the only operator of catapult equipped carriers are the US, the French, and the Brazilians), so it is not surprising that the navy requested a “break” from the JSF program:

OSD TOLD THE NAVY: YOU CAN’T TAKE A ‘BREAK’ FROM THE F-35C: According to a congressional source,  in its 2015 budget proposal, the Navy asked to take a three-year “break” from its production of the F-35C, its variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. Concerned this was a first step toward walking away from the program permanently, OSD told the Navy: no way.

 It’s an open secret that the Navy would prefer to invest more in its F-18 fighters rather than buy the F-35C. But if the Navy pulled out of the program, the unit cost — already under scrutiny —  would go up for the Air Force and the Marine Corps.

The Navy did not get their “time out” because Office of the Secretary of Defense understood that a 3 year break constituted a cancellation of that variant, because in 3 years it will cost even more, and the DoD budgets will be under more stress.

This is, to quote Joe Biden, “A big f%$#ing deal.”

A 23 Year Long Multi-Billion Dollar Long Contract Dispute Settled

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And, surprise, surprise, it is a sweetheart deal for the defense contractors: (paid subscription required)

After more than two decades and numerous attempts at a settlement, the U.S. government finally agreed to accept $400 million from General Dynamics and Boeing in the dispute over the Navy’s cancellation of the $4.8 billion A-12 Avenger II program.

 The settlement is a fraction of what the government sought when the lawsuit began, demanding $1.3 billion in restitution ($2.2 billion in 2014 dollars) for money spent on the stealthy carrier-based aircraft program that had yet to deliver an aircraft. And it is even smaller when compared with an agreement for $2.9 billion that was nearly negotiated in 2003.

 ………

 The Navy will receive three EA-18G Growlers that will be delivered on top of the 21 Boeing aircraft that were funded by Congress for fiscal 2014 and are expected to be delivered in 2016, according to the Navy.

 General Dynamics will provide $198 million in credits to the Navy toward the design, construction and delivery portions of the Zumwalt-class DDG-1000 destroyer.

 ………

 The dispute began in 1991, when then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney canceled the $4.8 billion stealth attack aircraft, run by General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, which has since been acquired by Boeing. It was terminated in part due to the government’s conclusion that contractors were not meeting cost and schedule targets. The Navy demanded that contractors repay $1.3 billion to the government.

 The prime contractors sued the government, arguing the government should make penalty payments because the contract was canceled for “convenience,” not a failure to perform. The case festered in the court system, eventually reaching the Supreme Court.

 ………

 In 2011, 20 years after the start of the dispute, the Supreme Court considered the case. The Navy argued that the contractors had not completed the work they had promised. The contractors argued that the government held back classified information about stealth technology that hampered their effectiveness. Ultimately, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, where it remained until now.

They met none of their technical requirements, they missed their schedule, and they were hideously over budget, and the punishment for the (now effectively admitted with the settlement) misfeasance and malfeasance is that the contractors get to secure the status of existing programs.

The Pentagon is Procuring Weapons at the Expense of Real Capability

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Two years after the USAF selected the 50 year old U-2 over the block 3 RQ-4 Global Hawk, drone because the 50 year Dragon Lady was cheaper to buy, cheaper to operate, more reliable, and more capable, the USAF is trying to throw another bone to the military-industrial complex:

Less than two years after proposing termination and premature mothballing of the new Block 30 version—once eyed as a replacement for the venerable, high-flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft—the Pentagon leadership is toying with a complete reversal on its position as it works through options for the fiscal 2015 budget proposal.

In a resourcing management decision—the mechanism by which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) responds to the services’ annual spending plans—Pentagon budgeters gutted U-2 funding, shifting more than $3 billion into the Global Hawk Block 30 account. The decision is not yet final, and it remains to be seen whether the service will maintain its position from the fiscal 2013 budget. It favored halting Block 30 work and operations and focusing solely on the Lockheed Martin U-2 as the high-altitude, standoff intelligence collector for the next decade or more.

………

At issue for the Global Hawk is a dive in the cost per flying hour (CPFH) for the aircraft. In earlier fiscal years, CPFH was near that of the U-2 at roughly $33,000 per hr. Fiscal 2013 numbers, recently in from the field, point to a CPFH closer to $25,000, according to a program source.

The notable decrease is due to a substantial spike in the number of hours flown, a shift partly related to the fielding of the first Block 40s outfitted with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars for ground surveillance, an Air Force official says. The official did not provide a total number for the year, but a larger number of hours allows fixed costs to be more diluted in the calculation. Though the Air Force has not publicly proposed terminating the Block 40 in budget plans, last year senior leaders were eyeing it for a kill. It was likely saved owing to the then open debate on the fate of Block 30.

Even if this new CPFH holds true in coming years, one program official notes that for some regions—such as the Pacific—Global Hawk must fly more hours to have an equitable time on station as the U-2. While CPFH may be lower for the Global Hawk, the figure is not reflective of the total cost to gather the needed intelligence.

To give an example, the unmanned air system (UAS) would have to fly 54% more flight hours to collect intelligence on areas in North Korea, the Middle East and Iran.

Even if this new CPFH (cost per flying hour) holds true in coming years, one program official notes that for some regions—such as the Pacific—Global Hawk must fly more hours to have an equitable time on station as the U-2. While CPFH may be lower for the Global Hawk, the figure is not reflective of the total cost to gather the needed intelligence.

To give an example, the unmanned air system (UAS) would have to fly 54% more flight hours to collect intelligence on areas in North Korea, the Middle East and Iran.

Nor is CPFH reflective of mission success rates between the two platforms. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection is in high demand, and aircraft downtime is extremely worrisome for combatant commanders. In the Pacific, 55% of Global Hawk’s missions were canceled in fiscal 2013; 96% of the U-2’s missions were achieved. The U-2 was also scheduled for nearly three times as many missions. Global Hawk lacks anti-icing equipment and is not able to operate in severe weather. An upgrade to remedy the shortcoming is being developed by the Navy for its Triton Global Hawk variant, but it would cost money and time to field.

The program source argues that CPFH is not an accurate metric on which to make a decision. He notes that Global Hawks based in Guam have to transit for hours just to reach North Korea, whereas the U-2, based at Osan air base, South Korea, has a shorter commute.

Additionally, the service originally opted to terminate the aircraft because of the lackluster performance by its Raytheon Enhanced Integrated Sensor Suite—the camera used to collect visual, infrared, and radar images. Global Hawk also flies at a lower altitude—typically close to 50,000 ft.—making it more susceptible to some weather and offering less-than-optimal ranges for peering into an enemy’s territory. The U-2, by contrast, operates above 60,000 ft., and has nearly twice as much onboard power at the ready for collecting radar images. Forthcoming fielding of the secret, stealthy RQ-180 UAS (also developed by Northrop Grumman) probably contributed to the Air Force’s view that the Global Hawk is excessive (AW&ST Dec, 9, 2013, p. 20).

The only reason to do this is to throw some bones to Northrop-Grumman, the manufacturer of the RQ-4, so that some general can score a lucrative executive or consultant gig after they retire.

Our military-industrial complex is  corrupting and destroying our ability to defend ourselves.

Unsustainable, Dangerous, and a Threat to the American Way of Life

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I am referring, of course to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, whose price is twice what we are being told:

The massive government and industry lobbying and PR efforts behind the troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are starting to pay off for JSF-maker Lockheed Martin and the military users of the radar-evading jet.

In recent weeks several news outlets have repeated the pro-JSF camp’s assertion that the F-35—planned to be the main warplane for the Air Force and Marines and half the Navy’s future fighter fleet—will soon cost just $85 million a copy or less in near-future dollars, thanks to an increasingly efficient production line.

The “good news” helps bolster the $400-billion weapons program, the most expensive ever.

But it’s not true. Not by a long shot. The much-maligned, single-engine F-35—which suffers from a complex design and a lack of maneuverability—currently costs twice what its proponents are projecting. And don’t buy the argument that the jet’s sticker price will substantially drop in coming years. Lockheed’s been making that claim for a long time now, and it hasn’t happened yet.

………

To put the F-35-boosters’ claims in context, Winslow Wheeler, an analyst at the Project on Government Oversight in Washington, D.C., has calculated the true current cost of an F-35. It’s way more than anyone in official circles likes to admit.

Sticker shock

Forget the $85-million or $60-million figure being bandied about in the press. Each of the 29 F-35s the Pentagon is purchasing from Lockheed in 2014 costs between $182 million and $299 million. And that’s leaving out research and development spending since the late 1990s, which could soon exceed $50 billion and add $16 million to true long-term acquisition cost of each F-35.

No, Wheeler calculated only the per-plane production cost, which includes advance funding for long-lead parts, the main funding in the year of authorization plus modification funds to fix design flaws on the planes shortly after they roll out of the factory.

By that measure, one Air Force F-35A—the simplest of the three JSF models—currently costs $182 million. A vertical-landing Marine F-35B sets taxpayers back $252 million. The Navy’s carrier-compatible F-35C, still mired in serious development problems, comes in at a whopping $299 million per plane.

Bear in mind that in 2010, Lockheed predicted an F-35 would soon cost just $60 million. “Actual F-35 unit costs are today multiples of what Lockheed says they will be,” Wheeler points out.

This is insane.

We are living the Arthur C. Clarke story Superiority, (story here, read it, it is a hoot) which depicts a war lost by a superior power because of its superior scientific achievements, and its continual grasping for a technological leap forward.

It’s Nice to Know that Someone Has a More F%$#ed Up Defense Procurement Process than the United States Does

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I am referring, of course, to the Republic of India, which has a long history of incompetent weapons development programs (Arjun tank, Kaveri engine, etc.) and corrupt foreign purchases.

We have one of the latter right now, with the India Ministry of Defense cancelling a helicopter purchase in response to a bribery scandal:

India has reacted to the scandal surrounding its purchase of 12 VVIP-roled AgustaWestland AW101 helicopters with the apparent cancellation of the €556 million ($776 million) deal.

In a statement posted late on 1 January on the Indian ministry of defence website, it says it has “terminated with immediate effect the agreement that was signed with AgustaWestland on 8 February 2010 for the supply of 12 VVIP/VIP helicopters on grounds of breach of the pre-contract integrity pact”.

Although the Anglo-Italian manufacturer had been pressing for arbitration talks to resolve the stalled deal, New Delhi has seemingly rejected this.

“Based on the opinion received earlier from the attorney general of India, it has been the view of the government that integrity-related issues are not subject to arbitration,” it says.

Nonetheless, there appears to be some ambiguity about its position until the country’s attorney general offers a fresh opinion. “However, [AgustaWestland] has since pressed for arbitration and appointed an arbitrator from its side. In view of this [the ministry of defence] sought afresh the opinion of the attorney general. With a view to safeguard the interests of the Government, [it has] nominated Mr Justice BP Jeevan Reddy as its arbitrator.”

………

A total of €51 million is alleged to have been paid as kickbacks by AgustaWestland to secure the order, an accusation strenuously denied by the company.

I have no clue why much smaller nations, like Israel and Sweden, manage to create sophisticated and effective weapons systems.

Boeing And Saab Join Up for T-38 Replacement

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Unlike the competition, (shown) it appears that Saab/Boeing appears to be going with a clean sheet design:

Boeing and Saab have signed an agreement to jointly develop and build an all-new aircraft for the U.S. Air Force’s T-X trainer competition, aimed at a replacement for the service’s 540-plus T-38 trainers. Boeing will be the prime contractor, but both companies will invest in the new aircraft, which will compete with three candidates based on non-U.S. off-the-shelf aircraft: the BAE Systems Hawk, offered by partner Northrop Grumman; the Alenia M-346, with General Dynamics as the prime; and the Korean Aerospace Industries T-50, proposed by development partner Lockheed Martin.

 Although Boeing and Saab are giving no details of the design—which in any case is described as flexible, depending on an Air Force requirement that has yet to firm up—it will not be based on Saab’s Gripen, beyond incorporating “some Gripen DNA,” an industry source says. This shows that the two companies expect to offer a smaller and cheaper aircraft than the Gripen-sized T-50.

 On the other hand, Saab’s expertise is in high-performance aircraft, pointing toward a fast and agile trainer that can produce pilots ready to handle complex fighters with no two-seat versions, like the F-22, F-35 and (so far) the JAS 39E.

 Discussions between Saab and Boeing were reported in September but have been underway for “much longer,” a Saab source says. Saab’s demonstrated capability in designing aircraft for flexible, affordable production is the key to the agreement, says an industry source. At the Paris air show in June, Saab President/CEO Hakan Bushke said the company had reduced production costs on the Gripen C/D even while slowing annual production to 8-12 units from 28, and that the larger JAS 39E would be cheaper still. “Bushke has made no secret of the fact that Saab is highly profitable at such rates,” says a Saab official.

The fact that the expertise that the Swedes bring to the table is the ability to deliver on time and on budget is yet another case of the the almost 400 year fallout from the sinking of the Vasa.

While Saab is adamant that the trainer will not be a Gripen E derivative, I’ve always thought that if you took the base Gripen, pulled the afterburner off of the F-404 (Volvo RM-12), and pulled out the radar, and removed some hard-points, they could have a decent trainer, though the direct operating cost would almost certainly be more than the that of the Hawk, which has about ½ the installed thrust of the Gripen.

Looking the competitors, with installed thrust varying by almost a factor 3, one can not help but think that the requirements of the program are not clear to the bidders.

Rand Corp. Study Finds that Joint Aircraft Costs More than Service Specific Aircraft

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Comparing Apples to Apples

Considering the history of multi-service fighter programs, the F-111 comes to mind, but there is also the JPATS, JSTARS and the Osprey tilt-rotor, it should surprise no one that Rand Corp’s analysis of the such programs shows that there are no savings. In fact, it shows that developing aircraft variants separately is less expensively than a common aircraft with service-specific variants.

The theoretical savings are a mirage:

A Rand Corp. report produced to guide future U.S. Air Force program plans has concluded that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program will cost more than three single-service programs would have done. That conclusion drew a sharp riposte from Lockheed Martin, which accused the report’s authors of using “outdated data” that overstated the F-35’s projected operating costs by a factor of two.

 Lockheed Martin based its criticism on numbers that cannot be found in the report. The company declined to give a source for those numbers, stating that they were “government data.” The Joint Strike Fighter program office distanced itself from the argument, saying it had “no real issues” with the report, and did not confirm any of the company’s figures.

 Rand’s Project Air Force team produced the report, which was requested in 2012 by then-commander of Air Force Materiel Command Gen. Donald Hoffman, as it became clear the JSF would be running many years behind the schedule that was planned up to 2010.

The study was based on historic data up to November 2011, including the fiscal year 2010 selected acquisition report (SAR). Rand, a think tank founded by the Air Force and still closely associated with the service, did not use the fiscal year 2011 SAR (issued in March 2012) which disclosed a three-year slip in development and actually reported higher cost projections than the 2010 report.

Because the JSF program is incomplete, and because no other joint fighter program has been completed as planned, the researchers used data from a variety of programs—from the F/A-18E/F and F-22 fighters to the T-6A turboprop trainer and E-8C surveillance platform—to gauge the historical cost increases in joint and single-service programs.

They did not focus on absolute costs, but on the percentage growth of estimated costs between the launch of a full-scale development program (Milestone B; MS B) and points five and nine years after MS B, the latter corresponding to the most recent JSF data available in late 2011.

………

Researchers compared the actual growth of F-35 estimates at the nine-year mark with growth rates for three separate programs based on historic growth with the F-22, the most comparable single-service fighter program. The same adjustments were applied to O&S costs, although a later and higher estimate of F-22 operational costs (at 14 years after MS B) was also included.

The study’s conclusion: The JSF estimated life-cycle cost (LCC) in 2010 was already higher than that of three single-service programs. “Under none of the plausible conditions that we analyzed did JSF have a lower LCC than the notional single-service programs.” The report does not recommend any changes to the JSF program, but advises the Air Force to avoid joint projects in future.

Of course, this does not answer why this is so.

One could argue that it is typically ambitious of joint programs, since the military’s goal of getting more bang for the buck is almost always more bang, not less buck, but if that were the case, the JPATS, the T-6 Texan II, where an extant turboprop trainer was adapted to a tri-service primary trainer would not have had a greater cost growth than the T-45 Goshawk, a naval advanced trainer, where an advanced jet was fully navalized to to land on carriers, but it did have a greater percentage cost growth.

When you further add the specifics of the JSF, specifically the Marine Corps requirement for STOVL, which f%$#s up the other variants in some very profound ways.