Category: Defense Procurement

It’s Not Just the B Model F-35

Yes, the F-35B, the STOVL variant has been placed on probation, but the entire program is encountering difficulties.

Most recently it has been revealed that there are problems with the aerodynamics and propulsion for all the models:

Flight testing so far has revealed problems with handling in the transonic and medium angle-of-attack regimes, [reportedly problems with wing drop/sideslip akin to those discovered in flight test for the F/A-18 E/F] and a problem with screech – destructive high-frequency combustion instability in the F135 afterburner – which is preventing the aircraft from achieving maximum power. [Which produces shockwaves, think the “snapping” on a an improperly lit Bunsen burner, writ large]

You know, that alternate engine for the F-35 is starting to look a lot better, huh.

Additionally, there are very real continuing problems with software, with the advanced helmet mounted displays and the vaunted 360° sensor fusiuon for the pilot not working properly.

As to the B model, weight problems is literally a killer.

With conventional and carrier launched variants, weight gain cuts into performance, payload, and range, but with STOVL aircraft, it means that they are simply unable to perform their basic functions:

Gates said that solving the unspecified technical issues now afflicting the aircraft “could” add cost and weight; the program office says that it “will”, and that it will take two years to “engineer solutions … and assess their impact.”

………

Vertical landing is a nonvariable requirement. The required airspeed is zero and can’t be adjusted by a few knots to compensate for extra weight. The JSF key performance parameter for bring-back load – corresponding to two 1,000-pound JDAMs and two Amraams – was set early on at a minimal level.

One reason that Lockheed Martin’s shaft-driven lift fan (SDLF) concept was a winner in 1996 and 2001 was that it seemed to offer thrust margin for vertical landing. At the start of SDD, the F-35B was projected to have an empty weight of 29,700 pounds – not a bad place to be in with (then) almost 40,000 pounds of vertical thrust. But, in the weight crisis of 2004, engineers found that the jet had ballooned to a far higher figure (never actually published) at which it could not land vertically with normal fuel reserves, let alone weapons.

………

Still, the redesign left a fundamental problem: the bring-back load (around 3,000 pounds) was only 8 percent of the landing weight. The result is that the F-35B couldn’t tolerate any OEW growth or thrust shortfall. The engine and transmission are maxed: that’s the issue underlying the repeated delays in powered-lift testing, chronicled here and here.

This is a mess, and much of it is driven by unrealistic requirements for commonality, and placing too much emphasis on the STOVL version, which wastes weight on the A and C variants.

When I worked on the now FCS, it was clear to everyone working on the program that the commonality requirements made the systems more expensive and less combat effective, and the same thing is happening with the F-35.

U.S. Navy Splits the Baby on the LCS Contract

Both Lockheed-Martin’s conventional design and Austal’s Trimaran got contracts for 10 ships, at $538 million, without mission modules, which means not much in the way of meaningful sensors or weapons.

For a ship that weighs as much as a frigate, but is as lightly armed as a corvette, but has the advantage of being able to change tasks, by swapping out mission modules, going from anti-sub warfare, to anti-surface warfare, counter-min, ISR, etc. if it can find its way to suitably equipped port.

Yes, “It’s a dessert topping AND a floor wax!”

Yeah, the idea sounds really stupid to me too.

Saab Gripen and Eurofighter Typhoon Pitched to Canada

The idea that Canada would buy anything but a US aircraft, particularly with a significant long shot, but the fact that both companies are pitching their aircraft as an alternative to the F-35 JSF:

Representatives from the German-based Eurofighter Typhoon and Sweden’s Saab Gripen appeared at committee and told members their planes can meet Canada’s air force demands, and are far cheaper than the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter stealth jet the government agreed to buy in July.

Canada intends to buy 65 F-35s for $9 billion — plus maintenance costs — to replace the aging fleet of CF-18s, with delivery expected to start in 2016.

Antony Ogilvie with Saab said they could supply Canada with 65 upgraded Gripens, with 40 years of maintenance costs included, for under $6 billion.

I am unsure of the maintenance costs of the F-35, but it is safe to say that the life cycle costs for the F-35 are at least twice as much as the diminutive Swedish fighter.

If the Gripen ever reaches sales critical mass, it could be the F-5 of this era. It’s half the life cycle cost and size of its competitors while offering decent performance by the standards of the day.

Truth be told, it’s likely that the Eurofighter will probably be cheaper over its lifetime than the JSF as well, and while not offering the all aspect stealth (or stealthish if you listen to the critics) of the JSF, it does offer a known price and operating cost, a wider array of munitions, greater agility, supercruise, and higher ceiling, with the advantage of known operational and purchase price and a 2nd engines for safer operations over the largely uninhabited, and rather inhospitable, areas in northern Canada.

About Damn Time!


The Commercial, but the music is better than average

When I was working at BAE Systems on the FCS-RMV, one of the systems that we needed to place on our vehicle was the so-called “Active Protection System” (APS), Raytheon’s “Quick Kill, a hit-to-kill interceptor intended to neutralize RPGs, ATGWs, and long rod KE penetrators.

One of the problems with this system, at least as if fed down to us doing the design, was that it never worked properly, which was surprising, considering that the Israelis had a system, Trophy, which worked, and was far less expensive than the APS.

Of course, because of the need for generals to find lucrative consulting gigs in retirement, Trophy was fought tooth and nail by the army, with their refusing to test the system on Strykers in Iraq.

Well, what goes around comes around, and with Raytheon basically dead, the US army will finally try out the system on a Stryker:

Next month a Stryker combat vehicle will arrive in the US equipped for testing the Israeli’s Trophy active protection system. The Army has pursued active protection for years, most recently abandoning the Future Combat System’s active protection system developed by Raytheon. We understand at least one M-ATV will also get the radar– directed system. The M-ATV integration is more challenging, given the vehicle’s design.

Seriously, it’s been something like 6 years that the Pentagon has refused to test the system, instead holding out for a system that was never near ready because our defense procurement system is that broken.

Your Pentagon in Action

The US Navy’s newest amphibious warship, the San Antonio Class, has been deemed, “not survivable in combat,” in results from Pentagon testing:

Northrop Grumman Corp.’s $1.68 billion amphibious warship, designed to transport Marines close to shore, wouldn’t be effective in combat and couldn’t operate reliably after being hit by enemy fire, according to the Department of Defense’s top testing official.

……………

The San Antonio-class vessel’s critical systems, such as electrical distribution, ship-wide fiber optics and voice- communications networks, aren’t reliable, according to Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation. The ship’s armaments can’t effectively defend against the most modern anti-ship weapons, Gilmore said.

……………

“Survivability” for the San Antonio means the degree to which the vessel “is able to avoid or withstand” an attack “without sustaining an impairment” of its ability to accomplish a combat mission, he said.

His conclusion that the San Antonio is “not survivable” doesn’t mean, however, that the hull and structure can’t withstand a blow from an anti-ship missile due to inherent weaknesses, Gilmore said. In fact, the Northrop ship’s hull construction is “improved” in comparison with the four classes of ships it will replace, he said.

The inmates (Pentagon) are running the asylum.

The F-35 JSF Clusterf%$# Gets Even Clusterf%$#ier

Yes, everyone’s favorite too big to fail defense program fails once again, with reports that SecDef Robert Gates has been briefed that costs will further escalate, and there will be an additional 3 year delay:

Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Pentagon’s costliest program, may see more price increases and new schedule delays of as much as three years, two government officials familiar with the matter said.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates is scheduled to be briefed tomorrow on new cost and schedule assessments for the F-35 and other aircraft, said the officials, who requested anonymity because details aren’t public. Software, engineering and flight difficulties are greater than expected, the officials said.

……

Slippage in the JSF’s timetable may be as much as one year for the Air Force and Navy versions and two to three years for development of the Marine Corps model capable of short takeoffs and landings, the officials said.

It should be noted that these delays were forecast by the Pentagon’s Joint Estimating Team (JET) over two years ago, and much of the delays are software issues.

Even Lockheed’s CEO admits this, while asking for more money (big surprise).

What’s more, not only will it be delayed and not only will the acquisition costs rise, but direct operating costs are jumping as well:

Gates also was advised in a Nov. 2 briefing that operations and support costs for the F-35 will be re-budgeted at 1.5 times the aircraft it replaces, more than twice the original goal and 50% more than more recent projections, according to reports.

Eric Palmer runs some numbers and shows that there has been about a 3 year of push-back on the schedule over the past 3 years, so basically the program is running in place.

What a damn mess.

Not Gonna Happen……


The real reason for the UK independent deterrent

With the draconian British budget cuts, and the conversion of their carrier aviation from the STOVL F-35B to the CTOL F-35C, there is now talk of the British engaging in some form of joint carrier operations with the French:

London’s decision to fit catapults on its planned second aircraft carrier opened up the prospect of French Rafale strike fighters flying off a British flattop, with reciprocal rights for British aircraft off the French carrier, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin said Oct. 26 at the Euronaval trade show.

Morin asked the French military staff to assess whether the installation of catapults would allow French aircraft, such as the Rafale, to operate off the Royal Navy vessel, and the answer was: “Yes, it’s technically feasible,” he told journalists.

That opened up potential opportunities of interoperability and mutual interdependence between the British and French fleets, he said. With such cross-deck operations came the possibility of a “permanent presence at sea,” he said.

I just don’t see it happening.

While the French and British have on occasion used common aircraft, most notably the SEPECAT Jaguar, given the nearly thousand-year history of animus between the two nations (see “Yes Prime Minister” vid), I just cannot see them operating jointly in this manner.

The Military Side of the UK Budget Cuts

It’s pretty grim:

  • Scrapping the existing carriers.
  • Scrapping the Harrier fleet.
  • Replacing the 138 F-35B STOVL with somewhere around 50 of the F-35C carrier variant.
  • The two carriers will be built, but one will not be fitted with catapults or arrestor gear, and so will never carry airplanes.
  • Scrapping the nearly new Sentinel surveillance aircraft as soon as they are back from Afghanistan.
  • Reduce MoD civilian staffing by 25,000 and military staffing by 17,000.
  • Canceling the late and over budget Nimprod MRA4.
  • Delaying a new SSBN.
  • Significant cuts to the surface fleet.
  • Speeding up the return of troops based in Germany

From a pure perspective of governance, you have to give the Tories props: When they said they would cut the budget, they applied this to the Ministry of Defence as well, which is, at least consistent.

Realistically, these cuts mean that, outside of low intensity UN peacekeeping missions, the British will be incapable of engaging in an operation independently of the US, but that has been the political reality since Suez in 1957 anyway.

Here is Some Sanity in Defense Procurement

The successor to the over-ambitious Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicle (FCS-MGV)* the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) has now dropped many of the technologies intended for the FCS-MGV, because, even now, 2 years after the cancellation of the program, the programs are still insufficiently mature to be deployed on a combat system:

In an effort to make use of the billions of dollars it invested in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the U.S. Army may have required too many immature technologies in its first Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Request for Proposals, according to the Army’s vice chief.

“We wanted to look and ensure that we made use of the investment in FCS and that we had the ability to use those technologies,” Gen. Peter Chiarelli told reporters at a Sept. 22 lunch in Washington.

However, if you want a vehicle in seven years, “you can’t be reaching deep for technologies right now,” he said.

………

According to Chiarelli, FCS was canceled in a way so that the Army could still make use of the research and development work done under the program.

“We wanted to ensure that those technologies that we worked so hard to develop could be integrated in to a new ground combat vehicle,” he said.

However, “there were a lot of those technologies that aren’t at a technology readiness level today where we could integrate them in seven years.”

(emphasis mine)

It boggles the mind that the technologies, “aren’t at a technology readiness level,” when the original intent was to begin fielding the FCS in 2008.

So the technologies in question won’t be ready 9 years after they were supposed to be fielded.

Our defense procurement system is seriously broken.

*Full disclosure, I worked on the Future Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle, FRMV, “wrecker” variant of the FCS-MGV from 2003-2006 at United Defense (later BAE Systems after the Carlyle Group sold me to buy Dunkin Donuts).
Future Combat Systems-Manned Ground Vehicle. These are the ones that are the tanks and APCs. As opposed to the various unnmanned vehicles, networking technologies, etc. that form the full FCS along with the MGVs.
Yes, I have worked everywhere. Maybe I can’t hold down a job, but more likely this has been my role as “technical hit man”, where you are parachuted in to take care of a specific need.

A Depiction of the Levels of Hell?

Click for full size (640 KB)


Your tax dollars at work

Or maybe just a description of development, procurement, and life cycle support costs of a weapons system for the Pentagon ……… but I repeat myself.

The problem here is that each one of these steps represents a place where some private contractor can sit astride the process and extract a toll.

This why it takes 25 years and billions of dollars to develop the next fighter aircraft, when the P-80 was delivered just 180 days after the go ahead was given.

If this is what the past 50 years of developments in systems engineering have given us, perhaps, just maybe, there are some deep flaws in the underlying assumptions of that profession.

The source for the link is the Defense Acquisition University, and yes Virginia, there is a Defense Acquisition University, and they have a handy, dandy interactive flash version available on site.

Senate Appropriations Committee Pulls F136 Alternate Engine Funding

In addition to zeroing out the alternate engine, they also cut 10 production aircraft from the FY 2011 for failure of the program to execute per schedule.

This implies to me that neither cut could have gone through on its own, but together, both those who have concerns about the JSF, and those who don’t want the engine got enough of what they wanted to support each other.

Meanwhile GE/RR is ramping up efforts to reverse this decision, noting, among other things, that the budget numbers that the Pentagon is putting forward on the F136 engine are sketchy at best.

H/t ELP Defens(c)e Blog

Brazil to Delay Fighter Acquisition Decision

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will now make the decision after elections but before he leaves office:

President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will decide who gets Brazil’s multi-billion dollar contract to build jet fighters after the October elections but before he leaves office on Jan. 1, his defense minister said Sept. 7.

The finalists now battling it out in the final stages of the tender are France’s Rafale made by Dassault, Sweden’s Gripen NG by Saab, and the F/A-18 Super Hornet manufactured by U.S. giant Boeing.

Da Silva favors the Rafale, because he thinks that there are more opportunities for technical transfer and other cooperation with the French, while the military favors the Gripen, which will be the least expensive aircraft over its life time, having half the engines, and half the weight of the two competitors.

As to the F/A-18, tech transfer is rather iffy, but the unit price is likely the lowest, and it might help with cooperation with any US military operations in Latin America.

My guess is that he will choose the Rafale, he has already expressed a strong preference for the aircraft.

At this point, there is no intention to use it on Brazil’s aircraft carrier, but that possibility might push them towards either the Rafale-M or the F/A-18 E/F, both of which are carrier capable.

Swiss Freeze Fighter Purchase

I think that the Swiss decision to delay any decision on fighter purchases has a number of causes.

First, they realize that changes in banking regulation may cut seriously into their revenues, and second, I think that they may be able to get some lightly used fighters cheaply from bankrupt nations like Spain, who is on the hook for a significant numbers of Eurofighter Typhoon:

Switzerland on Wednesday postponed its search for new air force fighter jets for several years, just weeks before it was expected to announce a decision on the multibillion dollar tender.

Swiss Defence Minister Ueli Maurer said at a news conference that the postponement of the replacement of about half of the Swiss army’s ageing fleet of F-5 Tiger aircraft “will last at most until 2015”.

The tender launched in January 2008 led to a fierce battle between European aerospace group EADS’s Eurofighter, French firm Dassault’s Rafale and the Gripen built by Sweden’s Saab.

I think that this impacts Saab more than Dassault or Eurofighter, as they really need a foreign client for their Gripen NG.

Israeli MoD Approves JSF Buy

Israel’s Ministry of Defense has approved a purchase of 20 F-35 fighters, though the report of a price of “only” $96 million a copy, is clearly a blivit,* as evidenced by this report of that 20 JSFs will cost about $2.75 billion, which gives a price of $137.5 million each, which is closer, but probably still less than, the cost of the aircraft.

In any case, while the MoD has approved, there is significant resistance from the full cabinet, with Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz expressing significant concerns about Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s decision.

It’s clear that both Lockheed Martin and the DoD were desperate to get this sale, which explains why Israel Aerospace Industries got a contract to build 800 wingsets for the stealthy fighter, which comes close to Israel being paid to take the plane.

They want a stamp of approval from a country that is not already a partner in the F-35 consortium, and Israel gives them more market credibility than almost any other non NATO nation.

*10 pounds of sh%$ in a 5 pound bag.

The Gang That Can ‘t Shoot Straight: Semi-Stealthy Fighter Edition

Because of supply chain issues, and because the assembly line is being constantly raided to keep the test fleet flying, Lockheed Martin is having to partially dissemble the wing on the F-35 to install components out of sequence:

Lockheed Martin has pushed back the resolution of a manufacturing problem plaguing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter final assembly schedules, but key suppliers are making progress building components as the programme prepares for the next leap in production orders.

In October 2009 government audit reports showed that Lockheed expected to eliminate the “wing-at-mate overlap” problem for the F-35’s four-piece wing with final assembly of BF-13, the thirteenth short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) in production.

The overlap means that key parts are delivered after the wing has entered final assembly, requiring workers to partially disassemble the structure.

The Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA) identified the resulting delays and inefficiency in the wing manufacturing process as one of the key drivers for production delays ranging from four to six months during the first two years of low-rate initial production (LRIP).

Your tax dollars at work.

A Clusterf%$# Deferred

The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) competition has been canceled

The Army has canceled the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) solicitation because the service decided, after an internal and external review, that the current Requests for Proposal (RFP) do not accurately reflect Army requirements and a changing acquisition strategy, sources tell us.

A contract for the new vehicle was very close to being awarded, we’re told. A restart of the GCV competition is expected fairly soon, a new RFP may be out within 60 days, and the Army intends to stay within the original seven year timeline to field a new vehicle.

Unsurprising.

When you have a series of requirements that delivers you a proposal for an unwieldy and ruinously expensive 70 ton behemoth, about the same weight as an M-1 Tank, something is stunningly wrong.

Trying to Go B-1 With the F-22

Lockheed and the USAF have reached an agreement to preserve the F-22 production tooling for future use.

The claim is that this is about, “will be able to repair and modernise the service’s aircraft, or manufacture new Raptors.” (Emphasis mine)

Make no bones about this: This is not about SLEPPing the airframes or upgrades, they don’t need the tooling for this.

They are hoping for a President, SecDef, and Congress will at some point change policy, as Reagan did with the B-1, and this is the sort of insubordinate crap that really needs to be addressed.

In a perfect world, Obama would find out who is behind this, fire them, and take the tooling and sell it for scrap.

In this world, we’ll see the pigs at the trough every year or so for the next decade in an attempt to restart the program.

After Over a Decade of Starving Their Force to Make Room for F-22s and F-35s………

The USAF is looking at buying new build F-16s and F-15s to fill the gap:

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a new report today that for the first time reveals how US Air Force plans to deal with a fighter shortfall that is expected to reach 200 jets by 2025.

The GAO report summarizes two mandatory reports the USAF delivered in March to Congress. There are four options:

1. Extending the service life of and modernizing about 300 F-16 aircraft
2. Increasing annual F-35 procurement above 80 aircraft per year
3. Procuring new upgraded variants of legacy aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15
4. A combination of options 2 and 3

The fact that the USAF has even considered resuming F-16 and F-15 orders could be very significant. Two decades of USAF leaders have consistently upheld the all-stealth rule for combat aircraft.

Significant is an understatement.

The USAF has been doing its level best to create a fighter shortfall for the past 15 years or so in order to force a move to an all-stealth force.

The fact that the situation has gotten so dire that the USAF is considering buying some Eagles or Vipers is a big deal.

It indicates that the budget pictures on the F-35 are even grimmer than previously understood.

BAE close to launch contract for APKWS rocket

BAE is looking to get its 1st contract to deliver APKWS guided 2.75 inch rocket.

The advantage to a system like this is that something like a Hellfire is sometimes too big, and always too expensive for smaller jobs, like taking out a room, a car, or a mortar fire team, and a helicopter can carry a lot more of these than it can Hellfires.

Rather unsurprisingly, it’s the Marines who are looking to take a buy.

Honestly, I’m waiting for them to cancel this, and move the money to the JSF or Osprey, which would both penny and pound foolish.

Prior posts on the various programs to add guidance to 2.75 inch rockets.