Category: Defense Procurement

I Think That the Fat Lady Is Tuning Up In the Green Room

The rats are leaving the sinking ship that is Syria, case in point Hamas is beginning to remove its staff from Syria, despite the fact that their patron, Iran is threatening to cut them off if they do so:

Iran had applied intense pressure to Hamas in an effort to persuade it not to leave Damascus, threatening even to cut off funds to the organization if it did so, Palestinian sources have told Haaretz.

The Iranian pressure also included an unprecedented ultimatum – namely, an explicit threat to stop supplying Hamas with arms and suspend the training of its military activists.

According to the sources, Hamas is abandoning its headquarters in Syria and looking at other Arab states as an alternative location for its political command center. Hamas’ move comes despite intense Iranian pressure on the organization to refrain from relocating.

A Syrian opposition spokesman said recently that once Assad is toppled, his successors will have no intention of preserving the strategic alliance between Damascus, Tehran and Hezbollah.

According to the Palestinian sources, only “second and third-ranking” Hamas activists are leaving Damascus, while senior members of the organization’s political wing, headed by Khaled Meshal, are remaining in the Syrian capital.

I really don’t think that there are a whole bunch of Arab nations out there that are chomping at the bit to paint a target on their back to ally themselves with Hamas, particularly since they are joined at the hip with Syria.

The fact that Hamas is getting the hell out of dodge indicates that the longevity of the Assad regime is problematic.

Expect Cost Escalations and Delays For the Joint Strike Fighter Engine

Because GE and Rolls Royce have pulled the plug on their joint F136 engine venture:

After 15 years of ups and downs, General Electric and Rolls-Royce have accepted defeat in their battle to power the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and will today announce the end of the F136 program and the Fighter Engine Team partnership.

By deciding to discontinue self-funding the F136 alternate engine they are also parting ways at an interesting time for the propulsion world. Rolls’s recent, and unexpected, rapprochement with Pratt & Whitney over commercial engines could, for instance, signal the start of new strategic links in the military engine world now that the long-lived experiment with GE is over.

………

The move to kill the F136 comes after an Oct 31 meeting between GE Aviation leadership and Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Ashton Carter in which “it became clear that the DoD would not support the FET self-funding effort,” says GE.

So basically, the Pentagon left a horse’s head in their bed.

I expect that all the good news from Pratt & Whitney over the past few months, about them making noise about being ahead of schedule and budget, to end abruptly.

Without a competitor engine, we  are now going to see all the stuff that was swept under the carpet for the F135 percolating back up, and the tax payer will be on the hook for it.

Gripen Scores Another Win

The Swiss Military has decided to purchase the Gripen for its air force:

Switzerland has chosen to replace its fighter jet fleet with Swedish defence and aerospace group Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen, Swiss newspaper Tagesanzeiger reported on Wednesday, citing unnamed sources close to the government.

Neutral Switzerland has wrangled for the past three years over whether to replace its ageing Northrop F-5E/F Tiger fighters, purchased in 1976 and 1981, with up to 33 new aircraft.

Saab shares were up 8.5 percent to 117.10 Swedish crowns by 1345 GMT after the newspaper report.

The newspaper said the cost of purchasing 22 jets would be about 3 billion Swiss francs ($3.3 billion), 1 billion less than the same number of rival models would cost.

I would also add that the Gripen is about ½ the weight and ½ direct operating costs.

When juxtaposed with the exemplary short and austere field performance, and the generally short distances involved, it’s the best choice for the Swiss.

Well, it’s the best choice except for not getting anything. After all, who’s going to attack them, the French, the Italians, the Germans? I don’t think so.

Stephen Trimble confirms this. Both SAAB and the Swiss government have confirmed the deal.

Yeah, This is a Vote of Confidence in the JSF

The US Marines have decided to buy Harriers from the UK to extend the life of their fleet:

Britain has agreed to sell all of its 74 decommissioned Harrier jump jets, along with engines and spare parts, to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps – a move expected to help the Marines operate Harriers into the mid-2020s and provide extra planes to replace aging two-seat F-18D Hornet strike fighters.

Rear Adm. Mark Heinrich, chief of the U.S. Navy’s Supply Corps, confirmed the two-part deal Nov. 10 during a conference in New York sponsored by Bank of America Merrill Lynch in association with Defense News.

Heinrich negotiated the $50 million purchase of all Harrier spare parts, while Rear Adm. Donald Gaddis, the U.S. Navy’s program executive officer for tactical aircraft, is overseeing discussions to buy the Harrier aircraft and their Rolls-Royce engines, Heinrich said.

The US Marine Corps does not seem to be completely sanguine about Lockheed-Martin meeting schedule, even the new schedule which slides IOC another 2 years to the right.

It Sucks to be Dassault Right Now

It looks like United Arab Emirates has reopened its fighter competition, meaning that the “done deal” to be the first export customer for the Rafale is now in doubt:

France’s long-running campaign to sell up to 60 Dassault Rafales to the United Arab Emirates faces a shock last-minute challenge, with the Eurofighter consortium having been asked to submit a proposal based on its Typhoon combat aircraft.

News of the development broke on the eve of the Dubai air show, where both types are scheduled to take part in the daily flying display.

Sources have confirmed that the UK provided a formal briefing about the Typhoon to UAE officials on 17 October, after being asked to explore how it might meet future fast jet requirements.

The same thing happened with Morocco, when what appeared to be a done deal fell through.

The Wiki says that the F/A-18 is still in the mix, but I think that it would be a long shot, since the primary driver for going with the Rafale in the first place was to have part of their inventory be non-US built.

Stephen Trimble seems to think that this might be an effort to make Dassault more flexible on price:

Riad Kahwaji, chief executive officer of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA), told The DEW Line that latest manoeuvres are a clear signal: the UAE air force thinks France’s price for the Rafale is too high. Major fighter deals are never immune from politics, but this deal is purely political. The UAE is buying the Rafale to balance its reliance on US-made weapons, including its fleet of 80 Lockheed F-16 Block 60s. Perhaps thinking the UAE has no other options, Dassault may have submitted a monopolistic price, Kahwaji said.

Even after negotiating exclusively with France for more than three years, the UAE has just re-opened the competition. The DEW Line’s colleague, Craig Hoyle, broke the story on Flightglobal yesterday that the UAE issued a request for proposals to the Typhoon, setting up a second competition between the same pair of fighters vying for India’s medium multi-role aircraft (MMRCA).

I’d love to have the antacid concession to Dassault’s corporate offices right now.

How the Marine Corps F%$#ed the JSF

The inestimable Bill Sweetman notes that many of the problems with the F-35 stem directly from the decision to make the Marine Corps, and their STOVL requirement, a part of the program.

The F-135 engine (43,000 lbs thrust) weights 6,500 pounds.  The F-414 (22,000 lbs thrust) weighs 2,445 lbs, so this means that the F135 weighs about 1500 pounds more than the about the same amount of thrust installed for the F414.

The engine is also about $5 million dollars more than two F414s.

Of cours, you couldn’t use 2 F414s for an STOVL aircraft, because the lose of just one engine still results in an aircraft loss, so it’s actually less safe than a single engine variant.

You also had the costs and delays associated with the weight reduction programs, which were driven by the needs of the STOVL B model of the JSF.

I think that it was clear from the start that having commonality with between CTOL and STOVL aircraft would result in additional costs, and reduced performance for the CTOL variants, and that incorporating the capabilities of the CTOL variants would increase the cost and weight of the VTOL variant.

So from an engineering perspective, this is a lose, but for the US Marine Corps, from a political perspective, it was a win.

The Marines knew, even with a (now canceled) British order for for a STOVL aircraft, if they were the sole service procuring this, that it would be much easier to cancel.

The F-35 as a joint Navy-Air Force program was too big to fail, a Marine-only aircraft wouldn’t be, so the Marines made it their program too, which had the (political only) advantage of making the JSF program even bigger and higher to kill.

The JSF is a real microcosm of everything that is wrong with the current US procurement/development process.

How Can You Tell That the Pentagon is Desparate About the JSF

Because they are demanding that Lockheed Martin, rather than the tax payers, will have to cover at least some of the costs: (Paid sucscription required)

Prolonged delays in development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter are coming home to roost for Lockheed Martin, as the Defense Department moves to force the manufacturer to bear the cost of any changes to production aircraft that could result from the thousands of hours of flight testing that still lie ahead.

Even as development has fallen behind schedule, Lockheed has continued to produce aircraft and the resulting overlap, or concurrency, has driven up the cost of the initial batches of F-35s, forcing the cutback on procurement to cover the overruns.

Crying foul 10 years after his company signed the F-35 development contract, CEO Bob Stevens revealed last month that the government has failed to reimburse Lockheed Martin for up to $1.2 billion in costs associated with low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 5. And those bills may not be paid until the company agrees to negotiate what Stevens says is an “unprecedented” contract provision, called a concurrency clause, for the next production lot of aircraft.

Such a clause would place the burden of financial liability on the contractor team for design changes to the LRIP 5 jets that result from discoveries made during the ongoing flight-test program. Stevens declined to outline how much liability the government is intending to place on the contractors.

…………

But while progress is being made, an October memo signed by the Pentagon’s chief tester has added to cost anxieties, indicating it could require an additional 10 months to begin F-35 pilot training, which was expected to start in the fall. It is now more likely to begin next spring, at the earliest. Further delays in pilot training could increase costs for customers who will be required to operate older fleets for a longer time until F-35s can be accepted into service. The memo adds to concerns that testing on the aircraft is too immature to proceed with pilot training and operational use.

(emphasis mine)

The problem is that the Pentagon wants the contractor to cover the costs of the post production modifications required for the early-build airframes as a result of delays in the test program.

This is an indication of desperation on the part of the Pentagon, because this jeopardizes the general’s lucrative post-retirement employment with the defense contractors.

This means that the program is in enough jeopardy that DoD feels the need to get tough with their future employers, which is kicking out a leg of the Iron Triangle.

I’m beginning to think that we won’t procure any more of these than we did the F-22.

Here’s a Surprise…

It turns out that the US Marines are manufacturing statistics to falsely represent the safety of the V-22 Osprey:

It’s an aircraft with a reputation for falling from the sky. But on at least one occasion, the U.S. military’s controversial V-22 Osprey tiltrotor — a hybrid transport that takes off like a helicopter and cruises like an airplane, thanks to its rotating engine nacelles — did just the opposite. It flew upward, out of control of its pilots.

On March 27, 2006, at a Marine Corps air base in New River, North Carolina, an MV-22 assigned to Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 experienced an unplanned surge in engine power as the three-man crew was preparing for a flight. “That caused the aircraft to inadvertently lift off the deck approximately 30 feet,” Marine spokesman Maj. Shawn Haney explained. “It came back down … there was major damage sustained to the right wing and the right engine.”

………

Yet the Marines and the Naval Safety Center ultimately decided that the Osprey’s dangerous joyride didn’t count as a serious flying accident, known in Pentagon parlance as a “Class A flight mishap.” The reason, said Capt. Brian Block, a Marine spokesman: The aircraft wasn’t supposed to take off just then; therefore, it’s not a flight problem. If a V-22 suffers damage while preparing to launch or after landing, or if the crew does not explicitly command the aircraft to take off but it does anyways, then the accident doesn’t count as a flight accident.

“No intent for flight existed,” he told Danger Room. “As such, it is not included in calculating the Class A flight mishap rate.”

It’s not the only seemingly serious accident that the Marines neglected to include in its tally of flight mishaps for the Osprey. A review of press reports, analysts’ studies and military records turns up 10 or more potentially serious mishaps in the last decade of V-22 testing and operations. At least three — and quite possibly more — could be considered Class A flight mishaps, if not for pending investigations, the “intent for flight” loophole and possible under-reporting of repair costs.

………

The Marines boast that the Osprey is the “safest tactical rotorcraft within the U.S. Marine Corps” over the last decade, in the words of Lt. Col. Jason Holden, the V-22 plans officer at Marine Corps headquarters in Virginia. By the official reckoning of the Marine Corps and the Naval Safety Center, the V-22 has a Class A flight mishap rate of 1.28 per 100,000 flight hours over the last 10 years, compared to a Class A flight mishap rate of 2.6 per 100,000 flight hours for all Marine aircraft over the same period.

But the Marines have given all sorts of reasons not to trust that official rate.

The Marines are so vested in the success of the V-22, that they cannot be trusted to manage the program.

The fact that the Marine Corps feels compelled to go to these lengths is an indication that the Osprey is not performing as promised.

This is the Real Goal of the JSF Program

Norway is saying that it will not commit to buying F-35s unless it gets a formal commitment to integrate Kongsberg joint strike missile (JSM):

Norway’s Kongsberg has warned that the country needs a commitment from the US government within six months to integrate a national-specific missile on the Lockheed Martin F-35, or it could withdraw from the programme.

So far, Norway has received no assurance that the Kongsberg joint strike missile (JSM) will be integrated as part of the Block 4 software update on the F-35 in 2019.

The absence of such a commitment could prompt the Norwegian parliament to reject an expected request early next year from the nation’s defence ministry to buy the first four F-35s, in order to launch training activities in 2016.

“That is what I think is the critical issue [for the parliament’s decision]”, said Bjorne Bjune, Kongsberg vice president of business development, speaking at the Air Force Association’s annual convention in Washington DC on 20 September. “That decision needs to be forthcoming.”

Integrating the JSM as the Norwegian F-35’s primary surface-to-air missile system killer is considered an absolute requirement by Oslo, Bjune said. Norway has already invested $1 billion to adapt the naval strike missile into the air-launched JSM, and is planning to spend a further $200 million.

One of the unspoken goals of the JSF program, from the American perspective, is to kneecap the development of systems related to the JSF, either by not allowing integration of foreign systems into the aircraft’s (very) closed architecture, or by making it prohibitively expensive.

The problems that are occurring now, when Lockheed and the Pentagon are trying to convince allies to purchase the aircraft, are nothing compared to what we will see once the planes start to enter other inventories.

Simply put, once your country commits to purchasing the JSF, you will find nothing but delays, stonewalling, and excessive costs if you want to integrate, or update, an indigenous system into your fleet.

Well, At Least It’s Not My Employer

Lockheed had to locked down its network after it was massively hacked:

By all accounts, Lockheed Martin’s swift detection of the attack helped avert potential disaster. “The good news here is that the contractor was able to detect an intrusion then did the right things to deal with it,” Cringely said. “A breach like this is very subtle and not easy to spot.” Furthermore, he said, the same day that Lockheed Martin detected the attack, all remote access for employees was disabled, and the company told all telecommuters to work from company offices for at least a week. Then on Wednesday, the company informed all remote workers that they’d receive new RSA SecurID tokens and told all 133,000 employees to reset their network passwords.

In a statement released Sunday, EMC said it was “premature to speculate” on the details of the attack. But if attackers did use information stolen from RSA to hack into the SecurID system used by Lockheed Martin, then EMC could be forced to finally reveal, publicly, any risks that the use of its system might now pose to the 40 million users of SecurID hardware token customers and 250 million users of its SecurID software.

I’m a contractor, so even if my employer were hacked in this manner, it would not effect me, since that don’t give mercenaries like me remote access to their networks.

Of course, they should have locked down their system months ago, when RSA, the company that supplies the keys for their VPN systems, and a lot of other companies out there, was hacked.

If You Want a Good Primer on the F-35’s Electrical Power Systems…

And the problems therein, go read Bill Sweetman’s latest on the latest problem with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Basically, it comes down to using bleeding edge technology, which, when juxtaposed with frantic weight reduction efforts, creates an absolute mess, just as it has with the failed bulkhead, the 360 degree vision system helmet and HUDless cockpit, etc.:

Another observation — relevant to future programs — is that the electrical problems (both this one and the AA-1 incident) have arisen from the use of a new system which, while it may have net advantages, is not core to the aircraft’s capability — you could in theory build a short-takeoff-and-landing stealth fighter without it.

The same goes for another headache area, the wide-field-of-view video helmet and HUD-less cockpit. The lesson may be that any innovations that fall into the nice-to-have rather than mission-essential capability should be low-risk when you incorporate them into the design.

In the larger picture, this is actually the alpha and omega of weapons development.

Too much whiz-bang for too much bucks.

India Shortlists Rafale and Typhoon for MMRCA Shortlist

Well, I was wrong in my guess that MiG would win this.

But India has narrowed the bid to the French and the British:

The United States lost a hard-fought competition to supply a new generation of fighter jets to India, which has listed two European manufacturers as the finalists for an order estimated to be worth $10 billion.

The decision was a blow for President Obama, who had pushed hard for this and other defense deals during his visit to India in November as part of his agenda to deepen and broaden the United States’ relationship with India. The American ambassador to India, Timothy J. Roemer, who separately announced on Thursday that he would resign from his post for personal reasons, said the United States was “deeply disappointed by this news.”

While political and economic relations between India and the United States have been warming for years, American arms makers have struggled to win big contracts here. After decades of frosty relations during the cold war, which pushed India to rely extensively on the Soviet Union for military hardware, many in the Indian defense establishment are still wary of American intentions and United States military aid to Pakistan, India’s main adversary.

The American bid to build the fighters came from Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Boeing had offered its F/A -18 jets, and Lockheed Martin pitched its F-16 planes. But India instead narrowed the list to the Rafale fighter from Dassault and the Eurofighter Typhoon jet made by a consortium of European companies. Russian and Swedish bids were also turned down.

I’m not sure what the calculus here.

These aircraft are clearly more capable in terms of payload and range than the Rafale (which is the light weight of the bunch) and the F-16, and faster than the F-18 (so is just about everything flying with an afterburner), and likely more reliable than the MiG.

My handicapping of the race? I think that Dassault is desperate for an export sale, and so will be willing to take a hit up front, and when this is juxtaposed with the fact that the IAF already has experience operating the Mirage 2000, I would give it a slight edge.

Trophy Active Protection System Has First Successful Combat Engagement


Here is some Video Pr0n from Rafael

Rafael’s active protection system, Trophy, received its baptism of fire along the Gaza border, when it intercepted an RPG fired by Palestinian militants:

According to IDF sources, the Merkava tank was patrolling the border with Gaza, when a missile launch was detected by the tank’s radar system. The Elta System’s EL/M 2133 ‘WindGuard’ sensors classified the threat as ‘severe’, alerted the crew and tracked the missile closing-in on the tank. As the RPG entered the system’s kill-zone, Trophy fired at the missile, destroying it at a safe distance from the tank.

The “on patrol” bit appears to indicate that the tank was on the move when Trophy intercepted the RPG, which is particularly significant, since one of the tougher nuts to crack for such systems is the ability to work when the target is in motion.

I’m not clear on its ability to counter long rod penetrators, or EFPs, both of which through a slug at something in excess Mach 2, as opposed to the subsonic speeds of typical ATGWs and RPGs.

My only question is what excuse the US military, which is looking to smaller, lighter, and more mobile, forces will use not to buy the system.

They will come up with a justification, but the real reason is that retired generals don’t get lucrative consulting gigs at Rafael, and they do from Raytheon.

On the Boeing Win

It will be called the KC-46A, and it appears that it was all about the relative size of the two aircraft:

A congressional source said Boeing was the “clear winner.” Lynn repeated the mantra and told reporters during the press briefing “that I think what we can tell you is Boeing was the clear winner” when asked how close was the competition.

The difference between the two bids may have come down the difference in fuel consumption, speculated Loren Thompson, defense consultant and analyst at the Lexington Institute. “The Airbus plane burns over one ton more of fuel per flight hour than the Boeing plane. Multiply that by 40 years and that’s a lot of money,” Thompson said. Boeing has argued for some time that its fuel consumption rate would save taxpayers “tens of billions” of dollars over the life of the program.

The first part is true, the 767 consumes less fuel per flight hour, but, and this is the reason that no one is buying it commercially any more, it costs more per pound of payload, or, one would assume, pound of fuel offloaded to tankers.

The Pentagon is saying that they are expecting a challenge, though I think that this less likely from EADS than it is from Boeing.

As to why Boeing won, I think that it comes down to the following:

  • If the primary criteria is lifetime cost per aircraft sortee, i.e. a simple price shootout, then the smaller 767 wins.
  • Boeing has a lot more Congressional support than EADS does, because they have been cultivating Congress for decades.
  • EADS’s position is such that it less likely to make a formal challenge to the award, I figure about 30% for EADS, as versus 90% for Boeing, because they do not have the existing relationships with the Congress and the DoD, and so are more concerned about creating enemies.

In the greater scheme of things, if this was just a price shootout, that might be a good thing, if further competitions, on systems that are more exclusively military in development, it might be a good thing.

In any case, you can read Boeing’s press release here.

Boeing Wins Tanker Contract

Just heard, and I’ll try to tease out more detail for the weekend.

I’m kind of surprised, the Airbus A330 is a better plane, that’s why the 767 is at the end of life, but the A330 is still selling,  but then again, I was kind of surprised when EADS won in the first competition, because of the dynamics of a foreign firm winning such a high stakes competition.

If Boeing had lost, I would have said that a challenge was a dead nuts certainty, but EADS is I think rather less likely to do so, if just because the potential blow-back is bigger.

Development Costs of F135 Rise, Marginal Unit Cost Falls

The Pentagon and Pratt & Whitney have negotiated a cost reduction for the next 37 engines that they deliver, but the non-recurring R&D Costs go up:

Pratt & Whitney has reached an informal agreement with government officials to slash 16% off the total price of the next batch of 37 engines to be ordered for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

At the same time, the company acknowledges the cost of the overall F135 engine development programme will grow by about $1 billion to support a three-year extension of flight tests and to improve the engine’s performance and durability.

If you assume $15 million per engine, it means that this cost, assuming that this continues across the production run (it won’t, particularly with the GE/Rolls F136 out of the picture) would end up saving money after the delivery of about 450 engines.

This is taking money out of one pot, and add it to another in the best case, and more likely it’s a stealth price increase.

I Predicted This 12 Years Ago

The Pentagon has killed the MEADS surface to air missile system:

The Pentagon announced today it would kill MEADS, an anti-missile program once declared the highest priority weapon system for the United States and its allies to build together.

The Army has tried several times before to kill the program, which uses the Patriot interceptor, but has always been overruled before by the Office of Secretary of Defense. Germany and Italy have made major political and industrial commitments in pursuit of MEADS and they will doubtless let America know just what they think of this decision.

I did some very preliminary work on MEADS about 12 years ago. Essentially, because, unlike the PAC-3, it did not exactly need to have 4 missiles to fit in a 4-pack that had the same form, fit, and function as the larger Patriot PAC-2, which allowed for some logistical enhancements.

At the time, I said that the program was doomed, because it was a multinational program, and, like the Roland SAM, it would be dropped by the US military, because the opportunities for cushy consulting gigs for retired generals would be too small.

I was right, and I am not alone in my jaundiced assesment of the decision:

To get expert perspective on MEADS’ demise, we contacted Frank Cevasco, one of the top international defense consultants and someone who has closely followed MEADS for more than a decade. While a senior Pentagon official he and colleagues at OSD pushed the Army to create a program office to manage a future extended air defense program, which eventually became MEADS. He said he does not represent any of the companies involved in the program.

Cevasco said at least part of the cost overrun can be attributed to a plan to replace Patriot with MEADS on a one-for-one basis. “I was told that doesn’t make sense as a MEADS fire unit has substantially greater geographic coverage than Patriot. I agree there would be additional costs associated with integrating MEADS with a separate Army command and control system, a requirement that was levied on the program unilaterally by Army about two years ago. Moreover, a portion of the cost overruns and schedule slippages can be attributed to the Army and DoD technology disclosure community who refused to allow the MEADS industry team to share key technology. The matter was resolved but only after intervention by senior OSD officials and the passage of considerable time; and, time is money with major weapons system development programs,” he said in an email.

Bottom line for Cevasco: “Army has done its best from the every beginning to sabotage the program, preferring to develop a US-only solution funded by the US (with funds provided by the good fairy).”

The military funds fairy is named either Obama or Gates, your choice.